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ABSTRACT
This work is an assessment of the administration of
Count Alejandro O'Reilly as governor of Louisiana from Au
gust, 1769, to March, 1770.

O'Reilly was a soldier of for

tune who rose to the rank of lieutenant general in the Span
ish army and was made Inspector General of Infantry in 1764.
He was chosen by Charles III to bring Spanish rule to Loui
siana after the 1768 insurrection of the French settlers in
New Orleans.

This uprising had resulted in the expulsion

of the first Spanish .governor, Antonio de Ulloa, who had
come to take possession of the colony after its' transfer
from France to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in No
vember, 1762.

Because of O'Reilly's execution of the main

leaders of the rebellion in New Orleans, much abuse was
heaped upon him by unsympathetic historians until well into
the twentieth century.
This study is introduced by a brief analysis of the his
toriography covering these events.

Next, there is an intro

ductory chapter dealing with the transfer of the colony
from France to Spain and Governor Ulloa's administration,
which ended in his expulsion in October, 1768.
The main body of the work covers Governor O'Reilly's
arrival in Louisiana, in August, 1769, the trial of the rebel
leaders, and the governor's administration of the colony.
Considerable space has been devoted to an analysis of the
iv
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trial proceedings, which are found in the Archives of the In
dies in Seville and in the National Historical Archives in
Madrid.

The reader can determine from these proceedings

whether or not the trial was conducted fairly by eighteenth
century Spanish standards.
The Indian policy adopted by O ’Reilly and continued by
his successors also comes under study.

In connection with

this, O'Reilly's plans for Louisiana's military posture
within the Spanish American Empire has been outlined.

The

weaknesses and strengths of these policies are shown in re
lation to the use made of them by the subsequent Spanish
governors of Louisiana.
This study also treats the social and commercial prob
lems under O'Reilly, and analyzes his fiscal and commercial
policies in the light of the subsequent history of Spanish
Louisiana.

The inadequacies of some of these policies are

noted.
O'Reilly's most important contribution to Louisiana was
the Code 0 'Reilly. This code was a synthesis of Spain's Laws
of the Indies. and was compiled under O'Reilly's direction
by two of his lawyers, Felix del Rey and Jose Manuel de Urrutia.

Although intended to be temporary, it served the colony

until Spain returned Louisiana to France in 1803.
The brief epilogue covers the highlights of O'Reilly's
career from his return to Spain in June, 1770, until his

vi

death in March, 1794.

He was Inspector General of Infantry

until 1783 and served as governor of Madrid, Andalusia, and
Cadiz, retiring from the last post in 1786.

The crown sum

moned him in 1794 to take command of the Army of the Pyrenees,
but he died en route at Murcia (Chincilla).

INTRODUCTION
On August 18, 1769, the French flag was lowered in the
Place d'Armes
leans.

(today Jackson Square) in the city of New Or

In its place was raised the banner of the Spanish

monarch Charles III.

Thus began the brief but important

administration of Lieutenant General Don Alejandro O'Reilly
as the second Spanish governor of Louisiana.
O'Reilly had been sent by Charles III to restore Span
ish authority in the newly acquired colony of Louisiana.
Developments in that colony after the arrival of Don Anto
nio de Ulloa, Spain's first governor of Louisiana, had led
to an insurrection in October, 176 8, and to Ulloa's subse
quent expulsion.

When O'Reilly came to Louisiana in 1769

to establish Spanish rule, he had the leaders of the rebel
lion tried and six of them were condemned to death.
In spite of the attempt of a number of historians in
recent times to exonerate O'Reilly for his treatment of
the insurrectionists, one still hears him popularly re
ferred to as "Bloody O'Reilly."

In order to put the Span

ish governor's actions in proper perspective, it would be
appropriate to examine critically the attitudes of leading
historians of Louisiana from the beginning of the nine
teenth century to the present.

These illustrate a variety

of views and interpretations: some indicate judgments based
on obvious prejudice or lack of knowledge of sources; others
adopt more ienient or vindicating positions.
As early as 1830 a bitter attack was made upon O'Reilly
and upon Spanish justice by the French historian, Francois
Barb£-Marbois.

Referring to the governor, he wrote:

...The Spanish general, O'Reilly, replaced Don An
tonio de Ulloa. ... O'Reilly was an enemy of reconciliatory measures, a warrior of reputation in his
profession, and thought a colony might be governed
even more despotically than a conquered country.
The barbarian indulged in acts of violence and fe
rocity which he mistook for prudence and firmness,
... Scaffolds were erected in New Orleans. Six
colonists paid by their heads for the courage with
which they had manifested their attachment to France.
The Court of Madrid secretly disapproved of these
acts of outrage; but fearing to endanger the author
ity of its governors it abstained frcm condemning
O'Reilly and even from disavowing him by an authen
tic act.-*Barbe-Marbois either ignored or was unaware of certain vi
tal documents covering the events that had occurred at New
Orleans and at Madrid.

That the French historian might

have been misinformed concerning the most critical facts in
the case is evident, as at least two readily discernible er
rors illustrate.

First, his comments concerning a secret

disapproval of O'Reilly's actions by Charles III and his
court are without foundation.

Neither Barbe-Marbois nor

■'•Francois Barbe-Marbois, A History of Louisiana (Phila
delphia, 1830), pp. 137-138.

anyone else has ever located any document proving this as
sertion.

On the contrary, materials used by the Califor

nia historian, David K. Bjork, in 1923, and the Spanish his
torian, Rodriguez-Casado, in 1942, are quoted in this study
and show conclusively that the king and his advisors approved
the general's actions in Louisiana.

Second, Barbe-Marbois

said that O'Reilly had 3,000 soldiers with him when he ar
rived in New Orleans in August of 1769.

The records, how

ever, clearly indicate that the exact number of men under the
general's command was 2,056.2
A realistic explanation for this historian's attitude
toward O'Reilly and the Spanish is Barb^-Marbois' sympathy
for his fellow Frenchmen in Louisiana.

Nevertheless, it

is difficult to understand how he could accuse O'Reilly of
barbarism when only six men were condemned to death for
treason in an insurrection in which a large portion of the
population of New Orleans and its environs was involved.
Another writer who attacked the Spanish general was
Francois Xavier Martin, Chief -Justice of the Louisiana Su
preme Court in the early nineteenth century.

He pronounced

^Ibid., p. 137. See the letter of Bucareli to Arriaga,
Havana, July 7, 1769, Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia
de Santo Domingo (hereinafter cited as A.G.I.S.D.), 80-1-6.
The document, in the Bancroft Library, Louisiana Collection,
has been translated and printed in Lawrence Kinnaird (ed.),
Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, Vols. II-IV of
the American Historical Association's Annual Report for 1945
(3 parts; Washington, D.C., 1946-1949), Pt. 1, p. 137.

nearly as severe a judgment on O ’Reilly as had Barbe-Mar
bois.

Martin wrote:
...Posterity, the judge of men in power, will doom
this act to public execration. No necessity de
manded, no policy justified it. Ulloa's conduct
provoked the measures to which the inhabitants re
sorted. During nearly two (sic) years he had haunted
the province as a phantom of dubious authority. ...
If the indiscretion of a few of them needed an apol
ogy, the common misfortune afforded it.3

His statement and others similar to it reflect an uncriti
cal attitude.

How can treason be called an act of "indis

cretion"?
Even in the first part of the twentieth century, his
torians in Louisiana were still condemning O'Reilly.

Al-

cee Fortier, a well known Louisiana historian, maintained
that the general deserved the title, "Bloody O'Reilly,"
which had been given him by the people of Louisiana.

For

tier accused the Spanish governor of violating King
Charles' desire that clemency be accorded the rebels.4

He

agreed with Martin that nothing could excuse the governor'
"cruelty"

^Francois Xavier Martin, A History of Louisiana (New
Orleans, 1829), pp. 208-209.
4 In her analysis of Fortier, Dr. Jo Ann Carrigan does
not agree with Fortier and shows that the revisionist
studies of this era disprove Fortier's assertion. Cf. Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (Vol. I, 2d ed.; Baton
Rouge, 1966), pp. 334-335.
^Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (4 vols.:
New York, 1904), I, 227-229.

As late as 1922, Henry Plauche Dart, a Louisiana attor
ney and legal historian, was continuing the myth of "Bloody
O'Reilly."

He went to the extreme of calling the governor

the "hired executioner" of Charles III.

Without offering

proofs, he accused O'Reilly of having come to Louisiana with
a predetermination to find the leaders of the rebellion
guilty.^

A careful study of the general's correspondence

with the Spanish Minister of State, the Marques de Grimal
di, and with El Baylio, Frey Don Julian de Arriaga, Secre
tary of State for the Indies, ahould have been made by Dart.
Had he read O'Reilly's account of his meeting with the
rebel leaders aboard the Spanish frigate Palas, and the ac
count of the arrest and trial of the insurrectionists, he
could not have drawn such conclusions.
Popular writers and-authors of text books of Louisiana
history were also infected by this anti-Spanish bias.
Among the literary figures George Washington Cable is typi
cal.

In a work on the Creole families of Louisiana, he un-

questioningly accepted the anti-Spanish interpretation.
He stated that the sobriquet, "Cruel O'Reilly," was one
merited by the Spanish governor, and he could find no ex
cuse for the execution of the rebel leaders.7

^Henry Plauche Dart, "Remy's Lost History of Louisi
ana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V (January.
1922) ,“p. "15.---------- ------^George Washington Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana
(New York, 1884), pp. 74-75.

Other writers who followed Cable's lead were John Ficklen and Grace E. King.

In their collaborative work on Loui

siana history, they espoused the "patriot-martyr" theme for
the executed rebels.

With pathos they wrote:

"All the Cre

oles wept over the sad fate of the patriots, and prayed
O'Reilly to spare their lives.

But nothing could move him."

And while they blamed the French commandant and acting gov
ernor, Charles Philippe Aubry, more than they did the Span
ish general, still they most heartily condemned the latter
for the "deceptive" manner in which he chose to arrest the
O

rebel leaders when he called them to his residence.
Writing in the early twentieth century, Marc Villiers
du Terrage, a French nobleman, condemned the Spanish sys
tem rather than O'Reilly.

He considered the general a mere

instrument of the Spanish empire.

While admitting that the

Spanish had the right to try the rebels, Terrage held that
death for treason in this instance was cruel and the Spanish
9
legal system ruthless.
If one accepts Terrage's thesis,
then all nations are guilty of cruelty, for death is the
normal penalty for treason.

8
John R. Ficklen and Grace E. King, Stories from
Louisiana History (New Orleans, 1905), pp. 240, 243.

9
Marc Villiers du Terrage, Les Dernieres Annees de la
Louisiane Frangaise (Paris, 1903), p. 318.

The most impartial view of the Spanish and of O'Reilly
was made by Charles Etienne Gayarr^, a nineteenth century
Louisiana historian.

Considering the events that occurred

in New Orleans in 1769 in the light of the standards pre
vailing in all of the European nations at that time, he
stated:
...To judge fairly of the feelings and ideas of these
men, we must transport ourselves back to the days in
which they lived; we must adopt the turn of mind which
education, habits and associations had given them, and
we must become impregnated with the political, social
and moral atmosphere in which they had been born. ...
It is not astonishing, therefore, that both Aubry and
O'Reilly should have honestly thought that, to pick
out of the rebellious colonists twelve leaders only,
...was an extremely merciful act. Besides, there is
no doubt that O'Reilly was moved by considerations of
policy; ... and above all it was expedient to set a
salutary example before the other colonies...
These observations are notable for their fairness, and they
stand out in near isolation in the midst of the bitter at
tacks on O'Reilly that lasted into the second quarter of
the twentieth century.

Unfortunately, since Gayarre was

the grandson of O'Reilly's comptroller, this interpretation
was dismissed as the product of pro-Spanish bias.

Actually,

Gayarre's work is based on a remarkably thorough study of
documents from the Spanish archives.
By the mid-1920's, the historiographical attitude to
ward O'Reilly began to reverse itself.

In 1925 the histor-

an, Henry Edward Chambers, in his multi-volume work on

■^Charles Etienne Gayarre, A History of Louisiana (New
Orleans, 1866), II, 345-347.

Louisiana, shifted the blame for the death of the "patriots"
away from the Spanish governor and laid it on the shoulders
of Aubry.

He maintained that "O'Reilly came to the colony

with a predetermined course of action laid out for him," and
stated that the Spanish governor accepted as a matter of
course the suppression of the rebellion and the punishment
of its leaders.

Chambers contended that O'Reilly was com

pelled by circumstances to make an example of the leaders of
the insurrection, lest other Spanish colonials rebel.
bulk of the blame was laid upon Aubry.

The

Chambers asserted

that Aubry, in a calculated manner, had kept Ulloa and the
colonial leaders from coming to terms, and that Aubry had
inserted between them a "wedge of misunderstanding and mu
tual antagonism," thus causing the rebellion.
that:

He concluded

"If the blood of the martyred Lafreniere and his com

panions calls aloud for vengeance, it is the shade (sic) of
Aubry and not that of O'Reilly that must heed the call."H
In the 1930's other historians continued the trend to
ward removing the blame from O'Reilly for his actions in
punishing the rebel leaders.

Another Louisiana historian,

James E. Winston, who relied mostly on secondary materials
supplemented by a few documents, attempted to prove that the
Spanish general was not vindictive and that he had not vio
lated the instructions of Charles III.

Nevertheless, he

■^Henry Edward Chambers, A History of Louisiana (3 vols.
New York, 1925), I, 291-292.

maintained that O'Reilly should have been more merciful, as
no one had lost his life in the insurrection against Ulloa;
he deplored the "inquisitorial" manner in which the trial
was conducted, and he stated that the leaders were presumed
guilty.

He also asserted that force had been used in ob-

taining the confessions of the accused. 12

Had he used all

of the documents, Winston would have learned that neither
of the two latter assertions was correct.

Moreover, to

call the Spanish trial procedures "inquisitorial" was to
judge eighteenth century Spanish procedure by twentieth
century American standards.

This is righteous indignation,

not historical analysis.
Writing in the early 1930's, David Knuth Bjork pub
lished a work on Spain in North America.

In this volume he

incorporated much of his doctoral dissertation on the early
Spanish era in Louisiana.

Through a careful examination of

many documents he proved that the Spanish monarch approved
of O'Reilly's actions in Louisiana, and that the general
had indeed faithfully carried out the king's instructions. 13

12

James E. Winston, "The Causes and Results ofi—the Rev
olution of 1768," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. XV,
No. 2 (April, 1932), pp. 197-213.
13
David Knuth Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly and the Span
ish Occupation of Louisiana, 1769-1770," in New Spain and
the Anglo-American West, ed.,by George P. Hammond (2 vols.;
Lancaster, Pa., 1932), I, 181-182.

10

Another prominent historian of the Spanish colonial era
in North America, John Walter Caughey, writing during the
1930's, agreed with Bjork's position.

He asserted that

O'Reilly had followed instructions, and that in judging his
actions one must use eighteenth century Spanish norms, not
the more "refined" ones of twentieth century America.
In 1942 the Spanish historian, Vicente Rodriguez-Casado,
carefully studied Spain's first years in Louisiana.

It was

his view that O'Reilly was acting in complete accord with
the king's commands.

He further noted the heavy emphasis

placed on economic factors by the rebels themselves in their
"Memorial" justifying the insurrection.^
In spite of the attempts of these scholars to put
O'Reilly's administration of the colony and the trial and
execution of the rebels in proper historical perspective,
the myth of "Bloody O'Reilly" has not completely disap
peared from general works still in use.

As late as 1949,

G. W. McGinty, in a text on Louisiana history, perpetuated
the myth.

He accused O'Reilly of a predetermination to

make an example of the rebel leaders, and of deceit when,

John Walton Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana,
Louisiana

15vicente Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacron
espanola en la Luisiana (Madrid, 1942) , pp” T§2~-T$7~.
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without warning, according to him, O'Reilly arrested the
leaders at his residence in New Orleans.16

In short, he

merely repeated earlier attacks on the Spanish governor.
Fortunately, by 1960 the most widely used text in Lou
isiana history, that of Edwin A. Davis, reflected the revi
sionist interpretation of O'Reilly.

This prominent Louisi

ana historian flatly rejected the "martyr-patriot" motif.
He stressed, even more than Rodriguez-Casado, the economic
issues that prompted the French planters and merchants of
New Orleans to rebel against Ulloa.

The "Memorial" issued

by these merchants and inhabitants of New Orleans, as will
be shown, certainly gives great substance to Davis' position.
Moreover, Davis unqualifiedly asserts that O'Reilly was an
honorable man who justly executed the leaders of a rebel
lion against legitimate Spanish authority.-*-7
In a new edition of Fortier's History of Louisiana,
edited by Jo Ann Carrigan of Louisiana State University, a
new analysis of Fortier's "principle and rights" theory is
•made.

Dr. Carrigan notes that Fortier's assertion that the

colonists loved both France and liberty seems to be a con
tradiction.

However, the contradiction is only apparent,

she asserts, for the colonists hoped to regain their former

l^Garnie William McGinty, A History of Louisiana (New
York, 1949), pp. 72-73.
l^Edwin A. Davis, The Story of Louisiana (Baton Rouge.
1960), I, 106.
-------------
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de facto independence of the years immediately preceding
Ulloa's arrival by returning to the laissez-faire rule of
France.

The rebel leaders, she noted, had become free in

practice, and exercised a self-rule similar to the British
colonists in America.

Just as the British Americans struck

for their "rights" in 1776, so had the Louisiana rebels of
1768.

They claimed they were fighting for their liberties,

which they indeed had acquired through the neglect of the
French government, especially during the Seven Years War.
These "rights" had in effect become their "fundamental
rights and liberties."

This analysis seems to put Dr. Car

rigan on the fringe of the revisionist school.
In view of historians' diverse interpretations of
O'Reilly's career in Louisiana, an impartial study of the
man and his achievements is essential to an accurate and
objective appraisal of his regime.
pose to be another polemic.

This work does not pro

It is intended to provide a

more detailed account of the Spanish governor's activities
in the former French colony than is presently available.
Moreover, greater use has been made of manuscript sources
collected in the Spanish and American archives and libraries.
It will be demonstrated that Governor O'Reilly had full power
to act as he did, and that he was neither vindictive nor

■^Fortier, A History of Louisiana. I (2d ed.), 344345.
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deceitful in his handling of the rebels, having been in
structed to establish Spanish power in Louisiana, and to
punish those responsible for the expulsion of Governor
Ulloa.
A considerable part of the dissertation will examine
O ’Reilly's policies, which were aimed at the creation of a
sound foundation for Spanish rule.

As will be shown, these

policies laid the basis for an examplary legal system and
for the promotion of prosperity through commerce and agri
culture.

In these respects his influence in the colony

was lasting.
Alejandro O'Reilly's contributions to the future of
the former French colony evidence the conclusion that he
was one of the most capable governors of Louisiana during
the period of Spanish domination.

I

THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN BY FRANCE,
AND THE FIRST ATTEMPT BY THE SPANISH
TO EFFECT OCCUPATION
During the course of the Seven Years War, the French
Court resolved to rid itself of the vast colony of Louisi
ana.

By 1761 it had become apparent that when peace came,

France might lose to the British all of her possessions in
North America.

From an economic point of view, the loss of

Louisiana would have been an asset.

The colony had been a

constant disappointment to the crown from the earliest days
of settlement.

Its costs had been excessive to Antoine

Crozat who had been granted the concession to settle Louis
iana in 1712.

Consequent to his failure to regain his in

vestment from Louisiana, he had successfully petitioned the
king, in 1717, to revoke his concession.

Later that year

the notorious John Law received the Louisiana concession.
He was soon bankrupt, as were many of his fellow investors,
and although he was ousted in 1720, the company that he had
organized controlled Louisiana until 1731.

In that same

year, Louisiana became a Crown colony; but the Louisiana
venture was also an economic failure for the French king.
In spite of this failure from the economic standpoint,
Louisiana had served the French for decades as a buffer to

English expansion across the North American continent below
the Great Lakes.

By 1761 it was almost a certainty that

Canada would be demanded by England as the price for peace.
This might lead to Britain’s eventual absorption of Louisi
ana, and this would greatly enhance the power of the Brit
ish Empire.

The French Minister of State, the Duke of Choi-

seul, realized, therefore, that he must consider means of
preventing this from occurring.

The Marquis D 1Ossun, the

French ambassador to Spain, suggested to Choiseul that the
French government might persuade some Canadians to migrate
to Louisiana, thereby leaving England fewer people in Can
ada.

However, a majority of these settlers preferred to re

main in their secure homes rather than venture into a wild
erness.

This idea having failed, Choiseul then next pro

posed changing Louisiana's boundary so that it would include
within its territory those parts of Canada most vital to the
French fur trade.^

This plan also proved unworkable.

The final phase of the discussion over the future of
Louisiana evolved from another suggestion of the Marquis
D ’Ossun.

He sent a communique to Choiseul telling him that

Charles III of Spain was desirous of possessing that colony.
Consequently, there began a series of negotiations with the
Spanish in 1761 to effect the transfer of Louisiana to
Spain.

Affecting these negotiations was the Family Compact

■^-Eliia W. Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman.
1934), pp. 16-19.
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between the French and Spanish Bourbons, signed on August
15, 1761.

This compact, the work of Choiseul, was designed

to provide a needed ally for France in her war with England.
The French Minister of State offered Louisiana to Charles
III provided he would make a much needed loan to the French
and subsequently enter the war against England.

In 1761

Charles refused to make the loan, as his bullion vessels
had not arrived from America.

Moreover, he flatly refused

to enter the war before May of 1762.

Hence, the proposed

cession of Louisiana to Spain did not occur in 1761.
Meanwhile Spain had been offering to act as a peace
maker between France and England, thereby hoping to per
suade the British to return Gibraltar and Minorca to her
for this service.

This gesture was refused by the English.

In the interim, the Spanish had been giving open aid to the
French, which led England to declare war on Spain on Janu
ary 2, 1762.

This immediately removed Louisiana from the

diplomatic scene as an offering by the French to involve
Spain in the war and its status was then even more uncertain.
In the course of the year 1762, the British overwhelmed
the French and also began to inflict serious defeats on the
Spanish in the colonial areas.

By August, 1762, France was

compelled to make peace overtures to Great Britain, but be
cause of the Family Compact, she could not accept a peace
without the consent of the Spanish.

Delay was dangerous.

The French Ministry again offered Louisiana to the Spanish,
but this time to end the war, not to enter it.

Spanish

misfortune came to the aid_of the French, for on September
29, 1762, the fortress of Havana fell to the British.

Since

Britain had already occupied the Floridas to the Mississippi,
the French offer of Louisiana to Charles seemed to provide
the necessary protection for New Spain against English ex
pansion.

It was, in effect, the only plausible solution

for Spain at the time.

The Spanish Court did not consider

the loss of the Floridas serious, and as Havana was to be
returned by the British, the remaining problem of a buffer
zone was resolved by the French cession of Louisiana to
Spain.

Consequently, the three nations signed a preliminary

agreement that was ratified in the Treaty of Paris in 1763.^
The treaty of cession for the colony took place sec
retly.

It was signed by Louis XV of France at Fontaine

bleau on November 23, 1762, and by the Spanish plenipoten
tiary, the Marquis of Grimaldi, ambassador to France, on No
vember 25,

1762.3

By January of 1763, France had prepared

a notice of the treaty for delivery to the colonists in Loui
siana, but, upon the insistence of the Spanish Court, this
was not then dispatched.

2Ibid., pp. 22-34. See also, Arthur S. Aiton, "The
Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," American Historical
Review, XXXVI (1931), pp. 701-720.
^Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, p. 39.
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In May of 1763, the Duke of Choiseul urged the Spanish
to take possession of their new territory.

In spite of

this suggestion and later ones, it was not until January
of 1764 that the Spanish Court took any action.

Moreover,

it was not until April 21, 1764, after some unexplained de
lays by the French, that the documents of transfer were
signed and delivered to the Spanish diplomats in Paris.

On

that same day, a letter was sent by the Duke of Choiseul to
Director-General Abbadie of Louisiana, informing him and the
colonists of the formal transfer of Louisiana to Spain.^
It is evident that both governments were responsible
for delaying the actual transfer of the colony, but Spain
found further cause for delaying the actual occupation.
The Spanish felt that they needed a large contingent of
troops to send to Louisiana to effect possession.

At that

time, most of the Spanish troops were deployed elsewhere as
a part of the program of restoration of those fortifications
that had suffered during the war that had just ended.

Choi

seul offered a solution to this problem by suggesting that
the French--soldiers in Louisiana could
army.

This provect'-fc^ be

acceptable to the SpanishCourt,

and an apparent obstacle was

^Fortier, A History

enlist in the Spanish

removed.^

of Louisiana,I, 148-150.

5Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, pp. 40-43.
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The final step preparatory to occupation was taken in
May, 1765, when Charles III appointed Don Antonio de Ulloa,
Captain of the Royal Spanish Navy, the first Spanish gover
nor of Louisiana.^
Ulloa was born on January 12, 1716, in Seville, the son
of Bernardo de Ulloa y Sousa, an economist.

Besides being

a naval officer, Don Antonio was a well-known scientist who
had made two extensive journeys in Spanish America.

He had

been a member of a scientific expedition sponsored by the
French Academy of Science in the late 1730's and early
1740's.

His role in that venture was published as A Voyage

to South America. At the same time he was authorized, along
with Jorge Juan y Santacilla, also a member of the expedi
tion, to study the conditions that existed in the viceroy
alty of Peru.

The observations of these two men were re

ported to Philip V of Spain in a confidential paper in 1749,
which was later published in 1826 as the Noticias Secretas
de America.?

Later Ulloa served as the governor of Huanca-

velica in the viceroyalty of Peru from 1758 to 1764.®

®Ulloa's Appointment, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, A.G.I.
S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 32, L.C., p. 3.
7Arthur P. Whitaker, "Antonio de Ulloa," Hispanic Amer
ican Historical Review (May, 1935), pp. 155-183"!
Sjohn Preston Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa: A Profile of
the First Spanish Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana History,
VIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 196.
After Ulloa's service as governor of Louisiana, he was
again called to duty in the Royal Navy. In 1777-78, he had
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In the meantime the colonists of Louisiana had learned
in October of 1764 of the cession of that area to Spain.
Prominent men in the colony called for a meeting of the
Superior Council of the

colony,^

to discuss this event.

Among those present at this meeting were Nicholas Chauvin
de Lafreniere, Procurator General (Attorney General) of the
colony, and Jean Milhet, one of the richest merchants in New
Orleans.

Lafreniere suggested that a delegation be sent to

France to petition Louis XV to revoke the cession.

The Su

perior Council agreed with Lafreniere, selecting Jean Milhet
to carry the petition to Louis XV.

Upon his arrival in

France, Milhet sought out the father of Louisiana, Jean Bap
tiste Le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville.

By his good graces, an

audience was secured with the Duke of Choiseul.

Although

Choiseul intimated his understanding of the feelings of the
French of New Orleans, nonetheless he told the delegates
that the, cession of the colony was a fait accompli. After

the responsibility for the direction of the flota, or fleet,
to New Spain which brought back to Spain one of the richest
cargoes of the eighteenth century. For his lack of success
in commanding his squadron in 1779 against the British, he
was court-martialed but was acquitted. He served in the
Navy for the remaining years of his life as a vice-admiral
(teniente general de la armada). He died on July 5, 1795,
at the age of 79. Whitaker, "Antonio de Ulloa," Hispanic
American Historical Review (May, 1935), pp. 186-188.
^The Superior Council was a governmental organ in New
Orleans having judicial and legislative powers. It resem
bled the Spanish Cabildp, but was much more powerful. Its
members were appointed by the French king from among the
influential planters and merchants of the New Orleans area.
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considerable delay in France, Milhet finally returned to
Louisiana in 1767 to report the sad news of his failure to
his fellow colonists.
While Milhet was away on his journey, further delays
by Spain in taking possession of Louisiana gave some of the
inhabitants of that colony ample time to imagine the worst
at the hands of their new rulers.

They feared that the ar

rival of the Spanish would mean the end of their freedom
which had increased progressively during the long years of
their isolation.

France, moreover, had never exerted a

strict control over Louisiana and had, by necessity, been
extremely lax during the Seven Years War.

Unfortunately,

the colonists did not know the ultimate intentions of the
Spanish monarch in their regard, for their new governor had
been instructed to leave, for the time being, their local
customs and institutions as undisturbed as possible, conso
nant with Spanish sovereignty.

Governor Ulloa had been giv

en the following orders by Charles III:
... I have decided that in this new acquisition, for
the present, no change in the system of government
shall be undertaken, and consequently, that in no way
shall it be subject to the laws and practices observed
in my dominion of the Indies, but that it shall be re
garded as a separate colony, even with respect to all
trade between them. It is my will that, ... everything

^Gayarre, A History of Louisiana, I, 127, 180-181;
Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 151, 159.

pertaining to it shall go through the Ministry of
State, ...
These instructions had come to Ulloa in Havana, where
he awaited his new assignment from the king.

He had come

to Havana in February, 1765, arriving there from Callao,
Peru.

His term as governor of Huancavelica, from 1758 to

1764, had not been successful.

Due to powerful interest

groups, among which were the Viceroy of Peru and the members
of the Audiencia of Peru, he had failed to achieve his goal
in Peru, which was the revitalization of its silver min
ing. I2
Further preparations for the occupation of Louisiana
continued during 1765.

Subsequent to receiving the royal

Cedula appointing him governor, Ulloa was advised by the
Marques de Grimaldi, Spanish Minister of State, that the
commander of the frigate, La Liebre, would be at his ser
vice and would meet him in H a v a n a . ^

The captain of that

frigate had been ordered to accompany the new governor of
Louisiana and tc remain there as long as Ulloa required
the services of the frigate.

Moreover, the captain carried

■^Cedula of Ulloa's Appointment as Governor of Louisi
ana, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C.,
p. 3.
^Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa," Louisiana History, VIII,
No. 3, 191-192.
l^Ulloa sailed on the Volante, a smaller vessel, as
he feared the frigate, La Liebre, might be too large to
safely negotiate the passage at the mouth of the Mississ
ippi . Ibid.
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with him further instructions for Ulloa from the king, in
forming the newly appointed governor of the procedures to
be followed in taking possession of Louisiana.^4
After receiving his appointment as governor of Louisi
ana, Ulloa took steps to carry out his new assignment.

In

July, 1765, he wrote to the Superior Council of New Orleans,
notifying them of his appointment as governor.^
made preparations for his journey to New Orleans.

He then
However,

it was not until January 17 of the following year that he,
his officials, and his small military contingent set sail.
The Spaniards arrived in New Orleans on March 5,
where Ulloa was greeted by the French commandant and actinggovernor, Charles Philippe Aubry.

Aubry had succeeded Dir

ector-General Abbadie, who had died suddenly on February 4,
1765.16

Through Aubry, as a result of circumstances unfore

seen by the Spanish Court, Ulloa governed Louisiana during
his entire stay in the colony.
Among the many difficulties facing the new governor
was the shortage of troops.

From the time of his arrival

l4Grimaldi to Ulloa, Madrid, July 3, 1765, Archivo
General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba (hereinafter cited as
A.G.I.P.C.), Legajo 174, D o c . 185, in Kinnaird, Spain in
the Mississippi Valley, pp. 2-3.
1 C

/

-‘•-’Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 130.
l^Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, p. 44, citing
Archivo Historico Nacional (hereinafter cited as A.H.N.),
Papeles de Estado, 3883, Exp. 3, Doc. 7, Fol. 631.
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in Louisiana, until he unceremoniously departed in October
of 1768, this problem plagued Ulloa.

He had brought with

him about ninety Spanish soldiers, anticipating many enlist
ments among the French troops yet stationed in Louisiana.
Contrary to Choiseul's and Ulloa's hopes, these enlistments
did not materialize.

This was due in part, however, to the

interpretation which Ulloa decided to place upon his orders
to pay the Spanish and the French soldiers equally.

He

adapted the pay scale to the French regulations which called
for seven livres per month.

The Spanish scale was 35 livres

per month, and had Ulloa used this scale he might well have
recruited enough volunteers.
this matter was corrected.

In a letter of May 24, 1766,
In the king's name, the Marques

de Grimaldi granted Ulloa permission to pay all Louisiana
troops according to the higher Spanish rate for troops
serving in the Indies. ^
Unfortunately, this change came too late to help Ulloa.
He noted in a communique to Antonio Bucareli, Captain-Gen
eral and Governor of Cuba, that despite the higher wages
the French regulars by that time were unwilling to enlist
in the Spanish army.

With more liberality Ulloa might have

solved his troop problem from the beginning.

Ulloa further

^Grimaldi to Ulloa, Aranjuez, May 24, 1766, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley,
pp. 5-10.
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noted that, in order to carry out his instructions in Louis
iana, and to be an effective governor, "... there is no oth
er recourse than to bring the troops from Spain.

Not

withstanding this initial misjudgment, Ulloa realized, and
stated, the positive need for a large Spanish contingent to
control the colony effectively.
In retrospect it is clear that the absence of a powerful
military force was the key factor in making a rebellion pos
sible in Louisiana.

Not only did Ulloa see the need for

this force, but Charles Aubry felt that without it he could
not formally transfer the colony to Ulloa at the capital city
of New Orleans.

It was Aubry's influence that convinced

Ulloa not to attempt to take formal possession

t h e r e . 19

Also of considerable importance in setting the stage
for the rebellion against Ulloa was the decision of the Span
ish Court to enforce certain typical Spanish mercantile re
strictions on the trade of the Louisianians.

One of these

decrees, dated May 6, 1766, was promulgated in New Orleans
for Ulloa by Aubry on September 6, 1766.

It restricted the

l^Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, August 31, 1766,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 12-13.
l ^ G a y a r r e ' s
analysis seems to be correct when he says
that Aubry used this argument with Ulloa to delay the trans
fer. Cf. Gayarr£, History of Louisiana, II, 162. See also,
B.F. French (ed.), Historical Memoirs of Louisiana (5 vols.;
New York, 1846-1853), V, 158.
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commerce of Louisiana to only a few Spanish colonies and the
mother country, while prohibiting foreign trade except with
the islands of Martinique and St. Domingue, and with France.
Regulations against smuggling were to be enforced, and all
cargo lists had to have Ulloa's approval.

The governor con

trolled the prices of all imported or exported goods, and
the papers of all vessels sailing from France to Louisiana
came under his supervision.

Due to the unpopularity of

these restrictions, Aubry, under pressure of the Superior
Council, did not enforce the decree.
Ulloa acquiesced.

In this decision

Although the decree was unpopular, it

was certainly not illegal as Fortier claimed.20
The mercantile decree of March 23, 1768, was similar
to that of May 6, 1766.

It limited the shipment of goods

to the colonists themselves.

Only specified ports in Spain,

such as Cadiz and Seville, were open to trade with Louisiana
and a few items were duty free.

Commodities from Louisiana

which could not be sold in Spain could be shipped, duty
free, to other countries in Europe for sale.

Finally, only

goods produced in Louisiana were to be exported from that
colony.21

This decree, as well as the earlier one, was no

^ R o d r i g u e z - C a s a d o } Primeros anos de dominacion esparTola, p. 120; Gayarfe,.History of Louisiana^ II, 168-171;
Fortier, History of Louisiana' 1^ 160, l6l, 170.

Commercial Decree of March 23, 1768, El Pardo, in
Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 45-50.

27
more restrictive than the average Spanish mercantile decree.
Nevertheless, the French colonists of Louisiana, as the
British colonists in North America, had long been free, in
practice, of most mercantile restrictions and consequently
were unwilling to submit to these relatively mild ones.

Due

to the resistance of the colonists, this decree, like the
earlier one, was never enforced.
The handling of the retirement of paper issues in Lou
isiana proved to be another cross for Ulloa to bear.

Upon

the Spanish governor's arrival, he was asked by Nicholas
Foucault, the French Commissary, to indicate his intentions
in regard to the paper issues then outstanding.

Ulloa

offered to redeem this paper at 75 percent of its value,
since that was the ratio established by Louis XV.

However,

the colonists refused to accept this as a compromise, in
sisting that had the colony not been transferred the French
king would have redeemed the currency at par.

However, the

history of the paper issues of the colony did not justify
their claim.^2
Another source of concern for Ulloa was the lack of
sufficient funds to run the colony.

The original yearly

allotment made by the Spanish government for Louisiana was
150,000 pesos, which was to come from the treasury of New
Spain.

Unfortunately, this amount was inadequate.

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 159-160.

Ulloa's
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letters to Bucareli are a litany of pleas for funds, and
this situation continued until the governor was forced out
of the colony.

As early as May of 1766, in recording the

tour of the posts of the colony, Ulloa mentioned sending
his treasurer, Don Martin Navarro, to Balize to meet the
Spanish frigate carrying 110,000 of the 150,000 pesos due
the Louisiana treasury.23
On December 12, 1766, Ulloa asked Bucareli for addi
tional funds to maintain the Spanish establishment in Lou
isiana.

By January 23, 1767, he had sounded a note of ur

gency in a communique to Bucareli.

Ulloa noted that since

June of 1766 the Colony had relied solely on Spanish gold
and silver for its currency, as faith had been lost in the
French and Spanish paper issues.

The amount allotted to

him for the running of the colony had proved to be far
short of what was needed.

Moreover, he lacked ample funds

even to meet the basic military and civilian necessities.2^
It was not long before Ulloa was again pleading for

23Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, May, 1766, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley,
p. 10. The King to the Viceroy of New Spain, Aranjuez,
May 21, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 36, L.C., pp.
18-21. The King to Ulloa, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, ibid.,
Doc. 37, L.C., pp. 22-25.
2^Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, December 12, 1766,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss
issippi Valley , p. 13. Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, January
23, 1767, ibid., p. 19.
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money to finance the administration of the colony.

In a

letter of March 3, 1767, he made known his need for an addi
tional forty to fifty thousand pesos to meet current and em
ergency expenditures; and at the same time he gave his first
indication that seditious activities were being carried on
in the colony.

His belief was that this unrest was aided by

the impoverishment of the newly established government.

To

avoid giving these groups any cause for complaint, he urged,
in a letter to Bucareli, the immediate dispatch of funds:
... In view of this and also of the fact that here
everything causes revolts and seditions, I should
thank Your Lordship, if your circumstances permit,
please to order that I be sent promptly 40.000 or
50,000 pesos for account of the allotment.25
As a result of such repeated petitions, the Spanish
Court finally realized that the 150,000 pesos allocated for
Louisiana's yearly expenses would have to be augmented with
further funds.

In May, 1767, the king decreed that 250,000

pesos should be allotted to the Louisiana treasury each

y e a r . 26

However, as a shortage of silver existed at that time in New
Spain, the source of Louisiana's funds, the additional money
did not arrive when due.27

This was a situation for which

25ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, March 3, 1767, ibid.,
pp. 20-21.
26crimaldi to Arriaga, Aranjuez, May 13, 1767, A.G.I.
S.D., 86-6-6, ibid., p. 28.
27New Spain, Ulloa's source of funds, was undergoing
financial reorganization by the new Viceroy, Jose de Gal
vez. Collection of revenue was temporarily suspended dur
ing this time. Consequently, the funds for Ulloa were not
available. Cf. Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa," Louisiana History,
VIII, No. 3, p. 217.
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Ulloa could not be blamed, but which, nonetheless caused ad
ditional difficulties in a colony where problems were already
serious.
In the summer of 1767, financial matters in the colony
reached a critical state.

Writing on June 17, 1767, from

Balize, Ulloa informed Bucareli that both the French and the
Spanish commissariats in Louisiana had suspended all payments,
as he simply had no funds.

In addition, he noted: "... This

results not only in seditious and insolent rumors, but also
very extravagant threats. ...I cannot exaggerate to Your
Lordship the peril in which the colony finds itself, nor the
importance of some aid to fulfill the most urgent require
ments and to quiet the disturbances that are being experi
enced. ..."2®

But the new allotment of 250,000 pesos was by

no means forthcoming as promised.

Although an additional

60,000 pesos had been transported to Louisiana on the fri
gate, San Juan Bautista, the creditors of the Spanish gov
ernment had not been paid in full.

Furthermore, Ulloa needed

money to pay the troops which he thought would arrive soon
from Spain.

Finally, he pleaded:

"... For this reason I

hope that Your Lordship will please order that there be no
delay in remitting the funds to complete the allotment,

28uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 17, 1767, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., p. 31.
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when the Viceroy of Mexico has had them sent to your city,
as he promised.
By December of 1767, the finances of the colony had fur
ther deteriorated.

It is to Ulloa's credit that he was able

to carry on as long as he did without proper funds.

Two let

ters to the governor of Havana bear eloquent testimony to the
approaching financial crisis.

Ulloa noted that prices had

risen for the colonists who bought their goods on credit.
Those dependent upon the Spanish government for their sala
ries and payments were suffering considerable hardship, as
often they could not even buy on credit.

Confidence in the

Spanish colonial government had deteriorated to this extent.
Ulloa's own words are fully expressive of the danger:
... Everybody is without pay; troops, officials, offi
cers, and purveyors. In the hope that the balance of
the allotment would be received during the month just
ending, the people have been suffering their want in
patience; but now that they have seen the contrary
come to pass, it is inevitable that this will result
in some very serious disaster, for the reason that,
as I have told Your Lordship, there TIs no place here
to turn for aid.30
These letters indicate the almost universally unfavorable re
ception now accorded the Spanish, as Fortier noted.31

it is

29uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 17, 1767, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid.. p. 31.
30Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 2, 1767, and
Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 25, 1767, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 38-40.
^Fortier, A

History of Louisiana. I, 159-163.
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difficult to imagine how Ulloa's warnings could have been
virtually disregarded by the Court at Madrid, until it was
too late to help him.
By February, 1768, the situation had not improved.

The

distressed Ulloa again pleaded for the allocated funds:
My Very Dear Sir:
Having described to Your Excellency on previous
occasions the miserable and critical state in which
this colony finds itself through lack of funds, I
have nothing more to add, because the longer the de
lay the more the want and troubles increase. ... One
of the suppliers of flour, Moore of New York, among
others, ... has asked me on two or three occasions
with great urgency to permit him to go to collect
this in that city (Havana).32
It is apparent that Ulloa was under heavy pressure from the
colonists and did not command their respect.

Clearly, any

government that is unable to satisfy the basic needs of its
citizens cannot long survive.
. The climax of these financial difficulties was reached
in June, 1768.

At that time, Ulloa gave clear notice to

Bucareli of the dangers involved in attempting to govern a
colony with such a small amount of money.

Debts against the

government were steadily accumulating, and no sign of im
provement was in sight.

Ulloa had no doubt of the conse

quences if such a pattern continued.

At the time of writing

this letter, 140,000 pesos from the 1767 allotment were still

^^uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, February 20, 1768,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississ
ippi Valley, pp. 42-43.
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due.

There was no silver in circulation, and it had been the

only liquid money since 1767.

Under those circumstances, le

gal proceedings against debtors in the colony were suspended.
The calamity which resulted from this intolerable situation
was predicted by Ulloa:
Such a situation is the more difficult and its conse
quences much more serious in a new dominion, as is
this one where, at the same time a new sovereignty be
gins, want makes itself felt. Furthermore, little at
tention is paid to it. For these reasons, it is inev
itable that the new subjects and those that supply the
necessities of life should make most dire predictions
for the future, because, as their fealty has not become
deep-rooted nor their confidence been won, distrust
cannot fail to be widespread, and it reveals itself
automatically.33
In October, 1768, as a final attempt to resolve the fin
ancial problems of the colony, Ulloa pointed out to the Min
ister of State, the Marques de Grimaldi, that conditions in
Louisiana had become intolerable because of money shortages.
The governor confessed that he realized that the failure of
his allotment to arrive was due to the general shortage of
funds in New Spain.

Nonetheless, this knowledge did not help

Ulloa in his desperate plight.

Consequently, in order to re

duce his own expenditures to the minimum, he suggested a re
duction in the forts defending the colony.

Since the Eng

lish had abandoned some of their posts adjacent to Spanish
Louisiana, he felt he could safely evacuate the Spanish posts

33uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 22, 1768, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 52-54.
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across from these areas. ^

His enforced departure from the

colony prevented the implementation of the plan.
In summary, then, there were two main issues:

a short

age of adequate money to run the colony, and too small a mil
itary force to enable Ulloa to assert his authority.

The re

sult was that the first Spanish governor of Louisiana was
brought into conflict with the powerful Superior Council.
This clash focused on the legitimacy of Spanish authority and
upon which agency was to exercise power in the colony--the
governor or the Superior Council.

The Council had long been

powerful and was reluctant to give up its position in the
governmental affairs of Loiiisiana.
The struggle between Ulloa and the Council had begun al
most immediately upon his arrival in the colony.

Upon Aubry's

advice, the Spanish governor had refused to present his cred
entials to the Superior Council when the latter demanded to
see them.

Moreover, Ulloa had not taken formal possession

of Louisiana at the capital city of New Orleans as the Coun
cil had reasonably expected.

Instead, it was at the French

fortress of Balize, near the mouth of the Mississippi, that
the act of transfer had occurred and the Spanish flag was
raised.

No member of the Superior Council was present at

this ceremony.

Nonetheless, the document of transfer was

■^Ulloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 6, 1768,
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6, ibid., pp. 75-76.
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signed on that occasion by the Acting-Governor, Charles
Philippe Aubry, the only official who had the power to turn
the colony over to Ulloa.

The wording of this document

clearly shows that in Aubry*s mind there was no doubt to
whom the colony belonged, nor that the transfer had been
legally made.

It stated in part:

Don Antonio de Ulloa, charged by His Catholic Majesty
with taking the possession and government of the prov
ince of Louisiana, ... to execute the orders of the
King, his master, ... I order, ... that he be given
possession of the post of Balize and that the flag
of His Majesty the King of France, my master, be
struck and that of His Majesty the King of Spain be
raised in its place....
Balize, 20 January 1767
Aubry (signature)35
It is true, as Gayarre asserts, that Aubry opposed the
choice of Balize as the site of transfer.36

Yet, as unim

portant as was that post, the document clearly proves that
the transfer was made one year and nine months prior to the
rebellion.

Fortier's assertion that the colonists were

justified in not acknowledging Louisiana as a Spanish pos
session is invalid in the face of this document signed by

^ A u b r y ' s Order, Balize, January 20,1767, A.H.N., Seccion Consejo de Indias, Legajo 20,854, Foxas 296, cited by
Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros artos de dominacion es panola,
pp. 176-177. This document signed by Aubry, in which he
recognized Ulloa's legitimacy, clearly refutes any claim he
is alleged to have made to the Superior Council on October
28, 1768, that he had never seen anything decisive concern
ing Ulloa's governing powers for the colony. Gayarre attri
butes this statement to Aubry. Cf. Gayarre, History of Lou
isiana, II, 193.

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 174-175.

36

the only French officer in the colony empowered to make the
transfer.

Moreover, Fortier claims that the ceremony at

Balize was only a flag-raising ceremony.

The wording of

the document referring to Ulloa's commission to take pos
session of Louisiana and its government in the name of the
Spanish king completely refutes Fortier's statement. 37
Ulloa chose Balize for the transfer because Aubry had
advised him that no formal transfer could take place at New
Orleans without a large Spanish contingent.

The French of

ficial felt that disturbances would occur in the capital
city if the Spanish did not have a show of force at the
time of the act of possession.

Until the Spanish flag had

been raised at that city, actual control of the colony was
tenuous.

Even the Spanish Minister of State realized this,

for in a letter to Ulloa, written not long after the Balize
transfer, he stated:

"... when possession of the said

colony has been taken, this gentleman (Aubry) shall be given
a present of 3,000 pesos fuertes, so that he may arrange
38
for his voyage to France."
Thus, although the Marques de
Grimaldi knew that Louisiana was in law and in fact Spanish,
he realized that complete control of the colony could exist

37
Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 161-162.
O Q

Grimaldi to Ulloa, Aranjuez, June 20, 1768, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 50.
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only when the Spanish flag flew over New Orleans.

In conse

quence, it seems just to assert that the Spanish Court must
take the brunt of the responsibility for Ulloa's failure to
take possession of Louisiana.

The governor had often in

formed the Minister of State and the Captain General of Cuba
of his shortage of money and troops.

There was little else

Ulloa could have done under the circumstances, since all ap
propriations and troop movements were centrally controlled.
The status of the colony, however, was never legally in
doubt after 1764.

The Treaty-of Fontainebleau was valid.

The act of transfer at Balize was sufficient to effect the
change in government in Louisiana itself.

All of the colo

nists had the opportunity of knowing of the general terms
of the treaty; Director-General D'Abbadie had been informed
of the Treaty of Fontainebleau in a letter, dated April 21,
1764, from the Duke of Choiseul, the French Minister of
State.

Furthermore, Jean Milhet had returned to the colony

in 1767, after his interview with Choiseul, and had informed
the Superior Council and the other interested colonists that
Louisiana had indeed become a part of the Spanish Empire.
His long delay, however, did feed the hopes of the colonists
that perhaps Louisiana might again become French.

The dis

appointment his news brought, consequently, was all the more
bitter.^9

Nonetheless, it is incontrovertible that Ulloa was

accepted by the colonists as the de jure and de facto governor.

^Martin, A History of Louisiana, p. 201.

He and the Spanish troops were accepted, although half
heartedly.

In addition, Spanish money was the basic cur

rency, and only Spanish passports were acceptable.

No fur

ther proofs need be offered that the colony was, and was
known to be, Spanish.
To the unusual circumstances of effecting the trans
fer at Balize and Ulloa's refusal to act independently of
Aubry in the New Orleans area, was added the personal an
tagonism of the colonists toward the Spanish official.

He

had been married by proxy to a Peruvian lady, the Marchio
ness d'Abrado, whose arrival he awaited at Balize from Sep
tember, 1766, to March, 1767.

When he returned to New Or

leans with his new bride, no festivities were held for the
city's social elite to honor the occasion.

Certainly the

socially sensitive Creoles could interpret this as an af
front to themselves.

Yet, there is no evidence offered that

Ulloa intended to be discourteous.

It seems that he felt

that any other course of action at the time would be inop
portune, as he had not taken formal possession of the colony
at New Orleans.

He was a naturally retiring man, which may

help to explajLn the incident.^®
The rebellion, to a degree anticipated by Ulloa, occurred
late in October of 1768.

The early stages of the uprising

are fully described by the governor in a letter of October
26, 176 8, to Grimaldi:

4n
s'
.
. .
,uGayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 175-176; Fortier,
A History of Louisiana, I, 161.
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Most Excellent Sir:
My Very Dear Sir: Yesterday, the 25th, at eleven
o'clock Senor Maxent41 came to inform me of what had
been learned about the present disturbances, and a
little later the engineer, Don Ypolito Amelot, brought
me the same information. This leaves no doubt that
there is already a conspiracy of the whole colony to
refuse submission to the dominion of His Majesty.
Their plan is to present a manifesto full of com
plaints against me, because it is necessary to have
some pretext to excuse their report to the council....
The conspirators will ask, ..., that the council inti
mate to me that I should depart from the province, ....
In order to make it appear that they are forcing the
council to accede to this decision, they have drawn up
a memorial...
...we learned that next Friday the city will be
full of people, the Germans and the Acadians coming to
it, together with the people here, armed to carry out
the coup.
When the French governor tried to persuade the
attorney general (Lafreniere) to exert himself to put
down this uprising, the latter replied that he could
not do so,. ..
The French governor is of the opinion that this
uprising has been plotted among Lafreniere, Comisario
Foucault, and Noyan, the son-in-law of the former,...
...I have given Your Excellency this long account
before the trouble breaks out....
New Orleans, October 26, 1768.
Don Antonio de U l l o a . 42
Obviously the full extent of the disturbances then
occurring in New Orleans and its environs was understood by
Ulloa.

Both he and Aubry knew the plans of the conspirators

4lGilbert Antoine de St. Maxent was a rich planter sym
pathetic to the Spanish. He had given 1500 pesos to Ulloa's
government to pay the Germans for the food supplies bought
on^credit^ Gf. Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, p. 154.
42uiloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 26, 1768,
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 77-81.
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and the names of the leaders before the insurrection materi
alized.

The testimony of these two men was of invaluable aid

to the prosecuting attorney who tried the leaders of the con
spiracy and rebellion.
As foreseen by the Spanish governor, a meeting of the
Superior Council took place on October 28, 1768, to discuss
the legitimacy and the conduct of Ulloa and the Spanish re
gime he headed.

At that meeting Chauvin de Lafreniere, the

attorney general of the colony, in the most violent terms
urged the acceptance of a petition which he alleged the col
onists had drawn up and given him to present to the Superior
Council.

This petition demanded that Ulloa either present

his credentials to the Superior Council or face banishment
as a disturber of the peace.

Moreover, it insisted that all

of the former privileges of the colonists be restored by
Ulloa's government, and that free trade be allowed.
/■

At the

V

urging of Lafreniere, the Council accepted the petition in
its entirety.

Ulloa refused to submit to these demands, since

he considered himself the legal governor and did not recognize
the Superior Council as having any prerogatives.

Thus, an

impasse was reached.
Soon after these demands had been rejected, armed bands,
among whom were the Acadians and Germans from the coastal re
gions near New Orleans, arrived in the city.

These groups

✓

were led by Joseph Villere, Captain of the militia of the
German Coast, and by Jean Baptiste Noyan, Captain reforme of the
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French cavalry.

Aubry, fearing for Ulloa's safety, convinced

the Spanish governor that, as there was no adequate force to
provide protection for the governor and his family, they
should take refuge aboard the Spanish frigate, the Volante,
anchored in the New Orleans harbor.

Meanwhile, Aubry did

what he could to insure Ulloa's safety.

The Spanish garrison,

assisted by the French commandant and his regulars, put up a
show of resistance, and the French commandant tried to calm
the rebels.

With Ulloa ousted, the leaders, who apparently

had achieved their goal, accepted Aubry's suggestions.

Ulloa,

sensing his precarious situation, decided on November 1, 1768,
to sail for Havana. ^

Seemingly, the insurrection had suc

ceeded.^
Once in Havana, it was clear to Ulloa that to return to
Louisiana under the existing circumstances was impossible.
He informed his superiors in a letter of December 8, 1768,
that due to the extraordinary uprising in New Orleans, his
orders could not be carried out.

These instructions had pre

supposed the loyalty of the people of the colony to the Span
ish king.

Recent events, Ulloa noted, had clearly demon-

43in the meantime Ulloa had transferred to a French
vessel, Le Caesar, for the trip to Havana, as the Volante
was in need o£ repairs. (Cf. Gayarre,,— A History of Louisi
ana , II, 212; Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacioh
espaiiola, p. 172.)
^ S e e the letter of Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, Au
gust 21, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp.
262-264. Cf. also, Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 189-
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strated that no such loyalty existed-.
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Three of the Spanish officials in Ulloa's government
were compelled to remain in New Orleans by the rebel lead
ers.

Don Esteban Gayarre, the chief auditor, Don Martin

Narvarro, the treasurer, and Don Jose de Loyola, commissioner
of war and the military intendant under Ulloa, were held by
the rebels as surety for the 100,000 pesos owed to the in
habitants of Louisiana by the Spanish government.

Besides

these three men, there were only a few Spanish troops scat
tered throughout the colony.

Anti-Spanish feeling continued

in Louisiana well into the following year.

It reached a new

peak in April when the Volante was forced to sail for Havana.
Jose de Loyola, in a communique to Bucareli on April 20,
1769, reported that the spirit of rebellion had not in the
lease diminished. ^
Soon after Ulloa's departure, Pierre Marquis, a Swiss
by birth, and the elected colonel-general of the colony's
militia, began to spread ideas looking to the founding of a
republic in Louisiana.

This action would have required the

expulsion of Aubry and his troops.

However, the colonists

had maintained in their "Memorial" that they were loyal to

^Ulloa to Bucareli, Havana, December 8, 1768, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 80.
^Loyola to Bucareli, New Orleans, April 20, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid.. p. 84.

the French King.

Most of the leaders of the movement op

posed the establishment of a republic.

Consequently, a

"Memorial Against the Republic" was soon drafted and circu
lated among the inhabitants of the New Orleans area.

A

probable cause for their opposition to a republic was the
certainty that neither Spain nor France would have toler
ated its existence, lest other colonies attempt the same
course.

Too, they must have realized that Louisiana had

neither a sufficient population nor a strong enough economy
to sustain itself as an independent state.

They had enjoyed

considerable freedom under French rule, and doubtless the
overwhelming majority of them wished to return to their
previous status.

These realities, then, dealt a death blow

to the Quixotic ideas of a republic.

In a short time, Aubry,

Foucault, and the Superior Council were again in complete
control of the colony.^7
... The next step the colonists took to consolidate their
position was to draw up a "Representation to Louis XV."
This document was drafted by the Superior Council on Novem
ber 12, 1768, and contained protestations of Loyalty to
France.

It was carried to France by Ensign Bienville de

Noyan, a nephew of Sieur de Bienville, by M. Saint Lette,
who replaced Jean Milhet as an emissary, and by M. Lessassier.

47cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 278-282; Rod
riguez -Casado , Primeros anos de dominacion espanola.234-238;
Du Terrage, Les Dernieres Annies de la Louisiane Francaise,
p. 285.
*----
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Charles Aubry, who had resisted the rebellion from its in
ception, sent M. LaPeyiere to France to represent his pos
tion. 48

From that moment on, the colonists could do little

but await the reactions of the French and Spanish courts to
the rebellion and the "Representation".
The attitude of the French government to the uprising
was at first uncertain.

One French author, Pierre Boulle,

suggests that the French ministry, after hearing of the re
bellion, considered proposing to Spain that the Louisianians
be permitted to establish a republic under the joint protec
tion of France and Spain.

The Comte de Chalet, French

ambassador to England, is supposed to have recommended this
plan to the Duke of Choiseul.

The Count D'Estaing is alleged

to have further promoted this suggestion.

He felt that in

this way both Spain and France would be rid of the burden of
supporting and constantly defending the colony, and yet it
would still serve as a buffer to English expansion.49
Choiseul, however, rejected these recommendations, stat
ing that the plan would be too difficult to execute.

Boulle

suggests that the Duke did not wish to offend the Spanish
Court, which had meanwhile decided to re-establish Spanish

4^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros alios de dominacion espanola, pp. 218-220; Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 169.
^ P x e r r e H. Boulle, "French Reaction to the Louisiana
Revolution of 1768," in John Francis McDermott (ed.), The
French in the Mississippi Valley (Urbana, 1965) , pp. 143-157.
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rule in Louisiana by dispatching General O'Reilly to Louisi
ana with a large force.

He also suggests that Choiseul and

other members of the French Ministry hoped some day to have
Spain return Louisiana to France.^
Spain, for its part, could have taken the easy course
and abandoned this costly colony by returning it to France
as the rebels desired.

However, the ministry realized that

it was a good buffer against English expansion toward New
Spain.

Furthermore, they believed it might be unwise to

let the rebellion succeed in one colony, thereby setting a
bad example for other disaffected areas in the Spanish em
pire.

It was clear to the king and the Council of the In

dies that Spanish control would have to be imposed upon
Louisiana .*^
After several meetings of the Council of the Indies, a
decision was made to put down the rebellion.

The views of

the Council, in which the king acquiesced, were well ex
pressed by the Duke of Alba at a session on March 25, 1769.
Repression was necessary, he declared, in order to impress
upon the world, but especially upon the American colonists,
52
the power and prestige of Charles III.
The stage was set.

50Ibid., pp. 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157.
"^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 347.
52

/

Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, p. 291; Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 250.
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It was only a matter of time before the Spanish Court took
the steps necessary to bring the rebellious colonists effec
tively under Spanish rule.
In assessing the true nature of the rebellion, one fun
damental problem still needs to be resolved.
motives behind the insurrection?

What were the

The explanation given by

Ulloa and Aubry is essentially economic and political.

The

French and Spanish governors agreed that the rebels felt
that Ulloa had to be expelled so that the trade restrictions
which threatened them could be removed, and so that the Su
perior Council could continue to be the chief governing body
in the colony.

From the beginning of Ulloa's governorship,

the merchants and the people wanted to continue the free
trade that they had come to enjoy under the lax rule of
France.

Chauvin de Lafreniere, the attorney general, and

Nicholas Foucault, the French commissary, had encouraged
these sentiments among the rebels. 53
Another explanation for the insurrection is offered by
a well known twentieth-century Spanish scholar, Vicente Rodriguez-Casado. He discounts the assertions made by the
nineteenth-century French historian, Francois Barbe-Marbois,
who held that Ulloa was an absent-minded intellectual who
53
Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72 "C", L.C., pp. 262-264.
Ulloa to Grimaldi, Havana, December, 1768, ibid., Doc. 69,
L.C., pp. 119-215, passim. Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisi
ana, II, 237-238.

was incapable of attending to normal administrative affairs.
Instead, Rodriguez-Casado portrays Ulloa as a man faced with
the task of imposing strict control on a colony which had
for many years been free of nearly all restraint.

He had

been sent to Louisiana by a ministry that was almost totally
ignorant of the political situation that existed in Louisi
ana.

Coupled with a lack of money and a shortage of troops,

Ulloa had as an advisor an irresolute man (Aubry) who cat
ered to public opinion.

In the last analysis, according

to this scholar, the major cause of the rebellion was the
existence in Louisiana of a libertarian, anti-clerical
philosophy, widespread in France and in her possessions at
that time.

It was a philosophy that understood human lib

erty as a right which had no restraints placed upon it ex
cept those inherent in man's nature.
the laws of God had no place.

In this philosophy

It was, in effect, a philo

sophy which held up man as the supreme standard of morality
and law.

This concept of human nature was quite obviously

alien to that of the Spanish, who held that the king, under
God, determined the extent of human liberty in

society.

^4-

Professor John Preston Moore, a scholar in the field
of Spanish colonial history, cites a number of valid reasons
to account for Ulloa's failure in Louisiana.

Ulloa's own

Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 176, 177, 179, 2WT.
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person and personality were, in Professor Moore's view, a
hindrance.

The Spanish governor was of medium stature,

with stooped shoulders and pale cheeks.

He was tactless,

highly sensitive to criticism, and so retiring and unsocia
ble that he antagonized the socially-minded Creoles of New
Orleans.

Professor Moore noted that he failed to realize

how attached to France the colonists were and, perhaps most
damagingly, lacked the quality of "authentic leadership."
In addition to these personal defects, he was simply unfor
tunate in being short of both troops and money and was com
pelled to promulgate two unpopular restrictive mercantile
decrees.55
Needless to say, the rebels gave their own reasons for
ousting Ulloa.

Through their leaders they maintained that

Ulloa, without showing any credentials to the Superior Coun
cil, had assumed gubernatorial powers and had issued at his
own discretion the "oppressive" mercantile decree of Septem
ber, 1766.

They claimed that their products would not be

saleable in Spanish ports on a competitive basis.

They con

tended that they had been promised uninterrupted commercial
advantages for ten years; but Ulloa's decree of September,
1766, had taken away these

p r i v i l e g e s .56

55Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa,"
No. 3, pp. 197-219.

Louisiana History, VIII,

56Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 185, 187, 196,
"Memorial." It is interesting to note that the "Memo
rial" itself, which emphasizes economic motives so much,
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Besides the heavy stress placed on the economic reasons
for the rebellion, the insurrectionists stated that Louisi
ana would be more useful to Spain if France owned it.

They

said that France had kept the Indians loyal, but Ulloa and
his men had alienated them.

Further ar-,

Spanish governor of violating the marCouncil of Trent by permitting inten.

they accused the
- ; decrees of the

-riage between a

Spaniard and a Negress without the priest a consent.

Final

ly, they professed to offer no offense to the Spanish Court
when they affirmed their loyalty to France and their desire
to be subjects of Louis XV again.^7
Perhaps all of these explanations have some validity.
If this is true, then one must assign relative importance to
each of them.

First, Ulloa's correspondence with Bucareli

and Grimaldi makes it clear that the absence of a powerful
military force was the one factor that enabled the rebellion
to succeed.

In addition, the lack of a proper money supply

to administer the colony lost Ulloa the support of the colo
nial merchants.

This, too, is evident from Ulloa's communi

ques with Bucareli and Grimaldi.

The extent to which Ulloa

depended on Aubry and was willing to follow his advice was

contradicts Fortier who maintains that it was a love for
France that caused the rebels to oust Ulloa. (Cf. Ibid., 175.)
57Ibid., 199, 202, 203.
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a serious mistake.

Aubry was not only irresolute, as Rod-

riguez-Casado stated, but he was too subservient to the
Superior Council.

Had Ulloa acted on his own, had he shown

his credentials to the Superior Council from the first, and
had he cooperated with its members, there may well have been
no rebellion.

Had he been more sophisticated politically,

perhaps he could have governed the colony in cooperation with
the Superior Council, even on its terms, until he was in a
position of power.
Ulloa's tragedy, then, was his failure to assess quick
ly the political situation in the colony and to work within
its limitations.

The Superior Council was to him no more

than the equivalent of the Spanish cabildo, a body having
purely local powers and almost completely subordinate to
the governor.

An astute political leader would have soon

seen that in New Orleans the Superior Council had acquired
great powers, and he would have adapted his methods to meet
the needs of the situation.

In time, with the arrival of

the additional Spanish regulars, Ulloa's position would have
been secure.

Then he would have reduced the Council to the

status of a cabildo or, if so instructed, abolished it.^®

58it must be admitted that to a man of Ulloa's training
and background this would probably have been unthinkable, as
in so acting he certainly would have disregarded the orders
of the Minister of State, the Marques de Grimaldi.
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Therefore, it may be concluded that the real cause of
the rebellion was a political struggle between Ulloa and the
Superior Council.

A successful insurrection occurred because

Ulloa lacked the political ability to cope with the unfore
seen and difficult situation in which he found himself.

II
THE COMING OF GENERAL O'REILLY TO LOUISIANA
As soon as a decision had been reached in the Council
of the Indies to retain Louisiana, steps were taken to im
plement this policy.

Needed for the task was a man of con

siderable military experience who possessed the ability to
govern authoritatively, but with restraint.

This latter

quality was important lest over-severity cause either fur
ther disorders or induce the population to migrate to the
English colonies or to French possessions in the West Indies.
For this mission, the King selected Lieutenant-General Don
Alejandro O'Reilly.

The general was, at that time, one of

the most prominent soldiers in Spain and a man very high in
the favor of Charles III.

It is very likely that he was

recommended for the command by the Spanish Minister of State,
the Marques de Grimaldi, who had befriended him on previous
occasions.•*Alejandro O'Reilly was a soldier of fortune who had
left his native Ireland, as had many others who chafed under
English oppression.

He was born in Baltrasna, County Meath,

Ireland, in 1722, the son of Thomas Reilly (sic), a lieuten
ant in "Reilly's Dragoons," a brigade of the Spanish army.

■*-Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 291, 300.
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The young O'Reilly became a cadet in the Spanish infantry in
1732, at the age of ten.

He was commissioned a lieutenant

in the War of the Austrian Succession.

In 1757, during the

first stages of the Seven Years War, he enlisted in the Aus
trian army, in which he served for two years.
joined a French unit.

In 1759 he

In the service of France he disting

uished himself in the battle of Bergen in April, 1759, and
later in the battle of Minden in July, 1759.

Because of

O'Reilly's bravery in these engagements, the Duke of Broglie,
a high-ranking French commander, recommended him to Charles
III.

Upon O'Reilly's return to Spain, the king promoted him

to the rank of lieutenant colonel.^
When Spain entered the Seven Years War against England,
the young Irishman was given another chance to advance his
career.

Although the war did not go well for Spain, O'Reilly

was able to demonstrate his military competence.

During the

Spanish invasion of Portugal, England's ally, he led a regi
ment in the capture of Chares and Pancorro.
promoted to bridagier.

For this he was

From Pancorro, he led his brigade to

Villareal, where he took part in the siege of that city.
this engagement he again showed his talent for warfare.

In
His

personal successes once more brought O'Reilly to the atten
tion of Charles III, who, at the end of the conflict, promoted

•y

/

4

•“Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 286-287; David
Knuth Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly and the Spanish Occupation
of Louisiana," in New Spain and the Anglo-American West,
p. 166.
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to major general.

His contemporaries considered him one of
3

Spain's most outstanding military leaders.

The Spanish had lost Havana to England during the Seven
Years War, but it was returned to Spain by the peace treaty
which ended that conflict.

As Mariscal de Campot O'Reilly

led the Spanish forces which re-occupied Havana in 1763.^
He was ordered to restore fortifications there and in the
rest of the West Indies where great destruction had occurred.
Contained in his commission were additional instructions to
give a full report on the status of the island's economy,
its judicial system, and those-policies necessary to secure
the island and to render it profitable to the inhabitants
and to the crown.^
The reorganization of the army in Cuba was of first
importance.

The forces established by O'Reilly consisted

of four volunteer regiments, eight battalions of regulars
and one cavalry unit.

The four volunteer regiments and the

cavalry unit seemed especially well trained.

Of the eight

regular battalions, the three Plaza battalions and the
Guanabacoa battalions were better prepared than the four
3

Bjork, ibid., p. 167; Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos
de dominacion espanola, pp. 288-289.
4

Rodriguez-Casado, ibid., p. 300.

^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, Havana, April 12, 1764, A.H.N.,
Papeles de Estado, Legajo 3025, No. 4, microfilm.
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£
battalions of Cuba.

The latter needed further training.

The future defense of the colony was of great concern
to O'Reilly.

He felt that it would have to be defended by

its own people without appreciable support from Spain.

He

maintained that one naval squadron could delay enemy forces
until help came from Cartagena or other parts of the empire
south of Cuba.

There was only one place close enough to

Havana which could be used to bring in soldiers and that
was Xagua.^
The general's observations on the economy and status
of the population of Cuba are worthy of consideration.

He

noted the rich produce of the island and the excellent cli
mate.

However, he felt that the island was not yielding to

its full capacity.

On the contrary, it had been a drain on

the Spanish treasury, never returning to the mother country
a fair portion of what went into the island.

Much of the

wealth that was poured into the island from Spain was
drained off to foreigners in legal and illegal commerce.

6Ibid.
?0'Reilly to Arriaga, April 12, 1764, ibid.
Xagua is a port located in the city of Cienfuegos in
the Province of Santa Clara east of Havana on the island of
Cuba. It is an excellent port with a narrow entrance and
wide, calm bay. (Cf. G. A. Thompson (ed. and trans.), The
Geographical and Historical Dictionary of America and the
West Indies, V (London, 1816). 309.)
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O'Reilly insisted that this situation must be remedied.^
On the whole, according to this report, the island was
backward.

Although many causes could be cited for this con

dition, the main ones were the inadequacies of the judicial
system, a scarcity of labor for the haciendas, and the fail
ure of the merchants to provide inhabitants with the neces
sary goods at reasonable prices.

Justice was lacking owing

to the partiality and collusion of the municipal alcaldes,
and to the delays in appealing to higher courts.

O'Reilly

recommended that a special court be established in Havana
to expedite the handling of appeals which theretofore had
gone to the Audiencia at Santo

Domingo.^

This report was submitted to O'Reilly's immediate su
perior, the Conde de Ricla, then to the Marques de Grimaldi,
and finally to Don Julian de Arriaga, Minister of the Coun
cil of the Indies.

In concluding his report to Grimaldi,

O'Reilly made all of his recommendations in the hope that
the king would approve them.

Moreover, he petitioned that

he might return to Spain, as he felt his mission had been
completed.

Grimaldi noted in reply that the king had taken

these considerations under advisement.

The Minister of

State cited his approval for the advancement of agriculture

^O'Reilly to Arriaga, April 12, 1764, A.H.N., Papeles
de Estado, Legajo 3025.
9Ibid.
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as recommended by O ’Reilly.

Nothing was said of O ’Reilly's

suggestion to encourage immigration to Cuba, but Grimaldi
agreed that foreign commerce could not be totally excluded
from the island.

The general was ordered to remain in Cuba

until the inadequately trained troops were considered to be
an effective unit of the island's military establishment.^0
Late in 1764, O'Reilly was recalled to Spain and pro
moted to the position of Inspector General of Infantry.^
To the task of Inspector General, O'Reilly applied enthus
iasm and vigor.

He was expected to re-train the Spanish army

in the Prussian methods of warfare, and for this purpose he
established at Avila a military academy for officers.
Rodriguez-Casado commented on the general's perhaps
excessive enthusiasm for this project and noted that the
academy later fell into disuse due to opposition within the
Spanish officers' corps.

This group had consistently re

sisted the reforms introduced by O'Reilly.

Perhaps this

opposition was due, in part, to O'Reilly's origin. ^

As

military governor of Madrid, a position to which he was

•^Grimaldi

to O'Reilly, San Ildefonso, August 5, 1764,

ibid.
H-Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 299-300; Bjork, ''Alejandro O'ReTlly and the Span
ish Occupation of Louisiana," in New Spain in the AngloAmerican West, p. 167, citing A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-6.
-^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espan-

ola, p. 300.
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appointed in 1765, O'Reilly was able once again to advance
his career.

When riots occurred in Madrid in 1766, owing to

Charles Ill's promulgation of unpopular decrees, O'Reilly
acted promptly to protect the palace from a hostile mob.
His action in safeguarding the king's person gave him a
preferred place at the court.^

Because of the king's high

regard for O'Reilly and the general's excellent military
and administrative record, he was raised to the rank of
lieutenant general on July 15, 1767.-^
Thus, in 1769 when the king sought the right man to
suppress the rebellion in Louisiana, it was with good rea
son that Alejandro O'Reilly was chosen.

His military back

ground, his experience in Cuba, and his effective quelling
of the riots in Madrid well recommended him for the mission.
When the royal cedula was issued appointing O'Reilly comman
der of the expedition to bring order to Louisiana, it not
only made clear O'Reilly's powers but also bore testimony to
the esteem in which the king held the general.
THE KING
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, Knight Commander of the Or
der of Alcantara, Lieutenant General of My Armies:

l^wiiiiam K e m a n Dart, "Alessandro O'Reilly," The
Tulanian, Vol. II, No. 6 (April, 1906), pp. 12-13.
■^Expedientes personales Alejandro O'Reilly, Archivo
Geperal de Simancas, Letter from the Director of the Ar
chives at Simancas, April 21, 1967.
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Having great confidence in your well known zeal and
activity in behalf of my Royal Service, I have de
cided to send you to America with several missions.
Since the most important is to take formal possess
ion of the Colony of Louisiana, which my most worthy,
Christian and beloved cousin has ceded to me, I have
decided that as soon as you reach the island of Cuba
and organize the proper number of soldiers and ammu
nition and other supplies which you feel are neces
sary, and that after having then taken possession of
it in my Royal Name, you make formal charge and pun
ish according to the law, the instigators and accom
plices of the uprising which occurred in New Orleans,
... So that you may carry out my instructions fully,
I give you today such power and jurisdiction as shall
be necessary for handling each matter, case and inci
dent. .. . for this is my desire.
Dictated at Aranjuez on the
16th day of April of 1769.15
Upon receipt of his orders, O'Reilly prepared at once
to leave for America to carry out his mission.

He set out

from La Coruna, Spain, in May of 1769 and arrived in Havana
aboard the frigate La Palas on June 24, 1769.

There he

presented to Antonio Bucareli, Captain-General of Cuba, his
royal commission.I6

Pursuant to his instructions, the gen

eral organized an expedition to take possession of New Orle
ans.

The speed with thich the men and supplies were assem

bled demonstrated his ability in the field of logistics, as
well as the complete cooperation given him by Bucareli.

Ac

cording to Bucareli, when O'Reilly left for New Orleans on

l^The King to O'Reilly, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C.
pp. 341-342.
l^Bucareli'to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 8687.

the morning of July 6, the convoy under his command was
quite impressive:
... I have the special satisfaction of being able to
report to Your Excellency that yesterday morning at
six o'clock the said general (O'Reilly) set sail on
the frigate Volante, together with twenty other
ships,1/ carrying the troops, artillery, munitions,
provisions, equipment, and funds shown in the at
tached statements. ... The quality of the veteran
troops and militia composing the troops selected could
not be bettered, ... All of them are eager to show
their zeal on this occasion.18
The attached list indicated a total of 2,056 men,^ includ
ing infantry, pickets and artillery men.

For his military

supplies the general took 46 cannons of various sizes, mor
tars, a large supply of small arms and ammunition, as well
as medical provisions and food.

In addition, O'Reilly had

with him 150,000 pesos to pay the debts owed by the provin
cial treasury, and for the immediate needs of his troops and
the colony itself.^0

it seems that nothing was overlooked.

l^in addition to the Volante, there were 20 ships for
troops and supplies, including 2 hospital ships. ("El Diario
de la Expedicion de Alejandro O'Reilly para la Occupacion de
Nueva Orleans /.17697j ." A.H.N., Seccion de Diversos, Titulos
y Familias, PrTego /Condado de7, microfilm.)
■^Bucareli to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 86
87.
I9cayarre, on whom most students of this era have re
lied, states that O'Reilly had 2,600 men. (History of Louiana, II, 296.) Although he does not indicate it, Gayarre
might possibly have included the sailors who are not in Bu
careli s number.
^Bucareli to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 86
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The wisdom of having this overwhelming forceat his disposal
was soon evident.

The Spanish government did not repeat

the tragic error it had made during the regime of the unfor
tunate Ulloa.
The "Diary", or log of the voyage, has shed new light on
the intervening days between O'Reilly's departure from Hav
ana and his arrival at Balize.

The secretary on board the

Volante began his record on July 5 and ended it abruptly on
July 27. ^

Including the Volante, the ship on which O'Reilly

sailed, the convoy numbered 23 ships.

Two of these were hos

pital ships, and the remainder included three frigates, two
brigantines, six sloops, six schooners, two setees, one
lighter and one paquette.

The sailing instructions called

for the Volante to lead, with ten ships in parallel columns
on either side, with the hospital vessels between them.

The

convoy was under orders from its commander to keep this order
throughout the journey.^2
After lifting anchor about mid-day on July 6, the con
voy gradually pulled away from the port of Havana.

Some

2-*-The abrupt ending in the middle of a sentence indi
cates, among other possibilities, that the scribe was inter
rupted and never finished his account, or that the remainder
of the journal has been lost.
^ ^^Relacion y diario de todo lo acaecido en la expedicion del Excellentissimo Don Alejandro O'Rrely(sic) desde su
salida de la Havana tornado posesion del Orleans, A.H.N.,
Seccion de Diversos, Titulos y familias, Priego (Condado de),
2270.

days of the journey were eventful and were recorded, others
were omitted.

On the seventh, the crew saw turtles near the

ships and noted that the sky had some clouds.

On the eighth

the convoy was sailing in good order, in water of about 82
fathoms.

Apparently, nothing of importance occurred until

the twelfth when a storm developed and the sea became choppy
At the same time, a schooner was reported missing from the
convoy, but fortunately it was found about mid-day in Saint
Blaise's cove along the Apalache Coast.

By July 16, the

ships were within sixty leagues of Balize and, after sail
ing into water of only fifty-nine fathoms on the seventeenth
they were within twenty leagues of Balize by the eighteenth.
At about noon on July 20, the convoy sighted Balize at
a distance of about seven leagues.

At eight o'clock that

night, a crewman sounded the depth and discovered that the
ship was in only forty fathoms of water.

The entire convoy

was halted, and an expert was summoned to guide the vessels
through the shallow water.

He arrived on the following day

and guided them to the approaches of Balize.

At this point,

the navigators estimated that they were thirty-two leagues
from the city of New Orleans by way of the river.

Accord

ingly, they dropped their anchors.24
While aboard the Volante. General O'Reilly made his

23Ibid.

24Ibid.
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next move preparatory to taking possession of New Orleans.
The pen of Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Bouligny, the gen
eral's aide de camp, provides a vivid account of the events
surrounding the re-establishment of Spanish authority in
Louisiana.

O'Reilly himself verified this account in his

own report to Don Juan Gregorio de Munian, a member of the
Council of the Indies.
Bouligny was ordered by O'Reilly to carry to Charles
Aubry a letter, dated July 20, 1769, notifying the French
commandant of the general's arrival.

O'Reilly stated that

he had with him his royal commission to take possession of
the colony and asked Aubry for his cooperation.

Bouligny

was further ordered to see that notices of the arrival of
the Spanish forces were posted throughout the colony.

It

was hoped that this would contribute to the success of the
expedition by preparing the inhabitants for O'Reilly's com-

m g . 25
Bouligny disembarked from the Volante on July 21, at
two o'clock in the morning.

He went by oar boat up the

river and arrived in New Orleans at eleven o'clock at night
on July 24.

He had stopped at Balize to notify the French

commander there of his intention to meet with Acting-Gover
nor Aubry.

Farther up the river the colonel met four ships,

one English and three French.

25 Ibid.

Upon his arrival at New
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Orleans, he observed five or six others.26
In the city, Bouligny was greeted by a large crowd of
people, among whom were the three Spanish officials, Loyola,
Gayarre, and Navarro, who had been detained by the colon
ists.

Accompanied by the Spanish officials, he went to

Aubry's home and delivered O'Reilly's letter.

As Aubry's

knowledge of Spanish was inadequate, Bouligny offered to
translate the document into French.

Aubry responded very

favorably to the message and said that he would cooperate
fully with General O'Reilly and if necessary use his forces
to aid in suppressing any

op p o s i t i o n .

27

The following morning, Tuesday, July 25, at nine
o'clock, Aubry assembled the colonists in the Plaza and in
formed them of the arrival of O'Reilly and his forces.

Ac

cording to Bouligny, "all, terrified merely by the name of
Your Excellency (O'Reilly), became quiet, and only M. Mar
quis, retired Captain of Swiss troops, and M. Lafreniere,
Solicitor-General of the King in this Council, said that
they had to speak with M. Aubry in private...."28

26;Bouligny's Account to O'Reilly, New Orleans, July 26,
1769, Ms., Howard Tilton Memorial Library Archives (Tulane

University, New Orleans, La.), Emile and Rosemunde E. Kuntz
Collection.

27ibid.
28ibid.

At ten o'clock of that same morning, Aubry met again
with Bouligny in Loyola's house to inform him that all was
well and that Marquis and Lafreniere wished to go down the
river with him (Bouligny) to confer with the Spanish gen
eral, and to implore his clemency.

Later in the day, Bou

ligny dined with Loyola, Gayarre and Navarro at Aubry's
home.

All agreed that the city had responded wisely in

showing no signs of resisting the Spanish.29
Bouligny noted that he did not depart that same day
for Balize, as the men who had rowed him up the river
were exhausted.

During the delay he had a close watch kept

on Marquis and Lafreniere, lest they decide not to go to
meet with O'Reilly and instead organize a resistance.

On

Wednesday he again dined with Aubry who arranged for the
senior captain of the French garrison to return with Boulig
ny to bring Aubry's greeting to the Spanish General.
O'Reilly's aide noted also that he had been very cautious
in answering any questions put to him.

Doubtless, he feared

that he might unwittingly give comfort to anyone trying to
resist the Spanish in any

w a y .

30

In the meantime, the third delegate to greet O'Reilly
had been chosen.

This was Joseph Milhet.

On Thursday,

July 27, Bouligny, accompanied by Aubry's captain and the
three delegates of the people, descended the river to Balize

29Ibid.

30 Ibid.
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to meet the Volante as it was entering the pass.

Bouligny

reported to his superior and the delegates awaited their
interview with O ’Reilly.

According to Bouligny, the three

men were quite ill at ease upon meeting the Spanish general,
but Lafreniere was able to compose himself and make a con
ciliatory statement to O'Reilly in the name of all of the
colonists.

He spoke thus to the general:

M. Marquis, ... M. Milhet, ... and I, ... have been
chosen to come to assure Your Excellency of the sub
mission to the orders of Their Most Christian and
Catholic Majesties and of their veneration for the
military virtues and talents that have placed Your
Excellency in the high position in which you find
yourself. ... The colony never had any intention of
straying at all from the profound respect that
it professes for the great monarch that Your Excel
lency represents. The severity of the nature of Don
Antonio de Ulloa, and the subversion of the privi
leges assured by the act of cession have been the only
cause of the uprisings that occurred in this colony.
... The colony implores of your kindness, privileges,
and of your equity, sufficient delay for those that
wish to emigrate.^1
These comments seem incongruous coming from the firebrand
that led the insurrection against Ulloa.

Presumably the

overwhelming power of O'Reilly's forces had cooled Lafren
iere 's revolutionary

a r d o r . ^2

The Spanish general listened intently to Lafreniere's
comments and replied:

3lBouligny's Account of the Occupation of Louisiana,
Ms., Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
-^The "valiant" Lafreniere described by Fortier scarce
ly seems to fit the picture of the man painted by Bouligny.
Cf. Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 209.
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Gentlemen, it is not possible for men to judge things
without first finding out about the prior circumstan
ces; as soon as I arrive in the city I shall devote
all my attention to becoming informed about everything
thoroughly, and you may be sure that my greatest plea
sure will be to do good, and that I shall regret very
much to see myself compelled to do harm to anyone. I
shall be the first to provide you with the means to
pacify yourselves. Put the entire public at ease and
assure it of the good disposition into which I find
myself compelled by my character. I look with pleasure
upon the step that you have taken, for you may be sure
that otherwise I would have made the flag of my king re
spected, and that nothing would have stopped me, ...
Have you imagined yourselves capable of resisting the
forces of one of the most powerful kings of Europe,
and have you ever thought that the Most Christian King
(Louis XV)... would have ever supported or paid any at
tention to the cries of a seditious p e o p l e ? 3 3
Certainly the general made his position clear and left no
doubt that the rebels would be punished.

This was obviously

what the delegates understood, for Marquis interrupted the
general and complained of the word "seditious."

O'Reilly

bade him hold his peace and told him that in time he would
allow them to present their case.

Turning from these seri

ous matters, O'Reilly invited the three to dine with him
aboard the frigate.

Afterwards, Marquis, Lafreniere and

Milhet returned to New Orleans "full of admiration for his
(O'Reilly's) talents and very hopeful of his clemency."34
O'Reilly's account of his arrival and subsequent ac
tions through the end of August of 1769 was less colorful

33Bouligny's Account of the Occupation of Louisiana,
Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
34Ibid.
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and less detailed than Bouligny's, but it corroborated and
complemented the colonel's.

Don Alejandro noted his depart

ure from Havana on July 6, and his arrival and anchorage at
the mouth of the Mississippi on July 22.

It was due to a

lack of a favorable wind that he decided to send Bouligny
ahead by row boat to meet with Aubry.

The general noted that

the colonists had shown some signs of resistance.

However,

as soon as they learned of the size of his forces and of his
determination, they became "more friendly."33
The three delegates sent by the colonists had aroused
O'Reilly's suspicions.

He believed that they had accompan

ied Bouligny to ascertain the strength of the Spanish forces
and to determine the general's true intentions.

After he

had met with them, O'Reilly was aware that they saw it would
be useless to resist.3^
During the interview with the three colonists O'Reilly
was certain that they were very anxious to learn his atti
tude toward them in particular, and toward the colonists in
general.

He professed in his letter to the Minister of State

that he was without prejudice toward anyone, but that he
would do whatever justice required.

It is interesting to

note that he commented in this communique to Grimaldi that

330'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp. 218-220.
36Ibid., pp. 221-222.
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he had not deceived the delegates as to his intentions, but
nonetheless he had not permitted them to exonerate themselves
of all guilt.

To the delegates he had stated that he would

not treat them unjustly, but he refused to commit himself as
to the nature or the extent of any punishment to be inflicted. 37 Undoubtedly, his evasiveness during the meeting led
many historians, including Fortier, to accuse him of dupli
city.

However, O'Reilly's statements to the three men were

certainly adequate to make his position clear.

Men such as

Lafreniere, Marquis and Milhet could hardly have believed
that a rebellion against the Spanish -crown would go unpun
ished.

Moreover, due to circumstances, there was ample time

for those who wished to do so to leave the colony.

They met

with the general on July 27, and it was not until August 18
that O'Reilly disembarked in New Orleans.
When the three colonists returned to New Orleans,
O'Reilly sent with them Spanish officers from his expedition
to prepare for his arrival.

They were on the whole well re

ceived by the inhabitants of the colony.

The only signs of

opposition came from the Acadians and Germans who lived along
the coast.

Consequently, these two groups were warned by

O'Reilly's emissaries of the destruction that awaited them
if they dared to take up arms to resist the Spanish forces.38

37Ibid., pp. 223-224.
38Ibid., pp. 225-227.
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After these preparatory moves, the general moved the
convoy toward New Orleans.

To avoid all unnecessary actions

that might cause resistance, and to prevent the flight into
English territory of some of the rebels, the convoy moved
quietly into the New Orleans port during the night of Aug
ust 16.

The people living in and near the city were awakened

on the morning of the 17th by cannon shot from the flotilla.
When they arrived at the river's bank, they found the entire
Spanish force anchored in the river.^9
Later during the day of the 17th, Aubry, the French
Commissary Nicholas Foucault, and other French officials
came aboard the frigate Volante to confer with General
O'Reilly.

Aubry pledged his loyalty to the Spanish king

and gave his submission to O'Reilly.

Foucault seemed to

have nothing to offer but complaints against the former
Spanish administration.

O'Reilly, for his part, did not

reveal his intentions to the French. ^

Thus, for the

remainder of the 17th the situation remained static.

The

stage was set for the impressive and near heraldic events
that were to follow on the 18th--events quite in contrast
to those surrounding the arrival of the first Spanish

3^0'Reilly to Munian? New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-10, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 91.
^ 0 'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp. 228-230.

71
Antonio de Ulloa. Bouligny vividly narrated these events:
Everything was ready for the 18th when pos
session was taken of the Plaza with all the form
and ceremony appropriate. Our troops in the center
of the Plaza occupied the three sides of a square
and the French militiamen closed the square. The
General disembarked at 5:30 P.M., and came to the
center of the Plaza, where he presented to M. Aubry
that which he was waiting for, the order of His
Most Catholic Majesty. Immediately the latter
placed at his feet the keys of the city. At the
same time, several Spanish flags were run up in all
parts of the city, and the artillery of the Plaza
and all the troops fired a general salute. After
this, our General, with the French commandant and
all the officers who were not under arms went into
the Church where the Te Deum was sung as an act of
Thanksgiving.^1
After taking possession of Louisiana in the name of
Charles III, O'Reilly again conferred with Aubry that same
day.

The general made it clear to Aubry that he intended

to obtain all the necessary documents:

"... para fundar la

causa contra los motores ..." of the rebellion.^

He left

no doubt that he would do his utmost to punish the leaders
of the insurrection.
public knowledge.

That there had existed a rebellion was

The general's task was to ascertain the

true causes of the uprising and to punish its leaders.

To

do this, witnesses would have to be called and all available
information gathered and examined.

The following day O'Reilly

ordered Aubry to prepare an account of the events surrounding

^Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
^ 0 ' Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. p. 235.
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the rebellion.^
The prompt cooperation given by Aubry indicated his
devotion to duty and his desire to cooperate with the Span
ish general.
quest.

He was indeed able to fulfill O'Reilly's re

His testimony was important to Del Rey, the Prose

cuting Attorney, in the conviction of the rebel leaders.

The

conspirators named by him in this report were Chauvin de Lafreniere, Procurator General (Attorney General) of his col
ony; Pierre Marquis, elected Colonel-general of the militia;
Jean Baptiste Noyan, a militia captain; Ensign Bienville de
Noyan of the French Navy; Nicholas Foucault, the French Com
missary; and Joseph Villere", captain of the militia.

Due

to the urgency of O'Reilly's order, Aubry's report was but
a preliminary one.

He did not name all of the conspirators,

nor did he give a full account of the causes of the insurrec
tion.

He promised O'Reilly that a complete report would be

forthcoming.^
On August 21, O'Reilly again conferred with the French
governor.

Later that day, each of the men (except Nicholas

Foucault) who had been implicated by the witnesses as the
prime movers and chief accomplices in the consipracy were

^ 0 ' Reilly to Aubry,
ibid., Doc. 72, "B," L.C.

New Orleans, August 19, 1769,
p. 257.

^Aubry to O'Reilly,
ibid., Doc. 72, "C," L.C.

New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
pp. 261-264.
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summoned to O'Reilly's residence.

Upon their arrival,

they were accused of sedition and treason and were arrested
by the Spanish guards.

Those detained were:

Chauvin de La-

freniere, Hardi de Boisblanc, Balthasar Massan, Joseph
Villere,^^ Pierre Marquis, Pierre Poupet, Joseph Petit,
Pierre Carresse, Julian Jerome Doucet, Jean and Joseph Milhet, Jean Baptiste Noyan and M. Le Braud.^
The manner of their seizure was not unusual in Spanish
procedure.

Each man was charged with sedition and treason

and arrested in the name of the king.

Then they were "...

taken as prisoners two by two and accompanied by various com
panies of grenadiers; they passed through a throng of people,
stunned to see exercised a justice that up to then they were
not acquainted with."^8

Two 0f those arrested were put in

confinement in the treasury building, eight were placed on
the Spanish ships anchored in the port, and three were placed

^Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collec
tion.
^According to Fortier, Joseph Villere" was arrested
later. (A History of Louisiana, I, 215.)
4?List attached to letter from O'Reilly to Grimaldi,
New Orleans, August 31, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc.
72, "D," L.C. p. 265.
Le Braud was released since he presented the "Memorial"
on order to Foucault, his superior. (Cf. Gayarre, History
of Louisiana, II, 313.)
^Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collec
tion.
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under guard in the barracks area.^
The dread i n s t i l l e d

i n the p e o p l e by t h e s e sudden a r 

r e s t s made O ' R e i l l y s e e the n e c e s s i t y o f q u i e t i n g t h e i r
fears.

T h e r e f o r e , he summoned the merchants o f th e c i t y and

spoke t o them r e a s s u r i n g l y :
Gentlemen, may what you have just seen not cause the
slightest uneasiness in anyone. That is a precise
justice in order to assure for you and this entire
city the quiet and tranquillity which it has lacked
for so long. The prisoners will be judged; each one
will be granted all possible means to justify himself;
the innocent will be set free, and the guilty will
suffer the penalty of the laws. Notwithstanding this,
the many confederates that the prisoners had in this
country have caused an almost general desolation; fear
has overcome the rest, and I believe that this alone
will be sufficient so that they will never (again)
think of departing from the legitimate obedience of
their sovereign .5”
Shortly after this, the general commanded that a Proc
lamation, dated August 21, 17 69, be posted on the doors and
the corners of buildings throughout the city.

It granted a

general amnesty to the populace of New Orleans and of Louisi
ana who had "... allowed itself to be led astray by the in
trigues of ambitious ... people."

Each citizen, the decree

stated, should consider himself thankful that he was the sub
ject of so merciful a king as Charles III, and out of grati
tude should show unswerving fidelity to His Most Catholic

^ O ' R e i l l y to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. p. 239.

50Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collec
tion.
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Majesty.51
Another proclamation was issued by the Spanish governor
on August 23, 1769.

It ordered all of the inhabitants to

assemble on the following day before the dwelling in which
O'Reilly was lodged.

Here the citizens were commanded to
CO

take the oath of fealty to Charles III.

However, the

actual procedure of administering this oath to all the
classes of citizens was not completed until August 26th, when
everyone, including the clergy, promised his allegiance to
the Spanish monarch.

Each person signed his name to the

formulary, which, along with other documents, was sent to
Don Juan Gregorio de Munian, member of the Council of the
Indies.53
In the meantime, O'Reilly ordered the arrest of Nicholas
Foucault, the French Commissary.

In a communication to

Aubry on August 23rd, the general noted that he had before
him the original of a paper called, "The Memorial of the
Inhabitants and Merchants of Louisiana,"
Le Braud under orders from Foucault.

printed by M.

This document was

^Proclamation of Amnesty, New Orleans, August 21,
1769, Bancroft Library copy in French, in Kinnaird, Spain
in the Mississippi Valley, p. 89; Proclamation of Amnesty,
New Orleans, August 21, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc.
72, L.C. p. 274; Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz
Collection.
^proclamation, August 23, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo
2543, Doc. 72, L.C. p. 279.
53o'Reilly to Munian, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-1, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 90-91.
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most offensive to His Catholic Majesty and to the Spanish
nation.

Because of Foucault's orders to have this paper

printed and because of the grave accusations implicating
him in the rebellion, O'Reilly requested that Aubry order
his

arrest.

^4-

In his reply, Aubry told O'Reilly that he

had immediately ordered the arrest of Foucault.

Moreover,

he noted that even if O'Reilly had not ordered the commisary's arrest, he would have taken him into custody.

Aubry

maintained that not only had Foucault ordered the printing
of the "Memorial", but he had abused his authority, and had
been a chief leader among those who had aroused the people
I
in the rebellion. Aubry had chosen M. Baube, Foucault's
assistant to replace the c o m m i s a r y T h a t Foucault as a
French official, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Spanish
courts is thus clearly indicated by this exceptional action
taken by Aubry at O'Reilly's request.
In his report to Munian, O'Reilly summed up the events

of the first few days of his occupation, giving a clear
picture of the state of affairs in the colony:
"... On the 21st, I had all the principal
leaders and instigators of the recent up
rising arrested; on the 26th, the inhabi
tants of all classes took an oath of

5^0'Reilly to Aubry, New Orleans, August 23, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 275-277.
S^Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 24, 1769,
ibid., p . 278.
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fealty before me, each one signing his name
in the order in which Your Excellency will
see from the attached formulary No. 1.
... The edict, of which I enclose a copy,
reassured the populace, which was greatly
terrified.
... With the leaders already imprisoned
and their property confiscated, their trials
are now proceeding in accordance with the
laws, before the judges whom I brought from
Havana for this purpose .... Not an officer
or even a soldier has said a single improper
word to these people. This great moderation
and good conduct has filled these natives
with confusion, as they (through malign in
fluences) had so greatly wronged our nation
without knowing us.... My measures up to
now have produced as favorable effects as
might be desired for the King, the public,
and my own satisfaction...."5d
Indeed, the new subjects of the Spanish king seemed to
be overwhelmed by O'Reilly's military power and his adminis
trative

tactics. He had combined the swift arrest of the

leaders of the insurrection with a general amnesty for the
average citizen.

Within ten days after his arrival in New

Orleans, he had established order and imprisoned the leaders
of the rebellion.

In the communique to Munian, the general

confidently assured the minister of the Council of Indies
that within four months all of the tasks assigned to him in
Louisiana would be performed, and he would then be ready to
depart for Havana.

There he planned to await whatever

5 ^0 ' R e i l l y to Munian, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-1, in Kinnaird, Spain in the M ississippi
Valley, pp. 90-92.
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further instructions the King chose to send him.-^

His

optimistic view of the amount of time needed for settling
the affairs of the colony was not far wrong.

Within two

r

months of the predicted period he had brought order to
Louisiana and had departed for Havana.

57 Ibid., p . 92 .

Ill
THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS
The trial of those indicted as leaders of the rebellion
against Don Antonio de Ulloa began late in August, 1769, and
did not terminate until October 24.

It was conducted accord

ing to the standard Spanish judicial procedures.

The promotor

fiscal, or royal prosecuting attorney, was Felix del Rey,
advocate of the Royal Audiencias of Santo Domingo and of New
Spain.

He was assisted by the official scribe of the expe

dition, Francisco Xavier Rodriguez.-*-

The Spanish court set

out to prove that there had been a conspiracy to oust Ulloa,
and that treason and sedition had been committed by the
leaders of the rebellion.

The prosecutor began the trial by

obtaining sworn statements from many witnesses.

His key

witness was the acting French governor, Charles Phillipe
Aubry, whose testimony was basically the same as that in
Aubry's letter to O'Reilly on August 20.

On that day the

Spanish general had told Aubry that as a witness to the

•*-0'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, June 27 , 1769, Dis
patches of the Spanish Governors, 1766-1791, Book I, Vol.
I, (translated 1937-38), Survey of Federal Archives,
Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
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insurrection, he (Aubry) was expected to give:

"... the

true causes, with the names of the persons who led the
people to commit the offense of being present in this
Plaza, for the purpose of bringing about the violent ex
pulsion of Don Antonio ..."^

Aubry immediately answered

this letter and provided an account of the causes of the
rebellion, with the names of most of the men arrested as
leaders in the conspiracy.^
Before giving the names of the rebel leaders and the
parts they played, Aubry sketched the background of the
revolt against Ulloa.

In explaining the circumstances

surrounding the insurrection, he listed as one of its
important causes a shortage of troops in Louisiana, which
resulted from the fact that the expected enlistments of
the French soldiers in the Spanish army had not occurred.
Due to this drastic shortage of troops, the French and
Spanish commanders had even been forced to pool their man
power to defend the colony.

They had placed their few men

at posts along the Mississippi where they found British
fortresses or troop concentrations on the river's east bank.
Aubry further noted that the colonists meanwhile had
accepted Ulloa as the legal governor.

They had acknowledged

^O'Reilly to Aubry, New Orleans, August 19, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, "B," L.C. pp. 257-260.
3Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
ibid., Doc. 72, "C," L.C. pp. 257-260.
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Spanish authority and knew that Spain was the source of
their money supply and that the Spanish government also
issued the passports for the colony.

It was Aubry's

opinion that the shortage of troops had prevented Ulloa
from taking possession of the colony at New Orleans.

The

French commander commented that another factor in encourag
ing the revolt was undoubtedly the issuance by Spain of the
two restrictive mercantile decrees of 1766 and 1768
respectively.

But in the last analysis Aubry held that the

chief cause of the insurrection was the Superior Council's
ambition to become the supreme governing body in the colony.4
The men named by Aubry as the leading conspirators
/

were:

v

C n a u v m de Lafreniere, Procurator General of the

colony; Nicholas Foucault, French Commissary; Balthasar Massan,
Chevalier of Saint Louis; Pierre Marquis, retired Commandant
of the Swiss company under Louis XV; Chevalier Bienville
de Noyan, Ensign of the Royal French Navy;^ Joseph Villere,
Captain of the militia along the German Coast; Jean Baptiste
Noyan, retired Captain of French cavalry;^ and Jerome Julian
Doucet, a lawyer recently arrived from France.

These men

4Ibid., pp. 261-264.

C

JThis Bienville was a nephew of the famous governor of
Louisiana, the Sieur de Bienville.
^Noyan was also a nephew of Sieur de Bienville.
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had set out to destroy Aubry's efforts to induce the
colonists to accept Spanish rule.

Moreover, they had

convinced the people that the Spanish governor was a
tyrant and that if the Spaniards remained in control of
Louisiana, the colonists would be no better off than
7

slaves.

According to A u b r y 1s testimony the conspiracy among
these men was so well guarded that it was not until four
days before the actual revolt, that is, on October 25,
1768, that their plans were discovered.

The French

commandant said that he had informed Ulloa of the plot
so that the two men could act together in this serious
matter.

Then, on October 26, he called together his

officers and men and informed them that he wished no harm
to come to the Spanish governor.

Unfortunately, Aubry

had at his command only about one hundred regulars.

On

that same evening, October 26, the French commandant con
ferred with Attorney General Lafreniere, who told him that
he had in his possession a petition from the colonists
addressed to Commissary Foucault.

This document asked

Foucault to call a special meeting of the Superior Council
to plan measures to remove Don Antonio de Ulloa and the other

^Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, "C," L.C. pp. 261-264.
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Spanish officials from the colony.

Lafreniere, moreover,

told Aubry that the entire male populace of New Orleans
and its environs was armed at that very moment.
Seeing the extent of the conspiracy, Aubry said he
appealed to Lafreniere and Foucault to halt it, but
Lafreniere answered that it had progressed too far, and
Foucault was noncommittal in his reply to Aubry.

On October

27, Ulloa agreed to hear the Council's demands in order to
avoid bloodshed.

The colonists were expected to have

delegates at the meeting to present their case, and they
had promised to attend unarmed.

On the following day, how

ever, the situation worsened considerably, as large groups
of armed men were gathering near the city.

At that point,

Aubry said that he had feared for Ulloa's safety.

The

French governor convinced the Spanish governor that he and
his family should take refuge aboard the Spanish frigate
Volante, where they could be more readily protected by the
French and Spanish troops.
By October 29 approximately one thousand armed men led
by members of the Superior Council, were in the Plaza
carrying white flags and shouting,

"Long live the King of

France", and "We want no other King."

Braving this mob and

trying to-quiet them, Aubry said that he addressed himself
to the Superior Council and reminded its members that Ulloa's
person was sacred and that he represented a great monarch.
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In spite of these efforts, as Aubry noted, the insurrection
continued.

After Ulloa's departure, Marquis with a company

of sixty or seventy men, went in pursuit of Don Antonio's
ship.

Hearing of this, Aubry commanded Marquis and his men

to return to New Orleans.

The French commandant noted that

for the first time since the rebellion had begun, they obeyed
him. 8
Aubry then made his charges against individual rebels.
He asserted that Marquis had consistently refused obedience
to him, the supreme commander.

The only occasion on which

Marquis had obeyed orders was in the incident concerning the
pursuit of Ulloa's ship.

Moreover, after Ulloa's expulsion,

Marquis had proposed the establishment of a republic,
by demanding independence even of France.

there

Aubry stated that

Doucet had helped to compose the infamous "Memorial of the
Inhabitants and Merchants."
Villere had defied him, and

He testified that Joseph
had stirred up the Germans and

the Acadians who lived along the coast.

Villere^ had also

accompanied the Acadians intheir march on the
Orleans.

Massan, he noted,

city of New

had held meetings with the

conspirators in his house, and had spoken out against Spanish
rule in virulent language.

8I b i d . , p. 264-271.

Aubry leveled no definite charges
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against either Ensign Bienville or Noyan, but he named them
as accomplices in the insurrection.^
In a later statement to O'Reilly, Aubry gave detailed
accusations against Commissary Foucault.

He charged Foucault

with calling the Council into session to discuss the "Memorial"
on October 28, and of later ordering the printing and dis
tribution of that same "Memorial" among the people.

More

over, as Aubry noted, instead of siding with him, Foucault
/

V

had supported Lafreniere and the other rebels in inciting
the people to revolt.

Aubry held that these actions were all

the more offensive and worthy of condemnation, as Foucault
in his official capacity as commissary knew that the colony
was a Spanish possession.

He had been officially informed

by the Duke de Praslin in a letter of February 23, 1767,
that once Don Antonio de Ulloa arrived in Louisiana the
colony was to be considered Spanish.10
Charles Garic, the chief scribe of the Superior Council,
also testified against Foucault.

He stated that the Com

missary had abided by the Council's decision to oust Ulloa,
and that he had gone with Lafreniere to ask Aubry to assume

^Aubry's testimony, A.H.N., Papeles de Estado (herein
after cited as P.E.), Legajo 20.854, Foxas 21-26, ^cited in
Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espatiola,
pp. 396-399.
■^Aubry's testimony concerning Foucault, attached to
O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, "E", L.C. pp. 327-332.
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the reins of government. 11
O'Reilly resolved to accept Foucault's claims that
since he was a French official directly appointed by Louis
XV he was not subject to the Spanish tribunal.

Nevertheless,

the governor chose to obtain a statement from him before
sending Foucault to France for trial.

Although charged

with all of the above offenses by Aubry, Foucault refused
to make any answer to them, except to admit that he had
ordered the printing of the "Memorial."

He was finally

sent to France in the custody of a Spanish sergeant major.

12

It is clear that there was weighty evidence against
Foucault.

Had he been subject to the Spanish tribunal he

would have undoubtedly been convicted along with the other
leaders of the insurrection.

As it was, he arrived in France

at La Rochelle and was arrested there by French officials on
December 30, 1769.
Bastille.

From La Rochelle he was taken to the

His hearing and trial proceedings continued

there until June of 1771, at which time his case was dis-

Garic's testimony concerning Foucault, attached to
O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
ibid., 7," L.C. p. 339.
•^Ibid., Enclosure "E," L.C. pp. 327-332; O'Reilly to
Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, ibid., L.C. pp. 317320.
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^
missed and he was set at liberty. 1J
Another key witness for the prosecution was Don Esteban
Gayarre, chief auditor under Governor Ulloa.

Gayarre im

plicated Lafreniere, Foucault, Carresse, Villere, Marquis,
Noyan and Massan.

He stressed the vital role played by

Lafreniere in organizing the conspiracy, stating that: "...
acting among them as chief or head was the said Lafreniere,
with whose consent the others worked in everything related
to the conspiracy; and the writings or papers leading to
it which publicly manifested his consent (to it) and his
hatred of the Spanish nation, were produced (with his con
sent), ..."

He further stated that Marquis was the leader

of the rebellious militia units and that Massan had been a
militia commander under Marquis.

Noyan and Villere" were

also named by him as leading conspirators, and Villere was
accused of stirring up the Germans and the Acadians.^

Thus,

in addition to corroborating Aubry's testimony against Lafren
iere, Foucault, Massan, Villere, Marquis and Noyan, Gayarre
added Carresse to the list of conspirators.
The next witness for the state was Don Martin Navarro,
royal treasurer for the colony of Louisiana under Ulloa.

He

■^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 332-333.
■^Testimony of Don Esteban Gayarre, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo
2_0.854, Foxas ll-vL2, printed in Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros
anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 388-391.
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\

also testified that Lafreniere had been the main leader of
the insurrection.

He then named Foucault, Massan, Marquis,
/

Carresse and Noyan as conspirators.

Villere, he stated, had

stirred up the Germans and the Acadians.

His testimony

corroborated Gayarre's indictment of Carresse, supported

s

Aubry's charges against Villere, and added weight to the
charges made against Foucault, Massan, Marquis and Noyan.
Navarro gave further testimony naming Jerome Doucet as a
main accomplice.

This man had been accused by Aubry of

helping to draw up the "Memorial".

Navarro then added new

names to the list of conspirators and accomplices when he
accused the Milhet brothers, Jean and Joseph, of leading
their respective militia units against Governor Ulloa.
Moreover, Joseph Petit, according to Navarro, had been a
prime mover in the rebellion, while Pierre Poupet and Hardi
*1 C

de Boisblanc had been leading accomplices.

The case for

the crown was indeed becoming strong.
Another important witness was Jose Melchor de Acosta,
captain of the frigate Volante.

He gave evidence against ten

of the twelve who were to be later convicted.

His accusations,

with those of Aubry, Gayarre and Navarro, gave the state two
reliable witnesses testifying against each of the accused.

*!C

-‘--’Testimony of Don Martin Navarro, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo
20.854, Foxas 14, 15, 16, ibid., pp. 392-394.

After swearing that he would tell the truth, the captain
noted that four or five days prior to the rebellion he had
heard rumors of a possible uprising and had immediately
informed

Don Antonio de Ulloa.

recount his experiences

De Acosta then

wentonto

during the last stages of the in

surrection:
...presently on the evening of the day
preceding the rebellion, he encountered
M. Lafreniere in Aubry's house and
observed that he was beside himself with
anger, and that he allowed himself to
say, while walking about his room, that
M. Foucault was an evil man, and Lafreniere
was even worse, ..."
De Acosta continued to testify that Aubry had told him that
he (Aubry) had tried to learn from Lafreniere what was trans
piring in the colony.

From this conversation with Lafreniere,

Aubry was convinced that the conspiracy was being instigated
^

^

1 /I

and led by Foucault and Lafreniere.
He further noted that Boisblanc and Carresse had been
associated with the chief conspirator, Lafreniere; and he
then accused Joseph Milhet of joining the rebel band that
gathered in New Orleans.
the Acadians.

He said that Villere had accompanied

Foucault, he commented, had ordered M. Denis

Braud to print the "Memorial," which Doucet had helped to
draw up.

Massan was accused of allowing the conspirators to

^Testimony of Captain Jose Melchor de Acosta, A.H.N.P.E.,
Legajo 20.854, Foxa? 8-11, ibid., pp. 383-387.
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meet in his home, and of being a member of the revolutionary
Superior Council.

De Acosta also accused Boisblanc and

Petit of being collaborating members of the Council.

He

named Poupet as its treasurer, and he cited Jean Milhet
for leading his militia unit in pursuit of Don Antonio on
the vessel which was taking him to Balize for safety.^
This extensive testimony was given by presumably trust
worthy men, who were either French or Spanish officials.
Consequently, it is little wonder that the prosecutor for
the Spanish crown had no difficulty in presenting a con
vincing case against the rebels.

Felix del Rey, the pro-

motor fiscal, very carefully stated the case for the crown.
In his preliminary statement, he reviewed the background of
the rebellion.

Next he drew up the case against the leaders

and chief accomplices.

Finally, he elaborated upon the

Spanish laws under which the accused were to be sentenced,
if proven guilty.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor pointed out
that by an act of cession the colony of Louisiana had been
transferred from France to Spain; that Don Antonio de Ulloa
had been sent by His Most Catholic Majesty to take possession
of the colony; that Ulloa, due to a shortage of troops, had
decided to postpone the formal act of possession until more

17 Ibid.
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troops had arrived from Spain; that Governor Aubry and
Governor Ulloa had worked together in the administration
of the colony; that some months after Ulloa's arrival,
formal possession had in fact been taken by Ulloa at the
post of Balize, and the Spanish flag had been raised at
the other posts of the colony;

"... Don Carlos Aubry made

formal delivery of the fort at Balize and of all other posts
in the Province to Don Antonio,

... as the person destined

for that end by His Most Catholic Majesty, the new Lord of
this country,

..."^®

He maintained, in effect, that as a re

sult of this transfer and Ulloa's actual administrative
actions, the colony of Louisiana was not only de jure, but
also de facto Spanish.

For further proof he noted that the

military, civil and ecclesiastical officials recognized Ulloa
as the rightful Spanish governor.

Moreover, Spanish money

supported the colony; salaries of officials were paid by
the Spanish commissary; military posts were built and old
ones were repaired at Spanish expense; churches were like
wise repaired and new ones built by the Spanish; and, finally,
passports were issued by the Spanish authorities.

All of

these things proved, Del Rey stated, that the colony was in
law and in fact under the dominion of Spain.

18

In addition to

J-°Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, attached to letter from
O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 28, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 360-364.
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this, the Duke of Praslin himself had informed Commissary
Foucault in 1767, that henceforth in Louisiana the only
legal money was Spanish.

No further evidence, Del Rey

commented, was needed to prove that Louisiana was in fact
a Spanish colony .^
The prosecutor then discussed the origins of the
rebellion.

He noted that there were a few individuals who

had been dissatisfied with Spanish rule.

These had spoken

out against the commercial decrees issued by the Spanish
government, declaring that the colonists would be worse
off than slaves under Spanish rule.

Meanwhile, the con

spirators induced a number of men to sign a petition of
grievances against the new government, and presented it to
the Superior Council.

This petition contained many state

ments offensive to the Spanish nation, demanding among other
things the expulsion of Don Antonio and his followers.
It was under the leadership of Nicholas Foucault and
Chauvin de Lafreniere that the rebellion took form.

These

were joined by Balthasar Massan, Ensign Bienville, Jean
Baptiste Noyan, Pierre Marquis and Joseph Milhet.

Under the

guidance of Lafreniere and Carresse, the "Representation"
was soon drawn up.

Joseph Villere, meanwhile, was inciting to

rebellion the Germans along the coast, while Noyan stirred

^ Ibid. , pp. 364-365, 391-392. Del R e y 's convincing
arguments seem to render untenable Fortier's defense of the
justice of the rebels' cause and his assertion that the col
ony was still French.
(Cf., Fortier, A History of Louisiana,
I, p. 162.
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up the Acadians.
Continuing his case, del Rey noted that when Aubry
learned of the conspiracy on October 25, he tried to get
Lafreniere to dissociate himself from it.

But the latter

stated that events were beyond his control, and nothing he
might do could halt the insurrection.

On October 28, the

"Memorial" had been presented to the Superior Council which
debated it and accepted it the following day.

That same

day, October 29, Marquis led his militia units into the
Plaza and was joined there by the rest of the conspirators
who were at the head of groups of armed men.

These develop

ments forced Governor Ulloa and his followers to depart
from New Orleans on the French ship Ulloa had chartered.
Del Rey held that these crimes against the Spanish nation
were the fruits of a conspiracy whose leaders and accomplices
were the following:

Chauvin de Lafreniere,^ Jean Baptiste

Noyan, Balthasar Massan, Pierre Marquis, Joseph Villere^ (dead
at the time of the trial), Pierre Carresse, Hardi de Boisblanc, Joseph Petit, Jean and Joseph Milhet, Pierre Poupet,
Jerome Julian Doucet, Nicholas Foucault and Ensign Bienville.
The last two, as officials of the French government, were
not considered by O'Reilly and del Rey to be subject to the

^There is no evidence that Lafreniere, although also
appointed by the French king, was ever considered by O ’Reilly
or the Promotor Fiscal to be beyond the jurisdiction of the
Spanish Court.
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Spanish tribunal. A
The prosecutor went on to state that although all who
took part in the rebellion were in fact guilty of treason,
nevertheless, due to the great mercy of His Most Catholic
Majesty, only the leaders and leading accomplices would be
prosecuted.

The rebel leaders were guilty of a crime which

was "... against the Person of the Prince and is by its nature
(a crime) of lese majeste and subject to the punishment of
natural death and confiscation of goods. ..."

However, the

Promotor Fiscal stated that he did not wish to rest his case
on the general principles involved in the crime of lese
majeste, but rather on those laws of Spain which applied
specifically to the crimes of sedition and treason.
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In his proof of sedition and treason, del Rey said that
the leaders had convinced the people that their liberties
were being violated.

Consequently, the conspirators told

the people they had a right to take up arms to defend their
alleged rights.

The leaders then persuaded the populace in

and around New Orleans to rise up against its legitimate
ruler, Don Antonio de Ulloa, the representative of the
Spanish king.

Del Rey logically concluded that as Ulloa

was the king's representative, the rebellion had been a
crime against the monarch's authority, and:

"... those who

21-Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543,
Doc. 72(2), L.C. pp. 366-382.
22Ibid., p. 383.
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so rise up are traitors and~mdst die for it and lose what
ever they possess."23
Thus the leaders were guilty of both sedition and
treason when they caused the rebellion.

This crime carried

the penalties of death and confiscation of all property.
Undoubtedly the leaders of the rebellion were guilty of
breaking these laws for:
The insurrectionists conspired openly against
the Realm, drawing the colony away from the
Catholic domination, execrating laws, the
government, and the nation, with furious
invectives, and this is in hatred of the
crown, ... which is also covered by this
last law: "In hatred of Him or of the
Realm."24
Due to yet another law that made it treasonable to entice
away from the rule of Spain any of its legitimate subjects, the
leaders of the insurrection were doubly guilty.

The violation

of this law also demanded the penalties of death and confis
cation of all

p r o p e r t y .

25

The Crown's attorney had no doubt

that the accused had violated these laws, as the colony of
Louisiana was the legitimate possession of Spain, having
been ceded to Charles III by the Louis XV.

The act of transfer

had been made public in the colony by order of the King of
France:

23ibid., p. 385.
24Ibid., pp. 385-386.
25Ibid., p. 386.

... that crime was perpetrated against
His Most Catholic Majesty and his State
... in this colony, which he (Charles III)
had gained possession of through the min
istry of Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the
right to which he held by virtue of the
act of cession from the Most Christian
King, which (act) was obeyed by the
Council and was made public in the
colony by his order. ...26
After the witnesses had given their testimony and del
Rey had lodged these formal charges against the accused, he
began to question the prisoners.
separately.

Each man was interrogated

Each was told of the crimes with which he was

charged and was confronted with the testimony made against
him by the witnesses for the State.

Those indicted then

either denied or admitted the accusations.

There was no

trial by jury in Spanish law nor was the trial held in a
public court.

Trial by jury was a tradition of Anglo-Saxon,

not Roman law; but Spain, as well as the other countries of
Europe, then had a government which derived its legal system
from Roman jurisprudence.
The procedures in this trial, therefore, must be viewed
in the light of the standards set for Spanish trials as they
were conducted in the eighteenth century.
The first of the conspirators to be examined was Lafren
iere.

As he was the procurator general for the colony, the

prosecutor considered him the most culpable.

26Ibid., p. 388.

He was guilty
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of abusing his position of power by using it to instill
sedition in the hearts of the people.

The promotor fiscal

so accused him:
He was the first who had put into the minds of
the people the execration of the government and
of the Spanish nation, using to the utmost the
influence he had gained by his intrepedity and
by his position as attorney general, to put into
the minds (of the people) the spirit of rebellion
and to bring them over to his faction; and it
(the spirit of rebellion) began to grow stronger
among a group of his relatives, ... he, together
with Foucault, was the author of these seditions;
he directed the "Memorial" and he arranged with
Carresse for the Council to decree the expulsion
of Don Antonio de Ulloa; ... he named to the
Council, with Foucault, councillors of his
faction, to foment and to favor his views; and,
finally, in the Council on October 29, of the
preceding year, he aided with excessive fervor
and extraordinary vehemence, the pretensions of
the rebels, and he resolved that taking possess
ion (of the colony) could not be proposed, nor
was it intended, through any means except new
orders from His Most Christian Majesty....27
Furthermore, del Rey said that Lafreniere knowingly acted
against the wishes of both the kings of France and of Spain,
whose commands he knew were above any acts of the Superior
Council.

As procurator general he should have sided with

Aubry and not with the rebels.2®
Lafreniere’s explanation for his actions at the time of
the rebellion were not convincing to del Rey.

The defendant

stated that he had not sided with Aubry at the time of the

27Ibid., pp. 395-396.
28Ibid., pp. 397-400.

meeting of the Superior Council, since protocol did not
allow him to be present when the governor was attending a
meeting.

He denied all of the charges against him, ad

mitting only that he had read the "Memorial" to the
members of the Council.

He did ask pardon, however, for

not having softened the violent expressions contained in
the "Memorial."

He further protested that he was not one

of the rebel leaders.

He insisted that it was Carresse

and not he who was responsible for the drafting of the
"Memorial" on October 27, 1768, and who, together with
certain others, had presented this document to him.

Never

theless, the prosecution was able to show, on the basis of
the testimony of reliable witnesses, that the said "Memorial
was in Lafreniere's possession prior to the date claimed
by the defendant.

The defendant also claimed that he could

in no way have complied with Aubry's request that he stop
the insurrection.

The prosecutor replied that his key

position in all matters relating to the rebellion certainly
enabled him to quell the

u p r i s i n g .

29

29ibid., pp. 401-402, 409. Lafreniere's denial that he
was a rebel leader, his shifting to Carresse all blame for
the drafting of the "Memorial" and his apology for not re
moving offensive statements from that protest are noteworthy
and revealing. During the trial he appears a much different
person from the one portrayed by Fortier, who praised
Lafreniere's "patriotism, boldness, and heroism." The trial
documents reveal a man who seems frightened, one whose im
plication of others hardly becomes the patriot or hero. (Cf
Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 232.)
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Finally, in his defense Lafreniere offered the argu
ment that Ulloa had not taken formal possession of the
colony.

Consequently, Ulloa had been expelled as a private

individual, and not as a representative of the Spanish
crown; treason, therefore, was out of the question.

Lafren

iere based his argument on the fact that the Spanish flag
had not been raised at New Orleans but rather at Balize
and other posts.

This, the prosecutor noted, was a weak

argument in light of all of the facts presented in the
opening statement to prove that the colony was both de jure
and cte facto a Spanish possession.

Had not, commented

del Rey, Lafreniere received his salary as procurator
general in Spanish money, paid by the Spanish treasury in
Louisiana?

By this very fact Lafreniere himself had recogon

nized the actual possession of the colony by Spain.

In

deed, there were too many witnesses against Lafreniere for
his defense to be acceptable.

Aubry, Navarro, and Trudeaux

had all testified that he was one of the chief leaders in
the rebellion.

The prosecution's case against the procurator

general was too strong to be shaken, without some overwhelm
ing evidence to the contrary.

Lafreniere was unable to

offer any such evidence in his defense.

^Confesion de Senor Lafreniere, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo
20.854, Foxas 356,-363, £ited in Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros
ahos de dominacion espanola, pp. 474-482.
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The case for conspiracy against Jean Baptiste Noyan
appears equally convincing.

Felix del Rey charged him with

inducing the Acadians to take up arms and to march to the
city of New Orleans, thereby adding to the threat against
Ulloa.

He was further accused of being:

"... one of those

who concurred with the cabals, prior to the event (rebellion);
spreading complaints against Don Antonio de Ulloa, freely
speaking out with others who were desirous of his (Ulloa1s)
expulsion. ...".

In addition to these charges, Noyan was

accused of urging the Superior Council to vote for the ex
pulsion of Ulloa.

Moreover, from the beginning of Ulloa's

arrival in Louisiana, Noyan had refused to accept Spanish rule,
and he had spoken of keeping "our lives always French and
never Spanish, ..."31
In his statement before the prosecutor Noyan admitted
doing and saying all of the things of which he was accused.
His defense, however, was that his words and actions had
never been seditious.

He claimed that he had only acted in

a manner that he considered loyal to his master, the French
king.

Noyan's defense, although unacceptable to del Rey,

does illustrate that Noyan was firm in his resolves, unlike
Lafreniere who sought to disavow involvement in the con
spiracy.

The promotor fiscal commented in regard to Noyan

that he had confessed only to those things with which he was

^•^■Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal.
2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 423-425.

A.G.I.S.D., Legajo
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charged and not to crimes of which he had not been accused.
He also noted that Noyan had signed the confession as he
always signed his papers and documents,in a steady hand and
OO

in his usual manner. ^

These comments were apparently made

to indicate to the Spanish court that the confession had not
been forced from him but had been freely made.

General

O'Reilly and his prosecutor obviously took great pains to
see that the trial was carried out properly.

No evidence

of any torture has been found.
As in the case against Lafreniere, so in the case
against Noyan, the court proved conclusively that any attempt
to demonstrate that the actions of the accused were merely
the actions of loyalty to Louis XV, and not actions disloyal
to Charles III, was pointless.

The prosecution had fully

proven that owing to the act of cession and the orders of
both monarchs, none of the inhabitants of Louisiana could
legally deny the authority of the Spanish governor without
defying both the French and Spanish kings.
Pierre Marquis who held the elected office of colonel
general of the Louisiana militia was also charged with serious
offenses.

Against the express command of his superior,

Governor Aubry, ha had incited the militia to rebel against
Ulloa.

He set out with his militia units in pursuit of Ulloa

32Ibid., pp. 426-427.
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although he did finally return to New Orleans at the command
of Aubry.

He had been named to the new sindico for the

rebellious colony after the departure of Ulloa and had
accepted this position in the new illegal government.
Reflecting the sentiments of his homeland, Switzerland, he
was charged with advocating a republic in Louisiana.

Had

this idea been accepted, del Rey noted, not only would the
colonists have openly defied Spain, but also France, the
nation to which the rebels allegedly were loyal.

Marquis,

furthermore, had voted for the approval of the "Memorial"
against the Spanish.^3
Marquis in his defense claimed that he had always held
the post of colonel general of the militia with the approval
of Aubry.

This the court could not accept in the face of

Aubry's testimony to the contrary.

It was impossible for

the prosecutor to believe that Aubry could have continued
to approve as colonel general a man involved in the rebellion
against the legitimate Spanish governor whom Aubry accepted.
In addition to this, the defendant denied that he had
endeavored to establish a republic in the colony.

The court

had too much testimony to the contrary to accept this claim.
Finally, he denied being a leader of the rebels at the
meeting of the Superior Council, stating that he went there

3^Ibid.% pp. 434-436.
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merely because he had been requested to be present.

Such

"non-rebellious" statements from a man considered by Fortier
as a forerunner of men like George Washington and John Adams
are not what one would expect of a sincere patriot in a true
revolution.
Regardless of whatever else he might have denied, Marquis
had to admit that he had indeed led the militia units into
the Plaza on the day Ulloa was forced to leave New Orleans
on the French vessel, the Caesar. The court also maintained
that he had led others in armed rebellion against the
legitimate representative of Charles III and therefore was
guilty of sedition and treason.

That Louisiana was de jure

and de facto a Spanish colony had been amply shown in the
opening statements of the trial.

It was as useless for

Marquis as it was for the other accused to claim that the
transfer at Balize was not sufficient to make the colony a
o/
Spanish possession. Such was the prosecutor’s reasoning.
Pierre Carresse was also charged with serious offenses
against the crown.

He was accused of leading armed bands of

Acadians into the city of New Orleans, of going with the
militia units to pursue Ulloa to Balize, and of accepting
nomination and election to a post on the new sindico of the
illegal government of the colony.
noted, he was:

3AIbid., pp. 436-440.

Furthermore, as del Rey
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... the one who after spreading among
the colonists the seeds of sedition, by
which he and other leaders were able to
excite their spirits, he drew up the
Memorial in the name of the inhabitants
and merchants, and he made many sign it
and handed it personally, together with
Marquis and Massan, to Foucault, proving
himself in these documents to be an
instigator and principal accomplice, as
well as having been one of those who
made arrangements for the Acadians to
stay in the house of M. Denville. ...35
In addition to these crimes, he supported the illegal
government of the colony after the departure of Don Antonio
by helping to form the colony's new independent bank, the
Bank of Mount Piety.

Finally, he had been one of those who
Of.

sought the expulsion of the frigate Volante.
In defense of himself, Carresse claimed, as did the
others, that Louisiana was not legally a Spanish possession
at the time of the uprising.

He further maintained that the

colonists had a legitimate complaint:

namely the oppressive

commercial decrees issued by the Spanish government.

To these

objections, the court answered that no rebellion would have
occurred, in spite of the unpopularity of the commercial
decrees, without the leadership of men who, like himself,
were held in high esteem by the common people.

That the

colony was legally Spanish had been conclusively proven in

35Ibid.. p. 441.
•^Ibid., pp. 441-445.
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the court's opening statement.

Finally, the court stated

that it was in possession of a letter from the accused to
Lafreniere, which clearly implicated Carresse in the uprising.
Also, the witnesses for the State against Carresse and the
documents proving the legality of Spanish possession of the
colony were evidence sufficient to convict the accused.

The

defendant's claim that new orders were needed from the French
king for the transfer was an unacceptable assertion.

Louis

XV had already made it clear through the Duke of Praslin
that the colony was to be considered Spanish when Don Antonio
arrived to take possession.37
In reply to Carresse's denial that he was a key figure
in the insurrection, the prosecutor offered not only the
statements of the Crown's witnesses, but also a letter from
Carresse to Lafreniere fully implicating the former in the
rebellion.

If more proof were needed that Carresse was a

leading conspirator, additional testimony had been offered
that he was among those who at first favored resisting Don
Alejandro O'Reilly when the general arrived at Balize in
July, 1769.

The court left no reasonable doubt that the
OQ

accused was guilty as charged.
Another leader of the rebels was Joseph Milhet.
accused him of stirring up the people and of planting

37Ibid., pp. 446-451.
38Ibid., 453-455.
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seditious ideas among them.

He was also accused of helping

to promote the conspiratorial decisions of the Superior
Council.

Milhet was denounced by the court as follows:
... he was one of those who worked in
gathering signatures for the Represen
tation which brought about the decree
of the Council, and he persuaded some,
who were excusing themselves from
signing, by assuring them that this
was an affair directed by men of great
judgment, and that all measures had
been taken to make sure that no one
would lose anything that was owed to
him by the Spanish.39

This, del Rey noted, was certainly sedition, for Milhet had
tried to convince the common people that by driving out the
Spanish they would be acting for their own true and righteous
interests.

It was he, who with Noyan and Ensign Bienville

on the night before the rebellion, had stirred up the Acadians.
In addition to these accusations, it was also asserted that
Milhet had accepted a position in the new sindico of the
illegal government of the colony, and that he had solicited
funds, after the expulsion of Ulloa, to keep the rebel regime
in power.
In his statement of defense, Joseph Milhet admitted that
he had indeed taken part in all of the events mentioned by
the court.

However, he declared that he did not recognize

^ I b i d . , pp. 456-459.
40Ibid.
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these events as being seditious or subversive of the legal
order of the colony.

He defended his actions among the

Acadians by asserting that he was only trying to help them
collect the money owed them by the Spanish colonial treasury.
The court's answer to this was that it was unreasonable to
think that a man of Milhet's intelligence could not have
realized that his actions were acts of sedition and, as such
were conducive to rebellion against the legitimate Spanish
regime.

An even greater absurdity, del Rey stated, was to

maintain that Milhet, as a leader of the militia, did not
realize that in stirring up the Acadians and in leading his
own forces against the Spanish, he was committing sedition
and treason.
The court's answer to Milhet's final argument, that in
leading his forces be only obeyed his commander, colonel
general Marquis, was incisive.

Del Rey declared that it

must have been obvious to Milhet that his chief commander,
Governor Aubry, was attempting to halt the insurrection, and
that his rightful obedience should have been to him.

Had

not Milhet led his forces in pursuit of Ulloa in defiance
of Aubry's open opposition to the rebellion?

According to

the prosecutor, the accused had no reasonable defense to
offer for his crimes.

He stood guilty as charged, a

seditious and treasonable man, and a key leader in the
insurrection.

By his own confession he had admitted taking

108

part in all phases of the rebellion, even to the extent of
aiding it financially.

This was, in summary, the state's

case against Joseph Milhet.^
x
42
Although Joseph Villere had died in prison,
the court
saw fit to offer in its report the evidence it had gathered
to prove that he was a prime conspirator and, as such, guilty
of sedition and treason.

The evidence given by the court

plainly implicated him:
... He stirred up the Germans, whose captain he was,
making them sign the Representation that was formu
lated to bring about the expulsion of Don Antonio de
Ulloa and of all of the Spanish, and he led them to
the city to join the rebels in order to keep alive the
insurrection, as was verified that day; and he was in
command of them, as has been declared by the witnesses
who testified to this in the Proceedings.
^ Ibid., pp. 460-465; Confesion de Jose Milhet, A.H.N.
P.E., Legajo 20.854^, Foxas 324-329, cited in RodriguezCasado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 452-457.
^There is still uncertainty about the circumstances of
Villere's death. From the official report sent by O'Reilly
to Grimaldi, it is clear that the Spanish governor had learned
of Villere's death from Captain de Acosta. The attached trial
account stated that he had a seizure of some sort and died
shortly thereafter. Beyond this, no other explanation was
offered. According to legend, Villere had struck a Spanish
soldier and in the ensuing struggle received bayonet wounds
which resulted in his death. It has not been ascertained
whether he was attempting to escape, or whether the struggle
with the soldiers was caused by some attack of his upon them,
or for some other reason. Gayarre claimed that Villere had
become angry upon being arrested, as Aubry had led him to
believe that he^Jhad nothing to fear in returning to New Or
leans. (Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 304.) According
to another document in the Spanish Archives, Villere died a
natural death on August 31, 1769. Thi.s report also says he
was buried by the Capuchins on September 1, 1769 (A.H.N.P.E.,
Legajo 20.854, folio 723).
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Further, it was Villere^ who had prevented the money taken by
M. Maxent to pay the Germans and the Acadians from reaching
them.

In this way, he was responsible for these people

believing that the crown still had not met its obligations.
Consequently, the Germans and the Acadians were induced to
march to New Orleans in the hope that they would receive
their money. ^

This latter accusation was supported by both

Aubry and Don Esteban Gayarre.
After dealing with the chief conspirators in the re
bellion, the prosecution indicted a number of accomplices.
Joseph Petit was considered by the court as a major accom
plice.

Although this charge was a serious one, it did not

carry a compulsory death penalty.

Del Rey accused Petit of

speaking out publicly against the Spanish commercial regu
lations and of cooperating, before the rebellion, with the
leaders and chief instigators to bring about the expulsion
of Ulloa:
... In public he spoke against the already
known commercial regulations, which caused
the people to be stirred up, attended the
meetings leading up to the insurrection,
and showed himself among the rebels with
his weapons, giving orders and acting as
their main leader; being so insolent that,
with the assistance of his followers, he
untied the ropes that moored the frigate
on which Don Antonio was expelled, as he
(Petit) was impatient with the slowness
of the sailors in this task, ...

^Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo
2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 493-494.
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Added to this, with others of his own social group he had
helped to force the sailing of the frigate Volante from New
Orleans on April 20, 1769.
with Lafreniere m

Moreover, he had been associated

attempting to persuade Aubry to give his

word of honor that he would use his influence to force the
Spanish frigate Volante to depart from the port of New
Orleans.

Finally, he was one of those who was prepared to

set out for Balize to offer resistance to O'Reilly in July,
1769.44
Petit's defense seems weak.

He claimed that he had been

in New Orleans on October 29 merely to hear the proceedings
of the Superior Council.

Furthermore, he denied that he had

been armed when he was in the Plaza with the populace on
that date.

However, his denials were of no avail, for the

testimony of many witnesses contradicted him.

That he was

guilty as charged had been sworn to by de Acosta and Navarro.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor considered him as important
accomplice, rather than an instigator and leader of the in
surrection.4^

This fact was to prove to be of vital im

portance to him when he was sentenced by the court.
Balthasar Massan was another influential accomplice.
He was accused of having forced some o f the citizens to sign
the "Petition" which had been presented to the Superior

44I b i d ., pp. 469-472.
45I b i d . , p. 474.
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Council for consideration.

Also, he was alleged to have

cooperated with the rebels before and after the insurrection.
According to the prosecutor, he was implicated as follows:
... in which he accepted the position of,
and acted as, the chief fiscal officer of
the rebels, promoting the ideas that
followed upon the rebellion; and among
these, on two occasions, he urged the
violent expulsion of the frigate of His
Catholic Majesty along with the officers
and troops who were loyal to Don Antonio
de Ulloa.
The court maintained that Massan, who was a Knight of the
Order of Saint Louis, should have restrained the people
during the events surrounding the rebellion.

Instead, he

aided the rebels, and refused to support Governor Aubry in
maintaining order.

His loyalty to Louis XV should have made

him loyal to Charles III, to whom the French king had ceded
L.f\

Louisiana.

In spite of Massan's denials of all of the charges
brought against him, the state's case appears convincing.
Governor Aubry had testified to his presence at the meetings
of the Superior Council and to his involvement in forcing
the withdrawal of the frigate Volante. He had been one of
the officials to whom the French governor had presented Don
Antonio as the man chosen by Charles III to take possession

46Ibid.. pp. 415-418.
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of Louisiana.

Furthermore, on the basis of testimony given

by Gayarre and de Acosta, he had been implicated in the
actual insurrection.

The case against him was strong.

Accordingly, the prosecutor indicted him as a leading
47
accomplice in the rebellion.
Jerome Julian Doucet, a lawyer who had lived in the
colony for only a short time prior to the rebellion, was
also accused of being an accomplice.

It was not considered,

however, that he played a major role in the insurrection;

so

he was indicted as a minor accomplice, and del Rey stated:
... who cooperated with Carresse in the
drawing up of the Memorial made in the
name of the inhabitants and merchants
for the expulsion of Don Antonio de
Ulloa and of all the Spanish, ... but
what is constant is the terrible crime
of having drawn up the Memorial of the
Inhabitants and Merchants, ... together
with many other writings directed to
sustain and to justify in law the crime
of insurrection.^8
Doucet, therefore, was regarded only as a collaborator
in the drafting of the "Memorial", which had stirred up the
colonists to rebellion.

He was also charged with collaborat

ing in later writings which sought to sustain and to justify
the accomplished rebellion.

The prosecutor noted that those

writings had attempted a justification of the insurrection

47
Ibid., pp. 419-423.
48
Ibid., pp.

487-488.
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on the theory of natural law.

They proposed to the world

the view that the rebels had only followed the example of
those many others in history who had sought to protect their
natural rights against an oppressive government.

They main

tained that the rebels had not committed any crime against
the highest law, the natural

law.^9

Doucet attempted to defend himself against the accusa
tions of the prosecutor.

He denied responsibility for the

most inflammatory statements in the "Memorial" and in the
writings published after the insurrection.

He was unable,

however, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
had not had an essential role in their preparation.

The

prosecution, for its part, admitted that it could not prove
that Doucet had a key role in drawing up the "Memorial" or
in drafting the later writings.

Nevertheless, there was no

doubt, the court asserted, that he had collaborated in these
works, which were offensive to the Spanish Crown and nation.
These documents had helped to further inflame the people of
Louisiana, and to sustain them in their resistance to their
legitimate ruler.

Since it had not been clearly proven by

the court that he was a chief accomplice, the prosecutor
charged instead that Doucet was an accessory to the crime
of sedition and treason.

49Ibid., p . . 492

The testimony of Aubry and de Acosta
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supported this indictment.
Jean Milhet, lieutenant of militia and brother of
Joseph Milhet, was also involved in the conspiracy.

The

court accused him of being a major accomplice in the rebell
ion.

He was charged with publically speaking out against

the two commercial decrees that the Spanish government had
issued for Louisiana.

Moreover, he had allegedly approved

of the "Memorial" and had sided with Foucault and Carresse.
Witnesses testified that he had led his militia unit into
the Plaza on the day Ulloa was ousted, and that he had later
led his troops, under Marquis' command, in pursuit of the
French vessel, the Caesar, as it sailed toward Balize with
Ulloa and his family.

That he was a lieutenant of militia

who, in violation of Aubry's orders, took part in the actual
rebellion was the most important charge against him:
... he took up his arms to back the
rebellion, ... but without permission
of the chief military officer of the
colony (Aubry) and even against his
express orders, which had been given
the night before, as Milhet himself
admitted in his confession; and he
took up his arms and joined his com
pany. As a result of this there is
no doubt that he was one of the main
accomplices of the insurrection.51

5QIbid., pp. 488-491.
5libid., pp. 468-469.
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In spite of the phrase, "principal accomplice", in the
charge, Milhet was not ultimately so convicted.

Rather, he

was convicted of being a collaborating or minor accomplice.
He offered no denial of the charges made against him by del
Rey; his defense rested on a legal technicality.

It was his

claim that he had acted as a private citizen, and not as a
member of the militia, when he took part in the expulsion
of Ulloa and in the pursuit of the Caesar. He asserted that
he had not acted in the course of the rebellion as a militia
lieutenant.

The court was unwilling to accept this reason

ing, for as the head of a militia unit he must have realized
that he was acting against the explicit commands of Aubry
who had tried to stop the rebellion.

Furthermore, as the

leader of a militia unit, he could not divest himself by a
technicality from that position.

He was, therefore, judged

guilty of being a minor accomplice in the rebellion.52
Pierre Poupet was also charged as an accomplice.

In

essence he was accused of being an accessory to the rebellion
after it had already taken place:
... He acted as the treasurer of the rebels, after
the insurrection had come about. Several meetings
were held in his house to plan the means to sustain
it, and he supplied the expenses necessary for that
purpose.

52ibid.
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The main charge against Poupet was that he had given
financial aid to the rebels after they had expelled Ulloa.
In addition, he was accused of being in the company of
Doucet, Noyan and Joseph Milhet in the house of a certain
M. Desiller, where the movement to incite the Acadians was
alleged to have begun.

Also, he was charged with carrying

arms and mingling with the rebels in the Plaza on October 29,
and of having been involved in the printing of the "Memorial".
Poupet denied some of the charges made against him.
He refused to admit any involvement in the events leading
up to the rebellion.

He confessed, however, that he had

accepted the post of treasurer for the rebels and had made
personal contributions to the rebel cause.

He further

admitted that he was present and armed among the rebels on
October 29.
The prosecutor agreed that the evidence at hand supported
the claims of the accused, namely, that he had been an "afterthe-fact" accomplice.

However, he had cooperated with an

illegal regime and had accepted the post of treasurer in a
government established in defiance of the legitimate ruler,
Charles III, and his representative, Don Antonio de Ulloa.
In view of these circumstances, the prosecutor contended that
Poupet had violated the Ley Julia, which forbade a Spanish

53I b i d . , pp.

476-478.
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subject from joining, as an official, a regime established
in opposition to the legal government.

In effect, he was

guilty of a mitigated form of sedition and should be
punished accordingly.^
The last of the accused was Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc.
He was also considered an accomplice, but not an instigator
of the rebellion.

Yet, he had been more involved in the

uprising than had Poupet.

Del Rey charged him with being:

... the banker of Louisiana, ... he was
named by Foucault and Lafreniere to
deliberate about the Memorial of the
Inhabitants and Merchants, ... and he
intervened in the drawing up of the
already mentioned Memorial, ... he
directed the establishment of the
bank, called Mount Piety.
Thus, he was cited as the banker for an illegal regime
established after Ulloa's departure, and as the man who had
directed the establishment of that bank.

Moreover, he was

accused of conspiratorial association with Lafreniere and
Foucault prior to the insurrection.

Even though it was known

that he visited with Lafreniere and Foucault on October 28,
the court could not prove definitely that he had prior
knowledge of the revolt.

Hence, he was not indicted as a

prime mover in the rebellion.
Boisblanc's defense was that he had not been involved
in any of the events leading up to the rebellion.

54-ibid., pp. 479-480.
~^Ibid., pp. 482-485.
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his visit with Lafreniere and Foucault on October 28.
ever, he denied complicity in the rebellion.
charges he could not, and did not, deny.

How

The remaining

It was known that

he had signed the "Memorial" on October 29.

It was also

common knowledge that he was the financier for the colony's
illegal government, and that he had directed the establish
ment of the Bank of Mount Piety.

Therefore, he was adjudged

guilty as an accomplice to the rebellion.

The fact that he

had thus joined a rebellious movement, and later an illegal
government, made him guilty of the crime of sedition and
treason.

His guilt, however, was deemed less than that of

the men who had instigated the insurrection.-^

Thus ended

the charges against the accused.
The trial had been conducted with thoroughness and
apparent impartiality.

It is unlikely that by the end of

the proceedings any of the accused thought he would be
acquitted.

Each had been accused of sedition and treason,

and must have realized that he might receive the death penalty.
Yet, the Spanish governor had exercised great moderation since
his arrival at New Orleans in August of that year.

The general

amnesty he had granted to the populace was evidence of his
spirit of leniency and forgiveness.

Perhaps some or all of

the accused expected that the full penalty demanded by

56Ibid.. pp. 485-487.
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Spanish law would not be incurred by them.

No available

records disclose their sentiments.
On October 24, 1769, General O'Reilly imposed the
sentences on the rebels.

His verdict made it clear that

the Spanish government, while not being vindictive, was
unwilling to allow a rebellion against legitimate authority
to go unpunished.

The twelve convicted men were sentenced

as follows:
"... condemned to the penalty of death
were Nicholas Chauvin Lafreniere, Jean
Baptiste Noyan, Pierre Carresse, Pierre
Marquis and Joseph Milhet as heads and
main leaders; and ... Joseph Villere,
already dead, ... Joseph Petit was con
demned to perpetual exile in prison;
... Balthasar Massan and Julien Jerome
Doucet were condemned to ten years in
prison, and Jean Milhet, Pierre Poupet
and Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc were
condemned to six years in p r i s o n . "57
O'Reilly's sentences must be judged in the light of the
evidence made available by the trial proceedings.

In the

eighteenth century, treason was considered a most grievous
crime by all nations.

That only six men were condemned to

death, while the other six were given prison terms, indicates
that the Spanish governor wished to assess fairly the extent
of the individual guilt or complicity of the rebel leaders.
As none of the six men sentenced to imprisonment was con
sidered to have been a leader, without whom the rebellion

57Ibid., pp. 501-503, 510.
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could not have occurred, each was granted that "justice tem
pered with mercy" which the general wished to exhibit toward
the new subjects of Charles III.

It seems that this was as

far as the Spanish governor could go in granting leniency.
Because there was no hangman in New Orleans, Felix del
Rey requested that O'Reilly have the execution carried out
by a firing squad.

This was done and the condemned were put

to death on the day following their sentencing.

On October

25, 1769, Lafreniere, Marquis, Noyan, Joseph Milhet, and
Carresse, (Villere was already dead), were taken into the
barracks area of the Lisbon regiment.

There, away from the

sight of the other colonists, they were executed by soldiers
of that regiment.

These proceedings were carried out under

the supervision of M. Ganderat, Jean Baptiste Garic, and
Lieutenant Juan Kelly of the Spanish artillery.

The con

demned were shot and were then pronounced dead.

For veri

fication of the trial and the sentencing, the signatures of
O'Reilly and del Rey were affixed to the document.

The

execution was verified by General O'Reilly, del Rey and Jose
Urrutria, the assessor.

The entire proceedings were certi

fied as true and accurate by Francisco Xavier Rodriguez, the
scribe of O'Reilly's expedition.-*®

Thus ended the futile

attempt of the rebels to overthrow the legitimate rule of
Spain in Louisiana.

58Ibid., pp. 512-517.
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In his letter to Grimaldi, to which was appended an
account of the entire trial proceedings, O'Reilly stated
that he considered that the trial had been conducted fairly
and that the sentences imposed were just.

He believed that

the people realized the justification for what he had done,
and he hoped his actions had been pleasing to the king.59
O'Reilly's own sentiments regarding the trial and its
outcome are more fully revealed in a subsequent letter to
the Minister of the Council of the Indies, El Bailio Frey
Don Julian de Arriaga.

In addition to a full account of the

proceedings, the Spanish governor indicated to Arriaga a
deep concern that all had been done properly, and as His
Majesty had desired.

He wrote to Arriaga as follows:

... The case that was being prosecuted against the
twelve leaders; ... has been concluded. Full
satisfaction has been given for the offense com
mitted, ... Everyone recognizes the necessity,
justice and clemency of the proceedings, and this
example will remain eternally graven on the hearts
of all. Respect for the authority of the King is
greatly augumented by the strict justice and great
celerity with which it has been carried out.
Henceforth, I shall receive without discrimi
nation those who were seduced and signed the first
representation to the council, and it will be the
greatest consolation to the public to know that I
shall not leave in the province any memory of that
ill-considered act. I shall reconcile and calm
their minds by all means possible, and none is
more effective than to let them know that there is
and always will be entire forgetfulness of the past,
and that everyone will find in the government the

“^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, October 27, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 353-354.
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protection and favor of which he is deserving....
I hope that I have carried out his royal in
structions, and if I have attained this happiness,
my satisfaction will be complete.... 60
O'Reilly was not left in doubt as to whether or not he
had acted according to the wishes of the king.

A favorable

reply came to him soon after the receipt of the documents in
Madrid.

Answering for His Majesty, the Marques de Grimaldi

wrote to O'Reilly on January 27, 1770, assuring him of the
king's approval:
... The complete justification of the proceedings
against those condemned to death and prison, the
moderation in reducing the punishment to what was
absolutely necessary to bring about the tranquility
and the good of the province, and your assurance to
the rest that no reminders of their crime will sub
sist, are very conformable to the pious soul of the
King. Your Excellency was well advised of the royal
intentions, put them into full effect, and the
assurance which I gave him of this may serve as a
source of satisfaction.61
Official public approval in Spain for O'Reilly's accom
plishments in Louisiana came in June of 1770, in a notice
appearing in the Gaceta de Madrid. The article noted that
the general had been awarded a gift of 2,000 pesos, and upon
his arrival in Madrid had been received and welcomed by the
King.

He was praised for completing the tasks given him by

Charles III, especially the one which he had recently

^ 0 ' Reilly to Arriaga, October 27, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
80-1-7, No. 9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev,
pp. 105-106.
^Grimaldi to O'Reilly, El Pardo, January 27, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 174, No. 5, ibid., pp. 181-182.
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finished in the colony of Louisiana.62

There is no doubt,

therefore, that he had carried out the wishes of the King
in a satisfactory manner.
Although the trial was over, there were additional
problems connected with it which had to be solved by O'Reilly.
The property of those condemned to death had been confis
cated and had to be liquidated.

O'Reilly had this done with

promptness, so that the widows, the creditors, and the royal
exchequer would be satisfied.

As a result of his rapid

settlement of these estates, the general noted that the
colonists realized that the Spanish dealt with their subjects
justly and equitably.^
A final letter to Arriaga concerning this matter was
sent by O'Reilly just before he left New Orleans on March
1, 1770.

He pointed out that the widows of the condemned

men had received their dowries, the creditors their debts,
and the state its due, as required by law.

Furthermore, he

stated that the sum paid to the assessor, the promotor fiscal
and the scribe for their work was only 2007 pesos. This
small remuneration, especially considering the distance each
had to travel for the trial, in O'Reilly's judgment, was

^Gaceta de Madrid, June 18, 1770, cited by RodriguezCasado, Fnmeros alios de dominacion espanola, p. 301.
63o'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 127-128.
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enough to convince the widows of the executed men, as well
as the populace, of the Spanish officials' disinterested
ness and sense of justice.64
Although the leaders of the rebellion were tried and
convicted, the status of other individuals, who later might
prove to be a source of discontent in Louisiana had to be
considered.

M. d'Arensburg, his sons and daughter, who was

the widow of Joseph Villere, were also considered potential
trouble makers.

Since d'Arensburg and his family had great

influence among the Germans along the Mississippi River above
New Orleans, O'Reilly ordered the family to sell its property
and to leave the area.

Due to his advanced age (seventy-

seven) , the elder d'Arensburg was allowed to live in New
Orleans, but the sons were commanded to move to Opelousas.
Relatives and friends offered surety for them, thereby
making themselves responsible for their good behavior.
O'Reilly asserted that d'Arensburg, who had been a comman
dant of the German settlement during Ulloa's regime, should
have tried to stop the rebellion.

Instead, he had remained

neutral during the events leading up to the insurrection,
even though he knew of the involvement of Joseph Villere,
his son-in-law.65

6^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, March 1, 1770,
ibid., pp. 160-161.
^ 0 ' Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
ibid., pp. 127-128.
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Another undesirable, M. de Sasier, deputy of the
Superior Council, had gone to France after the uprising.
Since the Spanish general felt that he had shown little
respect for law and order, he was not permitted to return
to Louisiana. ^
Still others, in O'Reilly's judgment, presented a danger
to the peace of the colony.

In a communique to Arriaga in

December of that year, the general listed twenty-one men
that he had ordered expelled from the colony as a threat to
the peace and security of the community.

Three Jews were

also expelled because of their religion and because of a
reputation for questionable business transactions. 67
The fate of the six who had been imprisoned in Havana
soon took a turn for the better.

In a short time they had

a number of advocates pleading for their release.

As early

as January of 1770, the Conde de Fuentes, Spanish ambassador
to France, sent to the Marques de Grimaldi, Spanish Minister
of State, a letter noting that Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc had
many men of influence in France who were speaking in his
behalf.

Among these was the brother of the prisoner, a

66Ibid.
67^0 details were offered as to exactly what dubious
things these men were doing. O'Reilly to Arriaga, New
Orleans, December 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid.,
p. 103.
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priest, who was the Provincial of the Order of Recolets for
the Province of Aquitaine, and Predicateur de Roi, a special
honor for any cleric.

Claiming that his imprisoned brother

was a victim of circumstances, he begged for clemency now
that peace was restored in Louisiana.
In time, these pleas which made their way to the Spanish
court for the release of the imprisoned rebels had their
effect.

By the summer of 1770, the Marques de Grimaldi

notified Governor Unzaga of Louisiana that the six rebel
leaders were to be released.

He noted that the Duke of

Choiseul had pleaded for mercy for them in the name of Louis
XV, and that His Most Catholic Majesty:

"... desiring to

manifest to the Most Christian King the regard which he has
for any suggestion of his, has seen fit to grant all of them
their liberty, and to order the governor of Havana to be in
structed to send them to Santo Domingo.... He is to warn
them before they leave never to enter again the domains of
His Majesty under penalty of death."69

However, it is note

worthy that in no way did Grimaldi imply that any injustice

^^Fuentes to Grimaldi, January 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, Doc. 94, L.C. pp. 64-65. Pere Hardi to Fuentes,
Attached to Fuentes' Paris letter to Grimaldi, ibid.
^ G r i m a l d i to Unzaga, San Ildefonso, August 25, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legaio 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 181-182.
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had been done to them.

The release was, accordingly, an

act of mercy on the part of Charles III.

It did not indicate

any criticism of the actions and judgments of the Spanish
tribunal under O'Reilly.
Antonio Bucareli, Captain-general and Governor of Cuba,
in pursuance of the order of the king, released the prisoners
who had been held at Castle Morro.

The six were put aboard

the British brigantine once used in the trade of the Asiento
granted by Spain to England, and from Havana they sailed by
way of Puerto Rico to the French colony of Saint

Domingue.^O

With the release of the six rebel leaders, the story of
the trial and its aftermath ends.

O'Reilly's decisive actions

in dealing with the rebels gave political stability to
Louisiana.

His work, however, was far from over, and he

continued the task of integrating Louisiana into the Spanish
empire.

With that same determination that he had shown in

handling the occupation of Louisiana and the trial of the
rebels, he completed the other assignments given him by
Charles III.

^ B u c a r e l i to Arriaga, Havana, December 12, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., p. 189.

IV
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
SPANISH GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS,
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL
Once order had been established in Louisiana and the reb
els had been tried and punished, the various other problems
pressing on O'Reilly were gradually resolved.

Carefully in

terpreting his instructions, O'Reilly established in Louisi
ana that same law under which all of the Spanish dominions in
America were governed.^

The legal system set up in Louisiana

was a condensed version of the Recopilacion de Leyes de los
Reinos de las Indias,

supplemented by La Cour Philipique,

■^Proclamation Establishing the Cabildo, New Orleans, No
vember 25, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley,
pp. 108-110.
2

<

^

^Recopilacion de Las Indias, as it is generally called,
was based on earlier laws of Spain, namely the Leyes de Tor o ,
which were compiled as the Nueva Recopilacion. The
Recopilacion de las Indias was first promulgated in Spain
on May 18, T680.
It was comprised of 9 books, 218 titles
and 6447 enactments, and dealt with every possible phase of
law for the colonies.
It was upon this vast pyramid of law
that the Code O'Reilly was based.
(Cf. Wallach, as cited be
low, and Henry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial
Louisiana," Report of the Louisiana Bar Association, 1921,
Vol. XXII /New Orleans, 1921/, pp. 53-55.)
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and the Recopilacion de Leyes de Castilla.3
As previously noted, O'Reilly appointed Luis de Unzaga
to succeed him as governor, effective upon his departure.
The intendant, the treasurer, and the contador, Jose de Loy
ola,^ Martin Navarro, and Esteban Gayarre, respectively, had
retained their offices when O'Reilly arrived.

Except for

these three men, nothing of the limited structure of govern
ment established under Ulloa remained.

Consequently, for

the permanence of the Spanish regime an adequate governmental
and legal system had to be established.
In the governor rested the highest executive and judicial
powers.
law.

He could issue proclamations which had the effect of

He was, however, subordinate to the captain general of

Cuba.’’ Appeals might be made from the governor to the special
tribunal established by the king at Havana, or to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, the Council of the Indies, or the king.

^Kate Wallach,"Research in Louisiana Law," Louisiana State
University Studies, Social Science Series, No. 6 (Baton Rouge.
T95B), "pp. 207-218'.
^Loyola died in September 1769. A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543,
L.C. pp. 593-594. Communique to O'Reilly from Madrid, Decem
ber 26, 1769.
^Gayarre seemed uncertain whether the governor of Loui
siana was under the captain general of Cuba. (History of Lou
isiana . Ill, p. 5 and p. 104.) His subordination to the cap
tain general is definitely verified by documents. Cf., Cedula
putting Louisiana under the captain general of Cuba, San IIdefonso, August 11, 1772, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp.
534-541.
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The intendant had commercial, naval and fiscal powers.
Hence, he often clashed with the governor over matters of
jurisdiction.

Among other things, it was intended that he

serve as a restraining power on the governor in the Span
ish American Colonies.
the whole province.

The contador was the auditor for

The treasurer was the official who kept

the funds for the colony and was responsible for informing
the governor and intendant of the financial status of the
colony.*’
For these key provincial officers, the crown appointed
advisors.

An auditor of war and assessor of government ad

vised the governor (and others, if necessary) on legal mat
ters.

There was also a legal advisor for the intendant,

called an auditor of intendancy.

Moreover, there were sec

retaries to the governor and the intendant and such minor
officials as storekeepers and interpreters.
these existed under

Ulloa,7

Since all of

this chapter will deal in de

tail only with those offices initiated under O'Reilly's ad
ministration which have not been dealt with in previous chap
ters.

There is no need to discuss the function of the lieu

tenant governors, as these officials will be treated in de
tail in Chapter VII.
Relying on powers given him by Charles III, O'Reilly had

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 5-6.
7Ibid.
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determined as early as October of 1769 to establish the Span
ish legal system in

Louisiana.8

Contrary to assumptions by

various historians that O'Reilly was not so empowered, the
following instructions, available for many years, prove that
he acted as commanded:
... that in both the military and civil spheres you
establish proper administration of justice and man
agement of the Royal Treasury, organizing the form
of government and its administrators in the manner
which you consider most suitable. So that you may
carry out my instructions fully, I give you today
such power and jurisdiction as shall be necessary
for handling each matter, case and incident. And I
desire, should it become necessary, that you use the
soldiers and weapons that will be at your orders, and
that to take care of matters pertaining to finances
and the treasury, you take as your adviser and prose
cutor such lawyers as you see fit, who having been
appointed by you, will perform these tasks with full
authority, for this is my w i l l . 9
There can certainly be no doubt as to the plenipotentiary
powers contained in O'Reilly's commission and to the King's
desire that Spanish colonial law be established in Louisi
ana.

The manner of executing these instructions was left

to O'Reilly's discretion, and the approval found in cedulas
later issued by Charles III, fully attests to the fact that

®0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17,1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 77, L.C. pp. 303-304.
^Cedula of Charles III commissioning O'Reilly, dictated
in Aranjuez, April, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp.
341-342. The draft is not dated. For date, April 16, 1769,
see Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly", in New Spain in the AngloAmerican West.
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the Spanish general faithfully carried out the royal inten
tions .10
On November 25, 1769, O'Reilly issued two proclamations
and two legal ordinances.

By the first proclamation and or

dinance, he abolished the old Superior Council, which had
helped to engineer the rebellion, and established in its
place a cabildo.

Under this ordinance were included the reg

ulations for the perpetuation of the cabildo and the provis
ions for the election of judges to try civil and criminal
cases in New Orleans.

Included also was a list of the re

sponsibilities of each of these officials.^-

The second

proclamation and ordinance dealt with the instructions for
instituting civil and criminal suits and the general adminis
trations of justice in the

c o l o n y .

12

a

brief analysis of

each of these documents will illustrate the importance of
Spanish law by showing the relationship of the Spanish legal
system to its French forerunner and to the civil code later

l^Cedula approving O'Reilly's Establishment of the New
Orleans Cabildo, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid.. L.C.
pp. 442-444. Cedula approving O'Reilly's Establishment of
Spanish law, tribunals and justice in Louisiana, San Ilde
fonso, August 17, 1772, ibid., L.C. pp. 470-471.
1^0'Reilly's Proclamation, New Orleans, November 25,
1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 108.
F. French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, New
York, 1853), V, 269.
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established by the state of Louisiana.

The proclamation of

November 25, 1769, states in part:
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, .... We establish, in his royal
name, a city council or cabildo, for the administration
of justice and preservation of order in this city, com
posed of six perpetual regidores. in conformity with
the second statute, title ten, book five, of the Recop
ilacion de las Indias. Among these shall be distributed
the offices of alferez royal, provincial alcalde mayor,
alguacil mayor, depositary general, andreceiver of
penas cf¥ camara, or fines, awarded to the royal treas
ury. TKese shall elect, on the first day of every year,
two judges, who shall be styled alcaldes ordinary, a
syndic general, and a manager of the income taxes of
the city such as the laws have established for good gov
ernment and administration of justice.13
The attached instructions promulgated by O'Reilly made clear
the duties incumbent upon the cabildo's members and the offi
cials elected by them.

The members of the cabildo and the

other officials mentioned were either elected by the exist
ing cabildo, or they bought their offices.

The governor had

the power to prevent a person from taking office in either
case.

Meetings of the cabildo were held every Friday and

were presided over by the governor, or, in his absence, by
the ranking alcalde ordinary.^
The cabildo was entrusted with the maintenance of public
order and care of the public welfare.

It regulated the price

of food, especially that of meat, looked after public

13proclamation of O'Reilly, November 25, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 108.
l^Cabildo, i b i d ., pp. 110-113.
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buildings, including churches, and the streets; and it col
lected

f i n e s . 15

Certain limited judicial powers also resided in the ca
bildo.

It had the right to. hear appeals from an alcalde or

a commandant in civil cases involving not more than 90,000
maravedis.16
court.17

Amounts above this went to the Havana appeals

The cabildo, as a body, seems not to have had any

original jurisdiction.

In order to hear appeals in the cases

mentioned, the cabildo appointed two of its regidores to de
cide, in conjunction with the alcaldes or commandant who had
original jurisdiction in the case, whether or not the appeal
should be heard.

No appeal in criminal cases was allowed

the cabildo, for these appeals were to be sent to the super
ior tribunal which, upon O'Reilly's recommendation, Charles
III later established at Havana for that purpose.1®
The clerk of the cabildo was either appointed by the
governor or he bought his office.

The duties of the clerk

were essentially those of the secretary of any council.

He

15Ibid. , p. 112.
maravedi was the smallest Spanish coin. Gayarre^
says 90,000 marayedis was $330.88. (Cf. Gayarre, History of
Louisiana, III, 4.)
17Gayarre says alcaldes heard cases up to 90,000 maravedis and that the cabildo heard appeals for amounts over
90,000. (Ibid.) This assertion is not justified in the light
of the documents. (Cf. Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 112.)
■^Kinnaird,

Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 108-
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acted as the chief archivist, preserving all of the papers
concerning the cabildo, as well as its trial proceedings.

In

order to insure his honesty, he was required to note the fee
charged at the bottom of each document, and he was subject to
the prescribed penalty for charging more than was allowed un
der Spanish

law.

The alcaldes ordinary, who were elected by the members
of the cabildo, were judges.

They were usually two in num

ber, and had original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal
cases falling within their assigned jurisdiction.

The juris

dictional area included the city and its dependencies assigned
to a particular alcalde. They were not permitted to handle
criminal cases of grave importance, and their civil cases
were only those which involved a very small sum, twenty pias
ters, unless the litigants both agreed to have the alcalde
hear the case; otherwise the governor had jurisdiction in the
case.
No alcalde could be deprived of his jurisdiction in a
case legally brought before him, not even by the governor.
However, the governor could, by a written order, demanded
by the litigants, require the alcalde to render speedy jus
tice conformable to law.

If the jurisdiction of the alcalde

was in doubt, the dispute had to be decided by the governor.

19The Clerk of the Cabildo,

ibid..pp. 123-124.
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But if one of the alcaldes claiming jurisdiction tried the
case before the governor reached his decision concerning the
jurisdiction that alcalde automatically lost jurisdiction,
and the other alcalde took charge of the case.
If the authority of an alcalde was challenged by a liti
gant, he could continue on the case only in conjunction with
the other alcalde. If both alcaldes were challenged, a regidor was associated with them to hear the case.

If the liti

gant wished to exclude an alcalde from hearing the case, he
had to present, in writing, evidence to substantiate his
claim that the alcalde was unable to render an impartial ver
dict.

Two men, one chosen by the alcalde, and the other by

the litigant, were to decide whether or not the litigant's
evidence warranted exclusion of the alcalde from the case.
If they could not agree, a third man was appointed by the
alcalde, and then the decision reached by the majority was
binding.

This feature of judicial procedure resembles the

Anglo-Saxon system of challenging jurors,

and provided a

reasonable procedure for the administration of

j u s t i c e . ^

That clemency existed under Spanish law was shown by
the prison rule for the eves of Christmas, Easter and Pente-

ZOAlcaldes Ordinary, ibid.. pp. 114-116. This analysis
of the alcaldes ordinary is based upon the Code O'Reilly and
the following secondary sources: Caroline Burson, The Stew
ardship of Don Esteban Miro (New Orleans, 1940); J.W. Caughey,
Bernardo de Galvez; Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana,
III; Henry Plauch§ Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV (July, 1921).
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cost.

On those days, the alcaldes, the alguacil mayor and

the clerk accompanied the governor in a tour of the prisons.
They released those who had been arrested for criminal cases
of little importance, as well as those imprisoned for debts,
on condition that they arrange to pay their debts in the fu
ture.21

Thus, Spanish law had a number of safeguards to

prevent the indefinite detention of prisoners prior to their
trial, or their lengthy imprisonment for minor offenses.
Consequently, it seems to have compared favorably with the
legal system in the British colonies of North America.
The regidor of the cabildo, who exercised the office of
provincial regidor alcalde mayor, had jurisdiction over crim
inal cases outside of the city and villages and over crimin
als fleeing from a city.

If, however, one of the alcaldes

ordinary or the governor had the case before him when the
criminal fled, that case was to remain within his jurisdic
tion and not that of the provincial regidor alcalde mayor,
even if the criminal was later apprehended by agents of the
regidor alcalde mayo r .

In effect, he had jurisdiction over

those vast areas of the colony which were not specifically
under the control of other alcaldes or the governor.

22

21Alcaldes Ordinary, Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 115-116.
22A case was tried in the court of alcalde Jacinto Panis
in June of 17 82 which shows the vast extent of the jurisdic
tion of an alcalde. The defendant, Evan Milly, was a resident
of Opelousas.
Panis ruled for the litigant, John Henderson.
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In order that the regidor alcalde mayor be unhindered in
the administration of justice in remote places, there was to
be no appeal from his judgment.^3

Accordingly, he was in

structed to conform to the letter and spirit of the laws and
to consult a lawyer in the cases brought before him.

Until

lawyers were available, the instructions issued under
O'Reilly's orders were his guide.

Any conflict of jurisdic

tion was to be resolved in the same manner as that prescribed
for situations involving a conflict of jurisdiction between
the alcaldes ordinary, or between an alcalde and the govern
or .24

and ordered the commandant at Opelousas to carry out the de
cision. (Cf. Henry P. Dart and Laura L. Porteous /eds./» "In
dex to the Spanish Judicial Records," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, Vol. XVIII /October. 1935/, p. 103.)
The extent of the alcalde's jurisdiction was governed
by custom in the different colonies. (Cf. 0. Garfield Jones,
"Local Government in the Spanish_Colonies," Southwestern
Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIX /July, 19l£/, pp. 75-76.)
23flenry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Lou
isiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV (July, 1921),

p. 275.
^Provincial Alcalde Mayor, Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss
issippi Valley, pp” 116-118. To assist the provincial alcal
de mayor in the administration of justice in rural areas,
Spanish law established the Santa Hermandad, a court made up
of citizens whose duty it was to bring justice to the king's
domain outside of cities and villages. These men not only
served as judges but, like the provincial regidor alcalde
mayor. they were also charged with the pursuit and arrest of
fugitives within their jurisdiction. The provincial regidor
alcalde mayor presided as the chief judge of this courtV the
Santa Hermandad. The Santa Hermandad does not seem to have
functioned in Louisiana. (Cf. Burson, Miro; Caughey, Galvez;
Jack L. Holmes, Gayoso, The Life of a Spanish Governor in the
Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799 (Baton Rouge. 1965).
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The regidor. who, according to law, was chosen as alguacil mayor, was, in that capacity, charged with the execution
of sentences and judgments rendered in the courts.

This in

cluded the seizure of goods for sale, receiving payments or
dered by the court, imprisoning and punishing criminals.

He

was also charged with the supervision of the prisons, and
was the official who appointed (subject to the governor’s
confirmation) the jailers and keepers of the prisons.

If

anyone broke the peace, he or his aides had the right and the
duty to arrest the offenders.

The regidor who held the of

fice of alguacil mayor was, in effect, a chief of police and
exercised only peace-keeping and restraining powers.

In no

way did he possess judicial power, as did the provincial
regidor alcalde mayor.
Another regidor was named depositary general.

This off

icial acted as the chief treasurer of the city's funds.

He

is not to be confused with the city steward, who could dis
burse city funds.^6

Before assuming his office he gave a

Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp
^Appointees to Cabildo by O ’Reilly, December 1, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p. 345. Cedula approving ap
pointees, San Ildefonso, September 11, 1772, ibid., pp. 536632. Proceedings of the Cabildo for December 1, 1769, and
December 2, 1769, in Records and Deliberations of the Cabil
do , (typescript translation by Adolph Baum and Arthur Tronosco, June, 1934), City Archives, New Orleans, Louisiana,
Book I, pp. 3-7.
Joseph Ducros was named depositary general and James
Durel was named city steward. Hence, Gayarre errs in making
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bond together with an accounting of his financial situation,
which insured the safety of the deposits made with him.

His

surety had to be approved by the governor, the alcaldes and
the cabildo.

The clerk of the cabildo recorded this bond

in the book used for the recording of deposits.

If, at any

time, the cabildo became apprehensive about the surety
offered by the depositary general, he could not receive any
more deposits until the cabildo had reassured itself as to
his solvency.
Upon demand by the cabildo or governor, the depositary
general presented the money deposited with him, and in the
same coin.

He was not permitted to make any substitutions

whatsoever in kinds of money.

At all times he kept a record

of the deposits in a book similar to that used by the cabildo
clerk.

In compensation for his services, the depositary gen

eral received three percent of the funds deposited with him.
These items and other details were fully explained in the
commission delivered to him at the time of his appointment.^7
Another office held by a regidor of the cabildo was that
of the receiver of fines.

He kept a record of all fines

"two" offices "one." (History of Louisiana. Ill, 3-5). Bur
son, in Miro, refers to the depositary general and the city
steward as separate offices (p. 14).
^ T h e Depositary General, Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss
issippi Valley, p. 120.
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imposed by the alcaldes or the governor, and had custody of
the funds obtained from this source.

In order to insure the

receiver's honesty, the clerk of the cabildo kept a record of
the fines imposed and in his possession.
required the governor's signature.

This document also

To further protect the

funds in his possession, he was required to give a bond sim
ilar to the one given by the depositary general.

At the end

of the year, his sureties were investigated to ascertain the
soundness of his financial status.

Spanish law obviously

provided many precautions to insure the honesty of the king's
officials.

It was primarily the opportunities for wealth,

abetted by the distance from the center of Spanish power, that
gave occasion to the acts of peculation and dishonesty among
colonial officials.
The penalties collected by the receiver of fines could
not be used at his own discretion.

As they were the property

of the king, they could be used only upon order of the gover
nor, the alcaldes or other judges.

To insure that only law

ful disbursements were made, the receiver of fines had to
give an accounting to the comptroller or auditor of the prov
ince at the end of each year.

He was, however, allowed ten

percent of all fines received into the treasury in compensa
tion for his work.

As he was responsible for the collection

of those fines at his own expense, this was perhaps not an
exorbitant amount.28

28The Receiver of Fines, ibid., pp. 121-122.
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Another regidor held the office of alferez real, or
keeper of the royal ensign or standard.

This official was

the custodian of the royal standard, which he carried at
certain public ceremonies.

This office was primarily one of

social prestige.
Of the remaining elected or appointed officials, the
two most important were the attorney general and the city
steward.

The former, elected by the cabildo, differed much

from the attorney general of today.
mote justice for the people.
wholly a prosecutor.

It was his duty to pro

Theoretically, he was not

Rather, he acted for the people, as

did the ancient Roman tribune.

Associated with this duty

was his responsibility for seeing that all of the public or
dinances were observed, and for remedying any situation which
might cause public harm.

He collected also the public debts

and revenues due to the city.

In addition to these duties,

the attorney general was charged with protecting the inter
ests of the crown by supervising the activities of the mem
bers of the cabildo, the depositary general and the receiver
of fines, to insure that they faithfully discharged their du
ties.

Finally, he took part in all public matters of import

ance, especially in the allotment of

la n d s .

29

The city steward, or manager of income and taxes of the
city, was elected by the cabildo, as was the attorney general.

29xhe Attorney General, ibid., p. 122.
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The steward was the keeper of the city's funds derived pri
marily from taxes.

He was responsible for keeping a strict

record of all the sums received as taxes or income for the
city.

When a person paid his taxes, the steward gave him

his receipt.

He was permitted to draw drafts on the cabil-

do's funds, derived from taxes and their income, but not on
any other funds available to the cabildo.

If he lent the

funds of the city to any individual whatsoever, he was held
personally responsible for repayment, lost his position, and
forfeited any right ever again to hold office in the king's
realms.
The public funds in the city steward's custody could be
used for public works undertaken by the cabildo, and for pub
lic mourning in the event of a death in the royal family.
However, the cost for construction and upkeep of bridges was
not paid for by the city, but rather by those who used those
facilities.

This would indicate that the extent of what the

government considered to be public was considerably different
from comparable ideas of today.

Possibly the arrangement for

the payment for bridges is reflected in the toll bridge of
modern times. in
u
The jailer, who had charge of the prisons, was appointed
by the alguacil mayor.

Since it was the alguacil mayor who was

charged with guarding the accused and executing sentences of

3(^The City Steward, ibid., pp. 112-123.

144
imprisonment, it was logical that he should choose the jail
er.

The appointment, of course, had to be approved by the

governor.

Once he was approved, the jailer was required to

present himself before the cabildo and take an oath to ful
fill his duties faithfully.

He, too, had to give a bond,

although only a small one of two hundred piasters. This
was to discourage bribery on the part of prisoners and to
insure that no prisoner held for failure to pay his debts
would, because of bribery, be released without an order
from the proper judge.

The jailer was to keep a list of

the prisoners and to see that they were properly cared for
according to the laws of the realm.

He was to be content

with his prescribed fees, and under penalty of punishment
was forbidden to take anything from the poor.^l
During O'Reilly's regime, all of the other officials
necessary to administer the Spanish legal system for the
entire colony were appointed.

Those not already discussed

will be briefly mentioned in the following chapter in con
nection with an explanation of the general principles and
procedures of Spanish law.

31-The Jailer and the Prisons, ibid., pp. 124-125.

V
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
IN SPANISH LAW
That section of the Code O'Reilly describing the insti
tution of suits, civil and criminal, was a condensed version
of the special laws dealing with these matters in Spanish America.

It was based upon the Nueva Recopilacion de Castilla

and the Recopilacion de las Indias, and was entitled "...In
structions as to the manner of instituting suits, civil and
criminal, and of pronouncing judgments in general, in conformity to the Nueva Recopilacion de Castilla, and the Recop
ilacion de las Indias, for the government of judges and par
ties pleading,...."

Drawn up by O'Reilly's legal advisers,

Felix del Rey and Jose Manuel de Urrutria, it was intended to
serve as the law for the colony of Louisiana until there was
common knowledge of Spanish procedure.^-

Together with the

regulations for the cabildo and its officers, it was the
only code under which the Spanish governed Louisiana during
their stay in the colony.
These instructions are divided into six sections, to
which is appended a list of the various offices held in the

. F. French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 269.
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colony and the fees allowed to each official for the various
types of duty performed.

The instructions are supplemented

by explanations and clarifications based on commentaries.^
On the whole, it is an able synthesis of a vast code of law
and the fact that it remained in force until Spain returned
Louisiana to France testifies to its worth.
The first section of the instructions concerned civil
judgments in general.

The instructions noted that no member

of a religious order could bring a suit into court without
the permission of his superior; no wife could so act without
her husband's permission; no son without his father's permis
sion; and no slave without his master's consent.

One excep

tion to these rules was that a son could bring suit in re
gard to possessions that he had gained as "spoils of war."
In suits involving more than 100 livres, the case had
to be presented to the judge in writing, and full justifica
tion for the claim had to be shown.

Then the defendant was

informed of the nature of the suit against him, and was given
nine days in which to present his defense or pay the claim by
default.

Witnesses were examined in secret by the judge, but

upon the demand of the other party involved in the case the
testimony had to be made public.-*

^Dart, 'Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana
Bar, p. 54.
^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 269-271.

The second section of these instructions dealt with ex
ecutory proceedings.

If a claimant had proper acknowledge

ment of debts signed by a notary, the judge could immediately
order that the debts be paid by the defendant.

The alguacil

mayor was charged with summoning the debtor and informing him
that he was bound by law to pay his debt.

If he did so, the

case was closed; if he refused, the alguacil mayor imprisoned
him and seized his property.
depositary general.

This property was held by the

Once the property was seized, two men

were chosen by the alguacil mayor to examine and evaluate it.
There was a nine-day delay in the sale of personal property,
and a thirty-day delay in the sale of real property.

During

this period, the debtor could pay his debt and thereby fore
stall the sale of his possessions.

The debtor's property

was not sold until the judge was satisfied that the debt
had not been paid, and not before notices of the sale of the
seized property had been given at intervals of three days.
After the final notice, if the debt was judged unpaid, the
property was sold and the creditor was reimbursed.

The al

guacil mayor received one tenth of the value of the property
for his fee, and the other officials received their fees as
allowed by law.4
It is interesting to note that in cases of payment of
debts, the creditor had to give surety for the amount paid

4Ibid.. pp. 272-274.
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to him if an appeal was lodged by the debtor.^

If the judg

ment was upheld, then his surety was returned.

If the deci

sion of the lower court was reversed, and the debt declared
invalid, then the surety served to reimburse the debtor for
the property lost, and to pay the court costs.^

This system

of executing judgment in civil cases before the appeal was
heard was a grave weakness in Spanish law, for it caused
serious harm to an accused debtor who later won his case.
Unfortunately, this procedure is still a part of Louisiana
law.
The third section of the instructions for instituting
suits, etc., dealt with judgment in criminal cases.

The

litigant could present a bill of information before a judge
and request the judge to begin criminal proceedings.

If no

one appeared in court to institute proceedings, the judge
himself drew up a proces-verbal and began to gather inform
ation concerning the alleged crime.
Once the investigation began, witnesses were called,
and the accused, if he was available, was brought before the
judge.

It was the duty of the alguacil mayor to demand the

surrender of the accused or seek him out if he did not sur-

^This appeal, if less than 90,000 maravedis were in
volved, went to the cabildo. Otherwise, it went to a special
appeals tribunal in Havana. (Ibid., pp. 271-272. Cf. also,
Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 112.)
^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. V, 273-274.
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render . The accused was given nine days in which to appear
before the court, and if did not do so in this time and offer
his defense, the proceedings against him began in his absence.
Once the accused appeared on his own, or was captured, the
proceedings were reviewed by the judge.
If the accused was present in the court from the begin
ning, he would be questioned in private by the judge, after
which he was permitted to offer his defense and to call wit
nesses in his behalf.

The court, or the litigant if there

was one, presented its case against the accused and brought
its witnesses before the judge to be examined.
done privately.

This was also

When the prosecution's case was made, the

accused was allowed to read it or to have it read to him,
thereby learning of the names of his accusers and their tes
timony against him.

In like manner, the prosecution read the

statement of the defendant's case.

If either the prosecution

or the defense objected to a witness, that the other had used
in the case, on the grounds of prejudice or unreliability,
the testimony of that witness was thrown out.

It goes with

out saying that sufficient cause was required before a wit
ness would be rejected.

The regulations for ruling out the

testimony of witnesses in criminal cases were the same as
those for civil cases.
If the accused was found guilty in a criminal case, he
was sentenced by the judge.

If the conviction was based on

the testimony of at least two reliable witnesses, his penalty
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was imposed according to the letter of the law, in strict
justice.

If, however, he was convicted on the testimony of

one witness and circumstantial evidence, the sentence was
not that demanded in strict justice by the law; rather a
lighter penalty was chosen at the discretion of the judge.
The reason for this leniency was stated in the Code O ’Reilly,
namely, that when two reliable witnesses were not available
it was better to err in the way of mercy.

The Code noted

that it was preferable to allow a guilty man to go free than
to convict an innocent man.

The common assumption of injus

tice in Spanish judicial procedures is not borne out by these
provisions for the protection of individual rights.?
The fourth section of the instructions concerned appeals
in both criminal and civil cases.

An appeal of less than

90,000 maravedis was heard by the regidores of the cabildo,
as well as by the judge who had original jurisdiction in the
case.

Fifteen days were allowed for appeal, and then another

fifteen days were allowed for the other party to present his
case.

The judges were required to render their decision no

later than ten days after the complete time allowed the par
ties for the presentation of their respective cases.

In

these proceedings, all of the pertinent documents were cop
ied, and the originals were forwarded to the cabildo where

^The procedures described in this section were basic
ally followed in the trial of the rebel leaders who were
tried under O'Reilly.
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the two regidores and the judge of the trial court could
either affirm or reverse the decision of the lower court,
depending on the evidence offered them.

In all of the ap

peals, the appellant’s only recourse was to show that the
judgment had not been in conformity with the laws of Spain.
The appeals were appeals in law and not appeals in fact.
Appeals in matters of over 90,000 maravedis went to the
special appeals tribunal, established at Havana for that
purpose, and its decisions were final.®
Appeals in criminal cases under this jurisdiction were
allowed only if the

alcalde^

of the trial court permitted

t h e m . A p p e a l s were made to the special tribunal at Hav
ana, from which there was no further resort in minor cases.
Appeals from the special tribunal in capital cases went to
the Council of the Indies in Spain.

Naturally, the king

himself could always override any decision of his tribunals.

®French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 272-279.
Cf. also, William W. Pierson, Jr. ’’Some Reflections on the
Cabildo as an Institution," Hispanic American Historical Re
view, Vol. V (November, 1922), p . 588.
^ O n l y the governor could pass judgment on crimes carry
ing the death penalty. (Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial
Louisiana," Reprint: Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV.
No. 3 /July, 19217, pp. 267-288.

l%)art notes that there were many instances of such ap
peals being granted, but he clearly states that the appeal
was granted by the alcalde’s favor, not by right, ibid.. d d .
284-285.
----
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No judgment in a criminal case could be executed before an
appeal had been heard.^
The fifth section dealt with the nature of punishments
for various crimes.

Although these are described in consid

erable detail, only a few examples need be cited in order to
understand the concept of justice that existed at that time.
Actually, the punishments imposed by Spanish law differed
little from those prevailing in other European nations dur
ing the eighteenth century.

For example, the crime of blas

phemy against the Savior or His Virgin Mother was punished
by cutting out the tongue of the offender and confiscating
all of his property, one half of which went to the treasury
and the other half to the informer.

This is reminiscent of

the laws of Puritan England, where blasphemy was punished by
death.
Law.

In each case, the penalty bore the mark of the Mosaic
However, there is no known instance of this law being

enforced in Louisiana.
Another crime to which a severe penalty was attached
was that of reviling the king or any member of the king's
immediate family.

Depending on the extent of the defamation

lllbid., pp. 277-279; Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colon
ial Louisiana, Louisiana Bar, pp. 56-57.
It is clear from O'Reilly's instructions to his lieu
tenant governors and other officials, including alcaldes.
that any serious offense must be sent to the governor for
trial. Lesser officials could only gather facts in serious
cases, and the governor alone could pass judgment. As noted,
even his decision could be appealed. (Cf. Burson, Miro. d d .
194-195.) .
----
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or detraction, the person was given greater or lesser bodily
punishment, the nature of which was left to the discretion
of the judge.

However, death was never inflicted on the

guilty party.

The offender's property was also confiscated,

and one half of it was given to the treasury and the other
half to his children.

If he had no children, two thirds

went to the treasury, and one third to the informer.
Another cited crime, and a very serious one in all eras
of history, was that of treason.

Anyone convicted of this

crime was condemned to death, and his property confiscated.
The crime of insurrection was associated with treason.

This

was defined as taking up arms against the state for any rea
son, even under the pretext of defending alleged liberties
or rights.

For this crime, the penalty was also death and

confiscation of property.

It was according to these laws

that six of the Louisiana rebels tried by Felix del Rey were
condemned to death.

The other six received lesser sentences,

as they were accomplices, not prime instigators, of the re
bellion.

That the strict enforcement of this feature of the

original code was not carried out by O'Reilly is clear.

Only

those without whom the rebellion could not have occurred were
given the full penalty of the law.
Murder was mentioned among the other crimes for which

12 N o case of this sort seems to have occurred in Spanish
Louisiana.
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death was the usual penalty.

Assassins and robbers on the

highways were likewise subject to the death penalty.

Assault

was punished according to the seriousness of the injury done
to the victim.
The sixth and final section of the instructions dealt with
testaments.

A student of Spanish institutions in Louisiana has

commented that the system for drawing up and executing wills
under the Spanish regime was very similar to that which obtains
under the present Louisiana Constitution.^

This is not sur

prising, as the Louisiana legal system rests to some degree up
on Spanish law, although the Napoleonic Code was used as the
prime source for the Louisiana Civil Code drawn up in 1808.
Under Spanish law, a nuncupative will required for vali
dity the signatures of three witnesses before a notary.

If

no notary was available, as was often the case in those days
in remote areas, five resident, or seven non-resident, wit
nesses were required to sign the document.

Codicils could

be added, but in no instance could a codicil alter the names
of heirs.

A new will was required to change the heirs.

If

the will was a mystic will--that is, a secret one--then seven
witnesses had to sign in the presence of a notary.

When any

will was probated, all of the witnesses, if available, were
required to appear before the judge and verify their signa-

l^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. V, 279-281.
l^Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Lou
isiana Bar, p. 58.
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tures.
If the deceased had died intestate, then special provi
sions were made in law for the procedures required for the
distribution of his property.

First of all, after capable

men had made an evaluation of the property, the debts of the
party had to be proven in court and then paid from the estate.
An executor appointed by the court carried out these provi
sions.

Then, one-fifth of the estate was to be set aside

for the offering of Masses for the repose of the soul of the
deceased.

The remainder of the estate was then divided among

the heirs, after the deduction of court costs, according to
the shares allotted to them by law.

If there were no heirs,

then after the wife had received her one-half share of the
estate and one fifth had been set aside for Masses, the re
mainder was given to charities.
In making the will, the testator worked within certain
limitations regarding the distribution of his estate.

One

of the most obvious restrictions was that while a testator
could give an heir his share before the will was made he
could not bequeath to him more than the law permitted.

If

only a part of the heir's legal share had been given to him
before the death of the testator, then the remainder could
be left in the will.

Generally, the testator was quite free

to dispose of his property.

He could entail it, in whole or

■^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 281-283.
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part.

He could leave his property to legitimate or illegi

timate heirs.

Furthermore, the parents by an advance agree

ment between them could disinherit any one or all of their
children.
For one dying intestate the laws carefully regulated the
distribution of the property among the heirs, the wife inher
iting one half and the children sharing the rest.

If the de

ceased had no legitimate heirs, his relations to the fourth
degree shared the property not due the wife.

Illegitimate

children could succeed to what was due their mother upon her
death.

In summary, it was a clear and well thought out sys

tem of testaments.^
Appended to these legal instructions was a list of fees
allowable to various officials, such as judges, attorneys,
scribes, and the like, for the various duties which they per
formed.

For example, a judge who verified titles, judgments,

decrees and the like received as compensation four reals in
milled dollars.

A scribe who sat in court in the city re

ceived fifteen reals per diem, but if he sat in court in the
countryside he received thirty reals for his work.

A survey

or received three ducats per diem for performing his duty.
The alguacil mayor received twelve reals for every free man
he held in prison, while for every slave he received only
eight reals. These are but a few examples of the various fees

16Ibid., pp. 283-285.
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allowed by law to each official for a specific duty per
formed.-^

There was merit in this, for by these regulations

the crown had a standard by which to judge any official who
might exact more than his due.

That some peculation existed

under the Spanish regime, even in the face of these regula
tions, cannot be denied, but it was no worse than the well
known corruption occurring in Louisiana during the post civil
war era, and the early 19301s .
At every stage of the process of establishing the Span
ish Code of Law for Louisiana, O'Reilly knew that he had the
opportunity to exercise great discretion.

Nevertheless, he

knew also that he had to submit his plans to the king for
formal ratification.

He had written to the Minister of State,

the Marques de Grimaldi, in October, 1769, telling him of his
plans to abolish the Superior Council and to establish a ca
bildo and apply the Spanish legal system to Louisiana.

Fur

thermore, he had suggested that it would be advisable for the
court to establish at Havana a special tribunal for hearing
civil and criminal appeals from

Louisiana.19

in December,

17Ibid., pp. 285-288.
l^Dart asserts the existence of peculation in the Loui
siana government, but states that he had found no proof that
it existed in the judicial branch ("Courts and Laws in Colon
ial Louisiana," Reprint in Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
Vol. IV, p. 287).
1^01Reilly to Grimaldi, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2594, Doc. 5, L.C. pp. 240-245.
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he wrote Grimaldi again, telling him of the actual estab
lishment of a cabildo and the application of the Laws of the
Indies in Louisiana.^O

"

Approval for O'Reilly's plans was forthcoming from the
king.

To O'Reilly's proposals for the establishment of a

cabildo, the application of the Laws of the Indies in Louis
iana, and the establishment at Havana of a special tribunal
for appeals from Louisiana, Charles III gave his complete ap
proval, and commanded the general to pursue his present
course.

The king further noted that cedulas were being drawn

up for the formal ratification of O'Reilly's actions.

He

stated also that the special tribunal which had been requested
would soon be established.21

After O'Reilly had returned to

Spain, the royal cedulas approving the governor's actions were
promulgated.

In these cedulas, Charles III noted that

O'Reilly had acted according to his instructions in establish
ing the Spanish system of law, and that in all things his
royal will had been carried out.

The letter and the cedulas

left no doubt that all had been executed as the Spanish mon
arch desired.^2

^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, ibid.. Doc.
19, L.C. pp. 212-224.
^ E 1 Pardo, Royal Communique to O'Reilly, January 27,
1770, ibid., pp. 369-371.
^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 7, 1772, ibid.,
pp. 442-444; Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 7, 1772,
ibid.. pp. 470-471.
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Besides the well known Code 0 'Reilly, which was promul
gated in November of 1769, the Spanish governor issued other
special instructions, decrees and regulations for the govern
ment of Louisiana.

Among these were the orders sent to minor

officials or commanders who handled lesser civil and criminal
cases in areas of the colony outside of New Orleans.

The ti

tle of these officials was tenientes particulares de la Costa,
or, in French, lieutenants particuliers de la dite Cote.23
They resided at such places as Opelousas, Pointe Couple,
Iberville, La Fourche, and St. Genevieve.

These officers

were instructed to hear only those civil cases involving less
than 20 piasters

otherwise the case had to be referred to

the governor of the province.

They were also empowered to

process and execute wills under certain conditions.

If the

will involved less than 100 piasters, the lieutenant was to
go to the residence of the deceased and distribute the es
tate according to the terms specified, or, if the person
died intestate, according to Spanish laws provided for per
sons so dying.

If the will involved more than 100 piasters,

the lieutenant appointed two men to make an inventory of the

^Petty officials who governed posts, generally along
the banks of a river. (Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana,
III, 21.)
24\Judge Martin says that twenty piasters was twelve
dollars. (History of Louisiana, p. 157)
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estate.

Once the estate was evaluated, it was distributed

according to the terms of the will, if one existed, or ac
cording to laws providing for persons dying intestate.

If

the heirs contested the will or the distribution of the prop
erty, they could make an appeal to the governor of the prov
ince .
Wills could be made in the presence of the lieutenants,
since there was a great shortage of notaries in the colony.
In these areas, remote from populated places, only two wit
nesses were needed to validate a will.

Moreover, the lieu

tenant could act as a notary for contracts, and could require
only two witnesses to validate them.

Even marriage contracts

were drawn up and certified by the lieutenant, who later sent
a certified copy to the clerk of the cabildo for his records.
In criminal cases, if the violation was a minor one,
the lieutenant settled the issue himself.

If the issue in

volved was serious, the lieutenant took the testimony of wit
nesses, at least two for the same action, and forwarded the
transcript to the governor, who then heard the case.
Besides these judicial duties, the lieutenants were
also charged with keeping the peace in their districts.

They

were not to allow any new person to come to live within their
districts unless this person had written permission from the
governor of the colony.

Furthermore, the lieutenant was in

structed to keep a close watch over commercial activities to
see that no illegal trading took place, especially with
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English ships.

Finally, an annual report of the conditions

of the area under his command had to be sent to the governor
at New Orleans.25

These instructions, as well as the appoint

ment by O'Reilly of the various men to fill the posts of tenientes particulares, were all approved by the

k i n g . 26

Since slavery existed in Louisiana under the French re
gime, it was necessary for O'Reilly to issue regulations in
this regard.

In a proclamation of August 24, 1769, the gov

ernor noted that many slaves had been buying and selling
goods in the city of New Orleans, contrary to a decree of Oc
tober 12, 1765.

Anyone who sold to slaves or bought from

them was subject to a fine of 500 livres, and both the goods
bought and the money received were confiscated.

This did

not apply if the slave had permission from his master to en
gage in this

t r a d e . 27

Three days after the decree of August 24, 1769, con
cerning sales and purchases by slaves, O'Reilly issued a de
finitive proclamation concerning slavery in Louisiana.

He

believed that in order to maintain this system the laws con
cerning slaves must be clearly understood and effectively
enforced.

Hence, he ordered that the Black Code, or Code

26Instructions for lieutenants particuliers de la dite
Cote, New Orleans, February 12, 1770, ibid.. ppT 3 T 5 ^ 1 :9^
26R0yal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid.,
pp. 507-512.
27Rinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev, pp. 89-90.
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Noir, issued at Versailles in 1724, be observed as it had
been under the French regime and under Ulloa.

This code reg

ulated matters of justice, discipline and the government of
the slaves within the colony of Louisiana, as well as the
conditions of the slave trade.

To see that it was fully en

forced, Governor O'Reilly appointed two Creoles, M. Fleurian
and M. Ducros, as administrators of the Code

N o i r . 28

Each

of these men later became regidores of the cabildo.^9
Another important regulation issued by O'Reilly was his
proclamation for the distribution of land in Louisiana.

He

noted that new and clearly stated regulations were necessary
regarding the conditions and terms of land grants.

He felt

that an increase in land ownership was needed to encourage
the agricultural pursuits of the colonies.
these conditions for a land grant:

He established

Each new family that

settled along the banks of the Mississippi was ceded a plot
of ground six to eight arpents wide and forty arpents deep.
Levees had to be built to protect the land, and the land
must be improved within the first three years of acquisi
tion in order to retain ownership.

Furthermore, the new

laws required that the roads near the land be kept up by the
grantee.

If, at the end of the three years, it was judged

^proclamation on Code Noir, August 27. 1769. A.G.I.
S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc.“ 707 T77U7 p. 216.
29Document of Appointment, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C.
p. 345.
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that the specified improvement had not been made, the prop
erty reverted to the crown.

This was probably done to keep

speculators from buying large tracts of land.

In certain

areas of the colony, as many as twelve arpents of land could
be granted along the Mississippi, if at these points the river
curved so as to cause these sites to be of less than normal
depth.

In the areas of Opelousas, Atakapas, and Rapides,

larger grants of 42 arpents by 42 arpents were permitted,
but only if the grantee possessed one hundred head of tame
cattle, some domesticated horses and sheep, and at least two
slaves to care for this live stock.

All grants were made by

the governor of Louisiana in the king's name.
These instructions also contained regulations in regard
to the raising of cattle.

These animals were permitted to

roam at large only between November 11 and March 15, doubtless
due to the shortage of grass on enclosed pastures during those
months.

Such cattle, however, must be branded; any cattle not

branded were considered as strays, and could be confiscated
and slaughtered after July, 1771.

Persons allowing their

branded cattle to roam at any other time were liable for dam
ages they caused to other settlers' property.30

In this mat

ter of the new land regulations, O'Reilly's actions received
the approval of the Council of the Indies and the King.

*2Q

■^Instructions para repartimiento de tierra, ibid., Doc.
12, L.C. pp. 328-338.

31

Cedula on Land Grants, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772,
ibid., pp. 513-519.
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This resume of the Spanish system of law established by
O'Reilly for Louisiana illustrates the nature of the new re
gime under which the people of Louisiana were intended to
live.

That the systems did not always function as intended

was not O'Reilly's fault.

Moreover, it was not, as was

asserted by Francis Xavier Martin, the 19th Century Louisiana
judge and historian, a system forced upon the people by
O'Reilly against the expressed instructions of the king.
Historians who attacked O'Reilly also held that the Spanish
laws were alien, and therefore incompatible with Louisiana
customs.

This is true only in that it was the system of a

country other than France.

But the law existing in France

and her colonies closely resembled that of Spain and the
Spanish Indies.

Both systems were based upon Roman, and not

Anglo-Saxon, law, and both had developed in a similar way.
The Bourbon dynasty reigned in both France and Spain, a
fact that further increased the similarity of the legal sys
tems.

In addition, the French Code Noir, as was noted, had

been adopted intact by O'Reilly.
To better illustrate the similarity of the two legal
systems, a comparison of the Superior Council with the ca
bildo may be made.

The Superior Council was first estab

lished in New Orleans under Crozat in 1712; was given per
manent status in the city and the colony in 1716; and was
reorganized in 1719, at which time it took its final form.
The Council was comprised of a First Councillor, or presid-
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ing judge, a Procurator General, or attorney general, and
other members who were themselves not necessarily lawyers.
It acted as a court for the city of New Orleans and the col
ony of Louisiana.

Crozat, and later the directors of the

Company of the West, appointed its members, subject to the
king's approval.

When Louisiana became a crown colony in

1731, the members were appointed by the

k i n g . 32

In dealing with civil and criminal cases, the French
judges were bound to written pleas only in important cases.
In minor cases, they held informal hearings.

In the early

days of the colony, the Superior Council had original and
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, but towards the end of
the French era local judges held court, and appeals were
made to the Superior Council.

Appeals from a decision of

the Superior Council could be made only to the king's Privy
Council.33
As has already been noted in the summary of the func
tions of the cabildo, that body was also a judicial one.
However, it served primarily as a court of appeals, and its
jurisdiction was more limited than that of the Superior Coun
cil.

The special tribunal established at Havana heard ap

peals in civil cases involving more than 90,000 maravedis.

3^Dart,'Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Bar, pp. 22-27.
33Ibid., pp. 28-35.
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Furthermore, the latter tribunal, and not the cabildo, heard
appeals in all criminal cases.3^

In spite of these differ-

ces, however, the two councils were sufficiently similar to
justify the statement that the cabildo was not, in essence,
alien to the people of Louisiana.

The greatest difference

was that the Superior Council had powers which the Spanish
chose to vest in the governor, or in others, like the appeals
tribunal at Havana, rather than in the cabildo.
The Superior Council and the cabildo both cared for the
public welfare and controlled public works, fixed food prices,
and the like.

However, the Superior Council had jurisdiction

over the whole colony, whereas the cabildo was, in theory,
restricted to local affairs in New Orleans.

Although tech

nically the cabildo had no power over land grants, it was
able to tax lands.

If an owner failed to pay his taxes or

did not keep up his land, the cabildo could force him to do
this or forfeit his

l a n d . 35

Again, as the cabildo members came from powerful families,
they also exercised some influence in other affairs beyond
their legal jurisdiction.

In one instance, they were able to

resist Carondelet's efforts to educate the slaves as required
by Spanish law.36

3^The Cabildo, Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev,
pp. 109-114.
L
35c.R. Arena "Landholding and Political Powers in Louisi
ana." Louisiana Historical Quarterly, VOL. XXXVIII (October
1955), pp. 28-29.
36Ibid.

I
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On the other hand, by the end of the Spanish period,
the cabildo in New Orleans had lost to the intendant some
of its financial control.

Logically the cabildo should have

retained fiscal powers within the city, but it did not.

37

Unlike the Superior Council, the cabildo, in spite of some
influence over colonial affairs, never acquired vast gov
erning powers.

It remained basically subordinate to the

governor in Louisiana, just as it did in the rest of the
op
Spanish colonies in America.
Another item worthy of note is that the personnel of the
cabildo appointed by O'Reilly was entirely of French extrac
tion.-^

This fact alone would make the judgments of that

body akin to those of the French Superior Council.

On the

whole, one might say that the cabildo was a weak reflection
of the Superior Council.

It differed from that powerful body

not so much in regard to its basic structure, but in regard
to the extent of its powers.
An example of an actual case will further illustrate the
closeness of the two legal systems.

In criminal trials, the

procedure for investigating and questioning witnesses and ac
cused was nearly identical.

A certain murder case handled by

07

Herbert I. Priestly, "Spanish Colonial Municipalities,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V (April, 1922), pp.
141-143.
OO

X

JOHenry Plauche Dart, "The Cabildo of New Orleans," Lou
isiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, pp. 279-281.
39

Documents of Appointment, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594,
L.C. p. 345.
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the Superior Council shortly before the end of the French
period of domination will illustrate this likeness.

The ac

cused was arrested at Natchitoches, put in chains, and taken
to New Orleans, where he was placed in a dungeon.

The Procu

rator General started the proceedings against the accused,
who in the meantime remained in prison.

The accused was not

given a notice of the indictment specifying the charges
against him.

Evidence was gathered at Natchitoches, the

scene of the murder.

Once this testimony was assembled, the

accused was told of the charges against him, and was given
the name of the chief witness for the state.

The accused de

nied the testimony against him, after which the witness was
brought from Natchitoches to attempt identification.

This

prisoner was identified as the murderer by the one witness,
but was not permitted to question the witness himself.

The

chief judge of the trial, however, questioned the witness.
The Council then decided on the basis of the testimony of this
witness, and other circumstantial information, that the man
was guilty.^

He was then sentenced to death by breaking on

the rack and hanging, but as an act of mercy the Council had

^ I n comparing this case with the trial of the rebels
as described in Ch. Ill of this work, one notices particular
ly that the French and Spanish methods of questioning the
accused, and of obtaining information and witnesses was iden
tical. The most notable difference was the fact that two
witnesses were required by the Spanish for the death penalty,
whereas the French considered one witness and circumstantial
evidence adequate.
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bis body broken after the hanging.^

A similar case under

Spanish law would have required two witnesses for the impo
sition of the death penalty.

The Spanish Code stated that

it was better that a guilty man should go free, than that
an innocent one should be falsely convicted and punished.
But aside from this, the procedures were nearly identical
to those required by French law.

Such a case, however,

since it was a capital offense, would have been tried by the
governor, not the cabildo.
A final important factor to be considered in the study
of Spanish law in Louisiana is the impact that this system
of law has had upon law as it exists in Louisiana today.

A

brief comparison of some section of the Civil Code of Loui
siana with the Code 0 1Reilly will illustrate the considera
ble influence which the latter had on the former. Section VI
of O'Reilly's instructions dealing with civil and criminal
proceedings indicates the close connection between the Span
ish laws and current Louisiana laws.
wills and their execution.

Section VI dealt with

One finds that the Civil Code of

Louisiana strongly reflects this section, since, for example,
the nuncupative will must be attested by five witnesses, as
was the case previously noted in Section VI of the Code
O'Reilly.

Both the Code O'Reilly and the Civil Code of Lou

isiana further required that these witnesses be residents of

^Proceedings of Superior Council, cited by Dart, "Courts
and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Bar, pp. 35-37.
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the place where the will was signed, and if they were not
residents seven witnesses were

required.

Again, according to Spanish law, the mystic or secret
will had to be witnessed by seven persons.
Code of Louisiana required the same number.

The 1825 Civil
However, the

1870 code reduced the required number to three witnesses.^
Section II of the instructions, as has been noted, dealt
with executory proceedings.

These proceedings concerned pri

marily the settlement of debts by legal means.
tion, for example,
the debtor's,
the debts.

Spanish law statedthat

even after seizure,until

In this sec

the property was

it was sold tosettle

If the debtor paid the creditors prior to the

sale of his property, his property was automatically returned
to him.

This exact provision is found in the Civil Code of

Louisiana, wherein it is noted:

"As a debtor preserves his

ownership of the property surrendered, he may divest the cred
itors of their possession of the same, at any time before
they have sold it, by paying the amount of his debts, with
the expenses attending the session."44
According to Section II of the instructions, for the set
tlement of a debti property could be sold only by those who

^Benjamin Wall Dart (ed.), Civil Code of the State of
Louisiana. Revision of 1870 (Indianapolis, 1947), Article
1581, p. 398.
43Ibid.,

art. 1584, p. 399.

44Ibid.,

art. 2178, p. 540.
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had been appointed by the judge for this purpose, under speci
fied conditions.

In the Civil Code of Louisiana it is provid

ed that the appraisal and sale should take place under similar
c o n d i t i o n s T h e s e few examples illustrate the direct in
fluence of the Spanish legal system on the laws of the State
of Louisiana.
Thus, the Spanish code of laws, as instituted by O'Reilly,
has been shown, first of all, to have been that system desired
by his monarch, and not a set of laws imposed by the general
on the people of Louisiana contrary to his instructions.
Moreover, it was ft system not basically alien to the French
population of Louisiana, but one closely resembling the laws
under which Louisiana was ruled by France.

Finally, it has

been noted that this system of law, although it held sway in
Louisiana for only thirty-four years, influenced the Civil
Code of the present state of Louisiana in an appreciable de
gree.

The importance of the influence of Spanish legal con

cepts and procedure in the development of the present state
code has been a reality previously either denied or given
inadequate coverage.

^*•5Ibid. , art. 2184, p. 541.

VI

THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM
BEGINS TO FUNCTION UNDER
GOVERNOR O'REILLY'S SUPERVISION
Within a few days after the promulgation of the Code
Q 'Reilly the Spanish legal system began to function in Lou
isiana.

Following his instructions, O'Reilly had notified

Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga^ on November 29, 1769, that he
would succeed him as governor of Louisiana.

Also, he in

formed Unzaga that a cabildo would be established on Decem
ber 1, 1769, at which time Unzaga would be given control of
the civil and military government of New Orleans and the sur
rounding territory.

Complete authority would be turned over

to Unzaga when O'Reilly departed for Havana.

Unzaga's salary

was six thousand pesos per annum, to which was added a three
thousand pesos allowance for a residence.^

The king's ap

proval for these measures drawn up by O'Reilly was received
by Unzaga after the latter had succeeded the general as gov
ernor:

■^■Unzaga came to Louisiana with O'Reilly as the Colonel
of the Havana Regiment.
(Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III,
44.)
2
O'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, November 29, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 231-233.
^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
ibid., pp. 225-230.
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The King has taken note that his royal intentions
have been complied with in this respect. I shall
continue to inform Your Lordship of what his majesty commands with respect to the colony, as I
have already done in the previous mails, on the
supposition that upon receipt of my letters, the
said lieutenant general (O'Reilly) will have al
ready left there and that Your Lordship will be
in possession of that command.
,
El Pardo, 24th March, 1770.
Grimaldi
In accordance with the information given to Unzaga on
November 29th, O'Reilly established the cabildo on the first
day of December.

Having notified the appointees, he called

them before him to take the oath of office, and then gave
each his commission.

It was also at this meeting that Un

zaga was formally appointed military and civil governor of
New Orleans and the territory surrounding it, and was named
governor-elect for the entire province.

The men, all of

French descent, who were appointed to the cabildo as regidores were:

Francis Marie Reggio, Alferez Roya1 ; Charles

Baptiste Fleurian, Alguacil Mayor; Peter Francis Olivier de
Vezin, Alcalde Provincial; Joseph Ducros, Depositary General;
Denis Braud, Receiver of the Fines; and Anthony Bienvenu,
Regidor
The following day, December 2, 1769, the cabildo began
to function.

At the first meeting, the elected officials of

^Grimaldi to Unzaga, March 24, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 163.
^List of Appointees, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p.
345; and Proceedings of December 1, 1769, Records and Delib
erations of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 3-5 (ZX-2B).

the cabildo and the other city officials took office.
senior alcalde ordinary was Anthony de la

C h a i s e

The

the junior

alcalde ordinary, Louis Trudeau; the attorney general, Louis
Ranson; and the city treasurer, John Durel.
the oath in the presence of Unzaga.

These four took

The meeting was notarized

by Charles Garic, formerly clerk of the Superior Council, who
had since become clerk of the

cabildo.7

Thus, the basic or

gan for the government of the capital city and the colony
under Spanish rule came into being.®
During the three month period between the establishment
of the cabildo and O'Reilly's departure for Havana on March 1,
1770, there were only a few administrative items considered by
that body.

Some meetings dealt with the public welfare, but

most of them were concerned with the various appointments made
by O'Reilly.

On December 23, 1769, Henry Depres was sworn in

as a notary public by O'R

e i l l y

and again on February 23,

^Gayarre^says that de la Chaise was the brother-in-law of
Joseph Villere (History of Louisiana, III, 31).
^List of Appointees, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p. 345
and Proceedings of December 2, 1769, Records and Deliberations
of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 6-7 (4A). According to Gayarre,
Garic purchased this office (History of Louisiana. Ill, 31).
®This author has found no documentary evidence that any
of these officials purchased their offices. Since the prac
tice, however, was common in the eighteenth century, it may,
therefore, be true that the offices were bought.
^The function of a notary public was basically the same
under O'Reilly as it is now in Louisiana.
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1770,two other men were appointed as notaries public.^
Most of the remaining business carried on during this period
was supervised by Unzaga, who was acting as governor of New
Orleans.

However, as he did not yet exercise full guberna

torial powers, all of the appointments were made by O'Reilly.
Prior to the day of his departure, only one other impor
tant official action was taken by O'Reilly in regard to the
cabildo.

In February, he sent to that body a letter of in

structions, clarifying the duties of the members of the ca
bildo with regard to city administration and judicial pro
ceedings.

It also gave instructions for the other judges

within the province.11

Until he gave official notice of his

departure to the cabildo on March 1, 1770, there was no other
important communication from the general.

The administration

of the city had indeed been left almost exclusively to gover
nor-elect Unzaga from the very day of the establishment of
the cabildo, as was intended by O'Reilly and approved by the
Spanish Court.
While the administrative proceedings of the cabildo were
few during the remainder of O'Reilly's time in Louisiana, the
judicial proceedings of the new government were quite numer
ous.

The first suit instituted under the new government had

■^Proceedings for December 23, 1769, Records and Delib
erations of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 14-15 (7B-8A-8B); pro
ceeding s for February 23, 1770, ibid.. Book I, Part II, p. 2.
llProceedings for February 23, 1770, ibid., Book 1,
Part II, p. 10.

176
been initiated under the late Superior Council on January
3, 1769, and the judgment rendered in May of that year.
But, since this decision had never been executed, the
petitioner had requested the new Spanish government to
execute the judgment.

One Elias Hughes had been awarded

17,133 livres, 16 sols and 10 derniers against Misters
Detour and Villefranche. The plaintiff had departed for
France, so a certain Nicholas Delasise had been chosen to
act in his stead.

There was a new hearing according to

Spanish laws, and finally on January 8, 1771, the case was
decided in favor of Hughes.

Everything was in complete

accord with the instructions set down by O'Reilly for these
proceedings, even to the fees alloted to the officials
hearing the case.
hearing.

io

Governor-elect Unzaga presided over the

Because of the large amount involved, the case

had to be tried in the governor's court.
An interesting case also concerning a debt collection
was initiated on January 16, 1770, in Unzaga's court.

A

certain John Pomet, captain of a ship named the Thetis,
brought suit against M. Adamville, the only one of a group
of debtors who had refused to comply with the governor-elect's
order of January 17, 1770, to pay for goods received from the

Villefranche, Spanish Judicial Records,
4053, January 3, 1770, cited by Dart and Porteous (eds.),
"Index to Spanish Judicial Records," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. Vol. VI (October, 1923), pp. 683-684.
l^ D e l l a s i s e v .
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captain.

Adamville was being sued for 168 livres, and

court costs and fees.

The case against Adamville was pre

sented on July 12, 1770, by Leonard Mazange, a lawyer, who
petitioned the court for collection of the debt.

The

alguacil mayor. Charles Fleurian, seized two notes payable
to Adamville by Charles Le Conte in the amount of 543 livres,
and deposited them with the receiver general for safe-keeping.
At that point the case became complicated, for Le Conte
claimed that Adamville owed him money from an old debt, thus
balancing out these two notes destined for Adamville.
of this the latter denied.

All

In the end, the court ordered

Pomet to be satisfied with these notes in payment of his
debts, and commanded that from the notes payable to Adamville
the court costs and fees be deducted.

This was the final

decision of the court in regard to the debt owed to Pomet
by Adamville.

In all aspects of this case, the regular
Spanish procedure was followed. 13
One of the civil cases illustrative of the proceedings
of the early days of the Spanish era was instituted on

January 22, 1770, in the court of Governor-elect Unzaga, by
Louis Diard against John Datchurut for loss of a boat and
its cargo.

Diard said that Datchurut had left St. Louis,

at that time under the jurisdiction of lieutenant-governor

13john B. Pomet v. Adamville, Spanish Judicial Records,
10649, January 16, 1770, ibid., pp. 685-686.
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Pedro Piernas, an O'Reilly appointee, to deliver the
merchandise to him but instead had gone with it to New
Orleans.

Furthermore, a worthless boat was returned to

him in place of his own, and the hides and flour had dis
appeared.

The plaintiff had hired this second boat,

leaving 800 livres with the officials in Illinois for
surety.
Governor-elect Unzaga appointed Attorney General, Louis
Ranson, and Receiver of Fines, Denis Braud, to arbitrate
Diard's claims.

After considered judgment, they ordered

the defendant, Datchurut, to pay all the demands.

In order

to carry out this judgment, the plaintiff and the defendant
had to journey to St. Louis, where the shipment originated,
to present themselves before Pedro Piernas.

He decided on

June 9, 1770, that the hides and flour should be valued at
357o of their original cost.
at New Orleans.

Meanwhile, the case continued

In February of 1770, all of Datchurut's

property was seized, as required by law, and placed in the
keeping of the Receiver General, Joseph Ducros.

Later in

January of 1771, Unzaga sent a dispatch to Piernas authoriz
ing him to seize the property of Datchurut in Illinois in
order to pay the owner of the boat.

Finally, on December

30th of 1773, a receipt for payment in full was signed by
the defendant at St. Genevieve, thus ending the case.^^

^Louis Diard v. Jean Datchurut. Spanish Judicial Rec
ords, 40^1, January 22, 1770. ibidTT pp. 695-696.
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Naturally, the majority of the cases were heard outside
the governor's court.

Most of these came under the cognizance

of an alcalde. A good example of one of these was the case
of Duforest vs. Chaperon, which was heard in the court of
the junior alcalde ordinary, Louis Trudeau.

Duforest was

the attorney for a M. Montegue who sued Chaperon for the
amount due Montegue on a note signed by Chaperon on June 12,
1769.

The latter failed to appear before the court, and

judgment was rendered against him by default.

This was in

accord with the instructions issued in the Code O'Reilly.
In December of 1770, Chaperon still had not paid the note as
the court ordered, so Duforest asked that the defendant be
summoned to verify his signature and the validity of the
note.

On December 22, 1770, Duforest asked that the note be

returned for future use, and that the proceedings be dis
continued.

This was granted and the case was closed.

Since

the plaintiff did not request the full enforcement of the
law by demanding seizure of Chaperon's property, the pro
ceedings rested at this unresolved point.
An interesting case regarding freedom for slaves was
recorded during O'Reilly's stay in Louisiana.

On February

16, 1770, Pierre Joseph D'llle Dupard and his wife petitioned
General O'Reilly that an agreement of theirs be recognized

^Duforest v. Chaperon, Spanish Judicial Records. 4019.
JanuarylTTTTTO, ibTdT. p. 700.
’

in law as binding at the time of their deaths.

In this

petition, they specified that if four named slaves served
them faithfully until their demise, they were to be freed
and accorded all the rights of free men upon probation of
their wills.

Governor-elect Unzaga, to whom O'Reilly

assigned the case, passed judgment on the petition and
granted it as requested.

The petitioner, M. Dupard, was

required, as was customary in manumission cases, to give
120 livres for pious works.

This money was turned over to

Denis Braud, the Receiver of Fines, for use at the Maison
de Charite. Attached to this agreement were all of the
documents proving that the petitioners had legal title to
the mentioned slaves.^

Although the petition was addressed

to O'Reilly, the judicial records show that he gave all
such cases to Unzaga, who either handled them himself, or
gave them to an alcalde.17 However, outside of business
involving a notary, no cases were begun under the new Spanish
regime until January, 1770.

O'Reilly was following his

instructions in turning over the civil government to Unzaga
as soon as possible.

1 fi

Sale of Estate of Joseph Dupard. Spanish Judicial
Records, 4030, February 16, 1/70, ibid., pp. 706-708.
■^Dart and Porteous (eds.), "Index to Spanish Judicial
Records," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. Vol. VI (January,
1923), pp. 145-163, passim.
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One phase of the administration of the colony that
O'Reilly kept completely in his own hands was that of the
military.

Not only did he maintain full control over the

defense and garrisoning of Louisiana, but he also kept
military trials under his supervision.

For example, one

military case involved five enlisted men of the company of
Captain Riu.

They had been cited by their commander for

insubordination.

The accused were sergeant Thomas de Cobas,

corporal Manuel Martinez, and privates Pedro de Leon,
Miguel Pinexo and Joseph Avellando.

The formal charge

stated that they had ignored their superiors, and had on
various occasions, behaved in a manner not conformable to
the military service.
A court martial board was ordered by O'Reilly.

This

body was headed by Captain Jerome Campani, and it continued
the hearing from December 24 until December 30.

During the

trial the accused made counter-charges asserting they they
had suffered grave injustices at the hands of their super
iors, Lieutenant Fernando Gomez and Captain Riu.

The com

mander of the company introduced witnesses to prove that
two of the accused were guilty as charged.

These were

privates Pedro de Leon and Miguel Pinexo, both of whom were
sentenced to six years at hard labor.

The sergeant, the

corporal and the remaining private were acquitted.

On the

other hand, the court gave credence to the charges made by
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sergeant de Cobas that he had suffered grave injustices at
the hands of Lieutenant Gomez and Captain Riu.

Consequently,

the accusations against Riu and Gomez were further investi
gated.'*’®
O'Reilly was particularly concerned over the alleged
injustices that had been done to sergeant de Cobas.

He

believed that, if true, they were not only harmful to the
sergeant, but were also dangerous for the morale and dis
cipline of the entire military corps in Louisiana.

The

general was also concerned about the pending promotion of
Riu to lieutenant colonel.

Because of the accusations

against the captain, O'Reilly told Grimaldi that he was
withholding the captain's appointment to the rank of
lieutenant colonel until an investigation could be made
into the c h a r g e s . L a t e r , both Gomez and Riu were allowed
to go to Havana to defend themselves against the charges
on

made by sergeant de Cobas. w

Before departing for Havana,

General O'Reilly had made these arrangements with governorelect Unzaga.

'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, January 2, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 86 and enclosures, L.C. pp.
595-605.
19Ibid., pp. 599-605.
20

The records available for this case did not indicate
the outcome of the court martial.
21-0'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 14, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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O'Reilly's continued control of the military is explained
by his position as Inspector General and his responsibility
not only for Louisiana's defense, but also for that of the
Spanish West Indies.

Even after his return to Spain, as

the concluding chapter will disclose, he took a vital part
in the military affairs of these areas, especially those of
Louisiana.

His subsequent concern with these areas derived

from his office as Inspector General of Infantry, and from
a recognition by the Spanish government of his knowledge of
the strategic potential of this section of the Empire.

VII
MILITARY AND INDIAN AFFAIRS
After the establishment of law and order in the colony
of Louisiana, the most difficult problems which O'Reilly had
to solve were those of military affairs and Indian relations.
A system of defense had to be set up in the vast newly ac
quired territory which was adjacent to Spain's traditional
enemy, England.

Defense had been of great concern to

Governor Ulloa, but the rebellion destroyed the work he had
done.

Ulloa had attempted to build effective forts at

strategic places adjacent to the English posts.

As he had

so few troops and so little money, he had not been success
ful.

Although much of Don Antonio's first year spent in

Louisiana was devoted to the building of forts, O'Reilly
felt compelled to revamp a great part of the system and re
vise the approach to the defense of the colony.^
0 'Reilly's basic plan for the protection and garrison
ing of the colony was outlined in a letter to Don Julian de
Arriaga in October, 1769.

The general decided to reduce

the number of forts in the colony, which he felt were too

^O'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 96-98.
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scattered to be effective.

Furthermore, trying to keep so

many forts was an unnecessary expense to the royal treasury.
Next, he hoped to reduce the number of regular troops to a
minimum, so that while having enough on hand to maintain
control, he would not require so great a number of regulars
as to overburden the royal treasury.
replace regulars.

Militia units would

Finally, he realized that the allegiance

of the Indians was necessary to insure the colony against
any raids.

Moreover, the Indian allies were an excellent
o
barrier to British expansion.
These general plans were soon supplemented by specific
action, both in regard to forts and to troops.

At the mouth

of the Mississippi River, Governor Ulloa had established a
new fortress, which he had built on an island composed of
mud and shifting sands, named the Isla Real Gatholica de
San Carlos.

It was located at a site along the river which

today is called Spanish Balize, nearly adjacent to the French
fortress of Balize.

While O'Reilly admitted that the general

area had been well chosen, the site of the fort was basically
unsatisfactory because of the shifting sand and sinking mud

^Ibid., p. 96; and O'Reilly to Arriaga, Havana, April
12, 1764, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo 3025; and Jack D. L. Holmes,
Honor and Fidelity. The Louisiana Infantry Regiment and
The Louisiana Militia Companies. 1766-1821 (Birmingham,
1965), p. 10.
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on which it was built.

He itemized a long list of faults

to be found with the fort.

Since it had been

built by Ulloa

in 1766, it had so deteriorated that the repairs would come
to 1,130 pesos, with a considerable sum to be expended
annually for upkeep, due to the nature of the

terrain. In

addition, the sailors and soldiers required to man the
fortress were exposed to the full force of the wind and
water, there being no natural protection.
was indefensible in time of war.

Furthermore, it

Also it was useless against

ships coming down the river to attack New Orleans, as it was
too far from the opposite water channel for its guns to be
effective.

In any event, O'Reilly felt an attack by water

would come by way of Lake Ponchartrain or Lake Borgne,
rather than by way of the Mississippi River.^
Since the fortress was considered of no value, he planned
to abandon it leaving only a small garrison of ten men as
observers.

In taking this action, he had followed the advice

of competent men who had gone to investigate the island and
the fortress.

In order to verify his own observations, those

men had signed statements attesting to their belief that the
fortress should be abandoned.^

^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 29, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, Doc. 25, in Kinnaird, Spain in the
Mississippi Valley, pp. 144-152.
^Ibid., attached statement signed by Unzaga et al,
January 8, 1770, Doc. 25, No. 2.
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On September 6, O'Reilly had issued a directive to the
commander at French Balize to maintain his post and guard
the entrance to the Mississippi River.

He was to be on the

lookout for all warships, especially foreign ones.

Moreover,

any vessel going through the pass must identify itself;
either by showing its papers or by giving the proper signal
before passing the fort.

In his monthly report, the com

mander was required to list all sailings.

To preserve good

order at the post, special attention should be given to
troop discipline.

The commander was also cautioned by

O'Reilly to see to it that all of the soldiers received
proper rations.

Because it was impossible in these brief

instructions to cover all possible circumstances, the Spanish
governor left to the discretion of the commandant the dis
position of any unusual problems.
Another fortress which O'Reilly decided to abandon was
Fort Saint Louis de Natchez, which was on the west bank of
the Mississippi, south of the British fortress of Panmure at
Natchez.

It was, he held, of no defensive value.

Further

more, due to its distance from New Orleans, it was deemed
worthless as a trading post, and he ordered the Acadians who
had settled there to move closer to New Orleans.

^0 'Reilly to Commandant at Balize, September 6, 1769,
Ms. copy dated February 26, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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Still another fort to be abandoned was that at Iberville
where a number of German families had settled.

These

colonists who had come on the English ship, The Britannia,
had weapons of their own and could defend themselves, if
necessary.

This step would release the regular troops

stationed at Iberville for the defense of the city of New
Orleans.^
After making known his plans for the abandonment of
these forts, O'Reilly went on to a more general appraisal
of the defenses of the entire colony.

He felt that owing

to the climate and terrain, it was useless to continue to
build fortresses or to dig moats.

Because of the rain and

dampness, the wood of the forts easily rotted.

Moats were

impractical in Louisiana, as they could not be made deep
enough to be of any use.

With the abundance of water in

the soil of the southern part of the province, moats were
impossible to maintain with the engineering capabilities
available to O'Reilly.

In summary, he believed that for

all practical purposes the province was not defensible in
the traditional way.

His plan, therefore, was to keep the

enemy busy elsewhere, and so ward off a massive direct attack
on Louisiana.

This was especially true for the city of New

Orleans and its environs.

6Ibid.. pp. 144-152.

The people would be the best
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defense for the colony if a direct attack should come.
To one familiar with the climate and the terrain around
New Orleans, and with the river's appearing and disappearing
islands, the views offered by O'Reilly seem realistic indeed.
While O'Reilly abandoned useless forts, however, he did keep
those which he felt to be necessary.
south to north, were the following:

Among these, from
French Balize; New

Orleans, itself; Pointe Coupee; Arkansas; Saint Genevieve;
Saint Louis; and the fort at the mouth of the Missouri
River.

In addition to these key river forts, he also re

tained the important posts of Opelousas, Natchitoches,
Rapides, and Atakapas.^

His instructions for their preser

vation will be noted later.
A central idea in O'Reilly's plans was the use of as
few regular Spanish troops in Louisiana as was consonant
with domestic security and defense.
organized the Louisiana militia.

To achieve this he

In all, thirteen militia

units were established during O'Reilly's regime.8

By Decem

ber, 1769, the Louisiana Batallion of Infantry had been re-

^Mortimer Favrot, "Colonial Forts in Louisiana,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (July,

T5‘
«77"p.""T40'.
8I b i d ., p. 740.
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established and reformed by General O' R e i l l y . ^

it had a

total of 549 officers and men, comprised of one company of
grenadiers and seven of infantry.

The grenadiers numbered

forty-five officers and men, six of the infantry companies
numbered seventy-seven officers and men each, and the remaining company numbered forty-two officers and men. 10 Prior to
O'Reilly's arrival, it was being formed in Havana, but the
rebellion had caused a temporary halt in the organization
of the batallion.

Pasquel de Ulloa, the sergeant major was

breveted as lieutenant colonel, and the adjutant general was
Joaquin Panis.11

Don Jose Estecheria was named colonel. 12

The general revealed his military plans through his
instructions to the commandants of the various posts of the
colony.

In November 1769, O'Reilly issued instructions to

Athanasius de Mezieres who was already the acting commander
at Natchitoches.

O'Reilly chose him to serve as lieutenant

governor of that district, not only because he was trust
worthy, but primarily because he was familiar with the area

^Gayarre claims that the batallion was not established
until after O'Reilly left (History of Louisiana, III, 50).
However, this is hard to reconcile with the documents cited
by Professor Holmes in Fidelity and Honor, p. 18.
•^List of Troops made for O'Reilly, certified by O'Reilly
and Juan A. Gayarre, December 8, 1769, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
■^Holmes, Honor and Fidelity, p. 18.
•^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, p. 50.
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and its people.

De Mezieres bad been in that community

since 1743, and had served as assistant commander under
Kerlerec.

Later he was acting commandant under Aubry.

13

O'Reilly instructed him to keep only a small garrison of
regulars, and to rely mainly on the militia.

The latter

unit was selected by de Mezieres himself, gubject to the
approval of the governor.

These orders were in direct

accord with O'Reilly's overall policy of reliance on the
militia rather than on regular troops.
To keep order in the community, de Mezieres was com
manded to maintain a small guard and a prison.

Legal in

fractions of a minor nature were to be attended to by de
Mezieres or other local officials, but cases of a very
important and extraordinary nature had to be referred by
courrier to the government at New Orleans.

In carrying

out the administration of justice, de Mezieres was directed
to observe exactly the prescriptions of Spanish law as pro
mulgated by O'Reilly.

A copy of the Code 0 'Reilly was sent

to de Mezieres for his study.

He was further instructed

to preserve the property of the Church and to impress upon
the people their duty to support it.

^Herbert Eugene Bolton (ed.) , Athanase de Mezieres and
the Louisiana— -Texas Frontier, 1768-1780 (2 vols.; Cleveland.
1914), I, 82 anci 130-131, citing the letter of O'Reilly to
de Mezieres, New Orleans, September 23, 1769.
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However, the directives to de Mezieres that O'Reilly
stressed more than any other pertained to the Indians.

The

Spanish Indian policy in Louisiana followed that of the French.
Just as it would have been too costly for the French to con
quer the Indian lands, so also would it have been for the
Spanish.

The Spaniards, like the French, wished to control

the Indian lands, but they chose the system of fealty and
alliance to accomplish this in Louisiana.

The Indian nations

were considered vassals and they were kept on friendly terms
by gifts.

The French had contacted them primarily through

traders.

This practice was continued in Louisiana, as also

was the French custom of annual gifts.

It was a more humane

method than that which the Spanish had usedin Latin America,
but it was not so effective.

Nonetheless, considering the

vastness of the Spanish empire and its weakness at the close
of the eighteenth century, it was the only realistic method.
An excellent example of the Spanish-Indian relations in^
Louisiana can be found by studying the actions of O'Reilly
and one of his subordinates, de Mezieres.

De Mezieres was

told that the Indian tribes along the border of Louisiana
and Texas, the Caddo, Tonkawa, and Yatasi, must realize

14I b i d . , pp. 27-29.
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that all of them, by the act of cession of Louisiana, were
now subjects of King Charles, a cousin of the French King.
Tribes which had warred with one another, because of their
different allegiance, must now cease their quarreling.

Without doubt, this must have been one of the most difficult
tasks that de Mezieres was expected to accomplish.

He and

the other officials of the area were twice reminded in the
instructions to establish peace among these Indians who
dwelt along the border.

A warning was also forthcoming

from O'Reilly, reminding de Mezieres that further enslave
ment of Indians was forbidden as of December 1, 17 69.
smuggling must be guarded against and punished.

Finally,

In regard

to law enforcement in general, de Mezieres was warned to
observe moderation."^

This is worthy of note coming from

a man So long reputed to be tyrannical.
In keeping with Spanish customs, a royal cedula approving
O'Reilly's instructions was issued.

The king sanctioned the

appointment of de Mezieres as lieutenant governor at Natchi
toches, and the instructions sent to him by O'Reilly.

In

cluded in this decree was royal approval of all other officials
appointed to assist de Mezieres and of the instructions issued

l^o'Reilly to de Mezieres, New Orleans, Nov. 24, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 82, L.C. pp. 561-569.
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to them by O'Rei l l y . ^
A series of letters between O'Reilly and de Mezieres
after the issuance of these instructions give

p.

clear

indication of the manner in which the Indian policy in
Louisiana was executed during O'Reilly's administration.
De Mezieres believed he needed a certain detailed list of
gifts for the Indians living in the Natchitoches area.
(These Indians came from the Grand Caddo, the Little Caddo,
the Yatasi and the Natchitoch nations).

In reply to his

request, the Spanish governor stated that a supplier of
goods, one M. Rancon, would give him what he needed.

17

The

discretion left to the commandant at Natchitoches is worthy
of note.

It is evident that General O'Reilly trusted him

and relied on his judgment which was the fruit of many years
of experience in the Natchitoches country.
Among the gifts sent to de Mezieres for the Indians, one
finds such items as guns and ammunition, knives and hatchets,
needles and cord, and luxury items such as tobacco, mirrors,

1ft An evaluation of these gifts sent by

shirts and hats. °

O'Reilly was made by the governor's accountant.

The Grand

■^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, A.G.I.
S .D ., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 489-494.
■^O'Reilly to de Mezieres, January 22, 1770, A.G.I.P.C.
Legajo 188-1, No. 10, cited by Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres,
I, 132-134.
*1 Q

List of Gifts Attached to Letter of O'Reilly to de
Mezieres, ibid.
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Caddo received gifts valued at 467 Reals, 7 sueldos, and 9
dineros of silver.

This was much less than the sum of 776

Reals, 7 sueldos and 3 dineros spent on the gifts for the
Yatasi nation.

It is to be presumed that the size and

importance of the tribe to the Spanish determined the amount
of money allotted for gifts.

The sizeable amount spent for

all of the tribes tells us also how costly it was for the
19
Spanish to control the Indians through the use of gifts.
O'Reilly was also concerned for the welfare of the
Indians.

This is certainly clear from a subsequent letter

to de Mezieres.

The commandant at Natchitoches was com

mended by the governor for his humane treatment of the
Indians under his care.

However, he was also warned that

he would be responsible for the behavior of any trader whom
he appointed.

In particular, the general's concern for the

Indians was shown when he praised de Mezieres for confis
cating and freeing four young Indians who had been brought
as slaves to the post of Natchitoches by an Indian trader.
The lieutenant governor was ordered to have the details of
the affair recorded, and have a proces-verbal drawn up and
sent to the governor of Louisiana, so that the trial against

19
"Regulos ... a Las Naciones de Indios por Reglamento
del Ex. S.D. Alejandro O'Reilly, "March 2, 1770, A.G.I.P.C,
Legajo 274-A.
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the trader could be initiated.

The commandant did as he

was ordered.
De Mezieres' cooperation and faithful execution of his
instructions in matters of this type are evident in a com
munique to governor-elect Unzaga in February, 1770.

A

Christian Indian named Santiago had been returned to his
own people by an enemy tribe which had enslaved him.

This

Indian, since he was of the same religion as the Spanish,
came to de Mezieres to warn him of an attack by his own
nation, the Tawehash.

De Mezieres sent the Indian to Unzaga,

who was requested to prove to the Indian that the French and
Spanish were allied.

De Mezieres hoped that Santiago would

return to his people and persuade them not to attack the
Spanish.

The lieutenant governor also asked Unzaga to pro

tect this Indian from an Illinois trader who at one time had
owned him, and who might seek to enslave him a g a i n . U n z a g a
granted his request, and the Indian returned by canoe to the
settlement at Natchitoches after his trip to New Orleans.22

2®0'Reilly to de Mezieres, January 23, 1770, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 188-1, No. 33, cited by Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres,
I, 136.
21

De Mezieres to Unzaga, February 1, 1770, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 110, No. 19, ibid., p. 137-138.
^ U n z a g a to de Mezieres, March 15, 1770, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 111, ibid., p. 152.
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Pedro Piernas had been appointed by O'Reilly as
lieutenant governor of Saint Louis and the Illinois country.

23

The instructions sent to him were essentially the same as
those for de Mezieres, but with some few changes designed to
meet the needs of the commander of a post so distant from
New Orleans.

Because of this great distance from the capital

city, Piernas was admonished to strive to gain both the
respect and love of the people committed to his care.
would insure greater loyalty to Spain.

This

Furthermore, in his

administration of justice, Piernas was ordered to observe
all of the laws of Spain, following the Code O'Reilly. A
full text of the Code, with a commentary drawn up by Manuel
Urrutria and Felix del Rey, was sent to Piernas.
Piernas was also instructed to inform the Indians that
they were now the subjects of a great and kind king.

Further

more, they were not to molest the English, as the English
and Spanish were at peace with each other.

Yearly gifts

would be allotted to the tribes allied to the Spanish to
reward them for their fidelity.
also was forbidden.

The enslavement of Indians

Traders had to be especially licensed

to go among the tribes and any Indians coming into the forts
were to be treated fairly in all negotiations.

23Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 157159.
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For the protection of the settlers, O'Reilly established
small garrisons at Saint Louis and at Saint Genevieve.

He

ordered the formation of militia units at both places, and
their commanders were appointed by O'Reilly himself.

Those

designated to these positions of command in the militia were
of French extraction in keeping with the general policy of
O'Reilly.

Piernas was ordered to keep strict control over

the regular troops in the two posts in order to maintain the
proper discipline.

Every three months, he had to draw up a

report pertaining to the soldiers under his command.

This

was judged necessary for the maintenance of military
authority in so distant an area as that of the Illinois
country.
Persons coming into the Illinois area were not permitted
to settle there unless they had written permission from the
governor of the province.

Moreover, trading was not allowed

without a license from the provincial governor.
For the maintenance of order, Piernas was to send regu
lar reports to the governor at New Orleans.

However, he was

permitted considerable discretion in carrying out his duties.
He was advised to use his own judgment in cases not specifi
cally covered in the instructions sent to him or in the code
of laws as explained by Urrutria and del Rey.^

^Instructions of February 17, 1770 to Piernas, attached
to a letter from O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1,
1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 8, L.C. pp. 276-292.
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In time, a royal cedula was issued which approved the
instructions sent to Piernas for Saint Louis and Saint
Gerevieve.

The cedula also ratified all of the appoint

ments made for Saint Louis, and gave the king's blessing
to all O'Reilly had done in Illinois and in all of Louisiana.25
Such elaborate instructions seem almost unnecessary
in the light of the small number of people in the Illinois
country at that time.

According to the 1770 census of both

Saint Louis and Saint Genevieve, there were at each post
only 103 persons, slave and free.^6

Yet, this was typical

of O'Reilly's thoroughness in carrying out his com
mission in Louisiana.
The instructions to the commander at the Arkansas post,
while basically the same as those sent to Piernas, throw
some additional light on the relations of Spain with the
Indians and with England.

The commandant was instructed to

keep a small number of soldiers at the post:

a sergeant, two

corporals, twelve privates, and an interpreter.

With their

assistance, he was to protect the post and its inhabitants

^^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid.,
pp. 495-500.
26census of Population at Saint Louis and Saint
Genevieve, 1770, attached to a letter from O'Reilly to
Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, ibid., p. 293.
Bjork says the population of these posts was 1102.
Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly," in New Spain, p. 183.

Cf.
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and supplies.

Because of the dangers present from Indians

not yet closely tied to the Spanish king, their new master,
the commandant was further ordered not to allow them to
bring their weapons inside the walls of the post stockade.
He was to impress upon the Indian the advantages in giving
their allegiance to the king of Spain.

The commandant was

to make the usual gifts to the Indian allies on a yearly
basis, alloting to each nation its due.

He was instructed

to protect the Indians against any white men who might
attempt to abuse them.

The commandant was further reminded

that no newcomer was allowed to reside at the post without
the written permission of the governor.
The instructions from O'Reilly concerning the English
called, in particular, for avoidance of any hostilities.
Since the two countries were at peace, all Spanish subjects,
including the Indian allies, were warned against attacking
subjects of the English king.27

This later directive was

similar to the one issued to Piernas, who governed the
Illinois district across the river from English Illinois.
As was customary, a royal cedula was issued approving
O'Reilly's instructions to the commandant of the post of
Arkansas as well as his appointments at the post.

OQ

27o'Reilly's instructions to the commandant of the post
of Arkansas. New Orleans, November 11, 1769, ibid., pp. 305---313.
^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid.,
pp. 501-506.
----
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A series of letters exchanged between O'Reilly and the
Arkansas commander, one M. Desmaseilleres, adds more know
ledge about the handling of Indian problems under O'Reilly.
When the commandant arrived in Arkansas he found a large
number of Arkansas Indians in the vicinity of the post.
He had endeavored to reassure the inhabitants who feared an
attack as he believed that the Indians would remain peaceful.
He considered that they had been impressed with his military
contingent and that the gifts he would provide would further
pacify them.29
To placate the Indians, the commandant gave them the
gifts sent at O'Reilly's orders.

As a gesture of generosity

he even made them gifts from his own

p o s s e s s i o n s .

This

was probably wise, as the presents seem to have been a
critical factor in keeping the allegiance of the Indians.
Moreover, as the Indians had recently come under their new
Spanish overlords, a good impression was in order.

The total

of the gifts for the three or four Arkansas nations was
valued at 4779 reals, and 72 sueldos of silver.^

The

^^Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, January 5,
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
30Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, (no date),
ibid.
31"Regalos ... a las Naciones de Indios," March 2,
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 274-A.
—-
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general complimented the commandant for his liberality in
giving gifts to the Indians from his own belongings.

In

this he had shown, said O'Reilly his loyalty to the king.
However, on another issue the Spanish governor took the
commandant to task.

Desmaseilleres was rebuked for giving

a large quantity of government owned supplies (without
authority) to a white man and an Indian. ^
O'Reilly reproved Desmaseilleres on more than one oc
casion.

While en route to Arkansas, the commandant stopped

off at Manchac to get extra provisions and ammunition.

The

general reminded him that he should have taken care of the
matter before leaving New Orleans and he should have first
oo

gotten permission. J

An even sterner reprimand was meted

out to Desmaseilleres in another instance.

The commandant

wished to retain at his post a surgeon who had arrived to
administer to the needs of the settlers.

He was reminded

that he should have read his instructions carefully, thereby
avoiding this unnecessary request.

Nearly three hundred

Indian families lived nearby without a surgeon, consequently
the post did not need o ne . ^

Attached to the copies of

3^0'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans, January 25,
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
^Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Pointe Coupee, November
25, 1769, and O'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans,
January 25, 1770, ibid.
<3 /

*

Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, (no date), and
O'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans, (no date), ibid.
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these letters was a list of the possessions

the commandant,

both in New Orleans and at Arkansas, which were sold by the
provincial government to make payment to the king's treasury.
This was presumably to reimburse the royal treasury for
goods used or distributed by the commandant without authori
zation.-^^
These communiques are among the few that enable one to
recognize in an intimate way features of the personality of
the Spanish governor.

Most of the documents coming from him

are devoid of any expression of feeling.

In these letters,

one sees revealed a man of almost inflexible character.

He

was most careful to carry out his own orders, and he ex
pected the same of his subordinates.

He may well have been

"unmoved," at least openly, by the tears of the ladies of
New Orleans who wept for the men who had been condemned to
death in October, 1769.

Letters of his during his later

life in Spain, reveal this same rigidity of character.
In addition to sending orders to the commandants of all
of the posts in Louisiana, O'Reilly himself went on inspection
tours, such as the one to Balize, and sent his lieutenants
on others.

Captain Eduardo Nugent and Lieutenant Juan Kelly

inspected several of the posts which O'Reilly himself, owing
to the limitations of time, was unable to visit.

Nugent and

35q 'Reilly, New Orleans, January 25, 1770, ibid.
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Kelly visited Atacapas, Opelousas, Natchitoches and Rapides.
At these posts, according to instructions, they were to accept
the oath of fealty to the king from the inhabitants; to accept
petitions of complaint addressed to O'Reilly; to gather re
ports of potential trouble-makers; to take a census and
review the local militia.
They were further instructed to go to the post of Adaes,
near the site of the present town of Robeline, Louisiana, and
ascertain the identity of the person who had been selling
guns to the Indians of that area.

They were also commanded

to assess the strength of the fortifications at this post.
Fort Adaes had been a border post of the Spanish for the
protection of New Spain against encroachments from French
Louisiana.

It was now superfluous.

Nugent's and Kelly's

orders called for them to keep a journal of their trip,
noting the character of the country, its products and the
condition of the roads.

The Indian allies were to be told

to stop attacking other Indians or whites in the Texas
territory, as all were now subject to the same ruler.
Renegade whites must be turned over by the Indians to the
proper authorities at each

f o r t . 36

These instructions are

somewhat reminiscent of those given to Lewis and Clark by

^instructions to Nugent and Kelly attached to letter
from O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 570-575.
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Jefferson, in that the officers were told to observe care
fully the nature of the country and to maintain a record of
their travels.
Kelly and Nugent left New Orleans on November 18, 1769,
and arrived in Natchitoches on December 29.

In all, they

covered 189 leagues in forty-two days of travel.

They

visited as many villages and outposts as they could en route.
By November 25, they had covered thirty leagues on foot.
Near the village of the Plaquemine Indians, (roughly the
site of the present Plaquemine, Louisiana), they began to
journey by boat, traveling on the Mississippi toward the
Atchafalaya river.

A scouting party which had been sent

ahead, was lost, but was found on December 3.

By the sixth

of December, they had reached the Atchafalaya River, and
after three days' journey up the river, they reached the
village of the Chetimashas Indians.

As neither this tribe

nor the Plaquemines were considered important groups, they
moved on toward the post of Atacapas.^7
At Atacapas, Nugent and Kelly found a small village of
people mainly of Acadian descent.

The white population

■^David Knuth Bjork (ed.), "Documents Relating to
Alejandro O'Reilly and an Expedition Sent Out by Him From
New Orleans to Natchitoches, 1769-1770," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, Vol. VII (January, 1924), pp. 21-29, documents
copies from A.G.I.P.C., 80-1-9. The original document could
not be found in the Papeles de Cuba, Legajo 2357 of the
Archives of the Indies.
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included 97 men and 67 women, who owned 33 slaves (25 men
and 8 women).

They had livestock in plentiful supply, there

being 1323 oxen, 565 pigs, 266 horses and 18 sheep.

O'Reilly's

agents noted that the land was rich and that the people were
very industrious, and observed that the women made their
own clothes.
As Opelousas was very close, it was the next stop for
the Spanish officers.

The inhabitants of Opelousas were

primarily Acadians, hard-working people who had considerable
livestock and productive lands.

Of the total white population

of 197 the men numbered 111, the women 86.
slaves, 69 men and 46 women.

They held 115

There livestock were more

numerous than at Atacapas, with 2419 oxen, 639 horses, 682
pigs, 198 sheep, 38 goats, 13 mules, and 3 donkeys being
counted.

It is interesting to note that the crops then were

much the same as today:

rice, sweet potatoes, and corn.

Kelly and Nugent stated that if the inhabitants so desired
they could easily produce wheat.

Finally, the officers

noted that the two settlements were close enough to be easily
merged into

o n e .

39

En route to Natchitoches by way of the Red River, they
stopped at the small settlement of Rapides near the present

33Ibid.„ pp. 38-39.
39Ibid., pp. 29, 30, 35, 36.
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site of Alexandria, Louisiana.

In the village there were

only 17 white men and 16 women who held 18 slaves (12 men
and 6 women). There were also 44 Apalache Indians (26 men
and 18 women), most of whom were of the Catholic faith and
spoke Spanish.

The people of Rapides were very poor, having

only a small amount of livestock--298 oxen, 98 horses, and
97 pigs--and produced a little corn and tobacco.

The soil,

it was noted, was much like that of the Natchitoches area.4^
Kelly and Nugent arrived in Natchitoches on December
29, travelling from Rapides up the Red River.

At Natchitoches

they found the governor's mansion, a simple fort, a store
house, a jail, a store room, and 80 settlers' homes.

They

observed that with the exception of the governor's house,
the buildings were in poor repair.
hill above the river.

The fort was on a small

The census at this town was more

detailed for it divided the inhabitants into age groups.
Among the whites, there were 98 boys under fourteen, 152 men
from fourteen to fifty, and 5 men over fifty, giving a total
of 255 male residents.

There were 94 girls under fourteen,

102 women from fourteen to fifty, and 2 women over fifty
years old, making a total of 198 females.

Among the slaves

there were 182 males (of whom 141 were able to work), and
129 females, with 93 able to work.

40Ibid., pp. 31, 36, 37.

The inhabitants possessed
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1752 oxen, 1268 pigs, 815 horses, 150 sheep, 50 goats, and
30 mules.

The soil was suitable for wheat, the agents

believed, although only corn, rice and tobacco were grown.
In general, the community was deemed backward because the
people were not industrious and many had no visible means
r- support. 41x
of
During their journey they had another important duty to
fulfill.

They were to administer the oath to all the people

with whom they came into contact.

This was carried out

without incident.
It was then time for the Spanish officers to return to
New Orleans to make their report to O'Reilly.

They departed

from Natchitoches for New Orleans on January 5, 1770.
Travel was rapid, as stops along the way were unnecessary.
They journeyed first on the Red River, thence to the
Mississippi, reaching New Orleans and reporting to the
/O
general on January 14.
Their brief journal gives a vivid
idea of the primitive life led by the settlers.

It also

makes one realize why the Spanish, by necessity if not by
desire, had to adopt a policy of alliance, subsidized by
gifts, with the numerous Indian nations of their new colony.
As in all other matters, so in Indian affairs, O'Reilly
kept control of the most important features of his policy in

41Ibid., pp. 31, 33, 34.
42Ibid., pp. 21-23.
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his own hands.

Rather than rely solely on the contact made

with the Indians by the various commanders at the distant
posts of the colony, O'Reilly himself called a meeting of
the chiefs in New Orleans.

Not long after the arrest of

the rebels, he issued a summons to all of the chiefs within
sixty leagues, or 180 miles, of New Orleans to meet with him
there.

He wished to impress upon the leaders the power of

their new ruler, the Spanish king.

An account of the

meeting accompanying a letter from O'Reilly to Don Julian
de Arriaga is most impressive:
... At half past eleven o'clock in the morning
there arrived at his Excellency's house nine
chiefs, accompanied by the interpreters, each
one respectively authorized, together with quite
a number of Indians, singing and playing their
military instruments.
His Excellency entered the principal hall
of the house, and having seated himself under the
canopy, accompanied by all the officers of the
garrison and the principal persons of the city,
the Indians were admitted into his presence, pre
ceded by the interpreters. After they had placed
their military implements at His Excellency's feet,
each one of the chiefs saluted him with his flag,
waving it in a circle over his head, and touching
him on the chest four times with it, then giving
it to him. Each one then presented him with his
burning pipe, the chief himself holding it while
he smoked, which His Excellency did as he was not
ignorant of its significance; and finally each
chief gave him his hand, which is the Indian's
greatest sign of friendship.
When these ceremonies had been concluded, the
chief of the Bayougoulas asked permission to speak,
and His Excellency having granted it, the chief
made substantially the following speech:
"Red men, chiefs and warriors, in your name I
speak to the great chief whom the great King of
Spain has sent to take possession of these lands.

210

"Father and great chief, we hope that thou
wilt deign to have pity on these, thy children,
and grant us the same favors and benefits as did
the French, and that thou wilt now deign to have
our arms and implements repaired and give us some
little assistance to live on for the rest of the
year.
"I am afraid of displeasing thee, great chief
of chiefs, and so I close, assuring thee that all
these red men, warriors and chiefs of the tribes,
will be inviolably faithful to thee, both here
and in the posts where are people of they orders."
O'Reilly took pains to explain to the chiefs the trans
fer of Louisiana from the King of France to his cousin, the
King of Spain, and the close ties between the two rulers.
He told the Indians also of the great power of the Spanish
King and of his clemency, promised them the presents which
they requested, and ordered them not to attack the English.
After these words he took a holy medal, and placed one over
the head of each chief, and then touched the Indian's
shoulders with his sword.

After this ceremony O'Reilly

promised the Indians a parade of his troops.

Accordingly,

that same afternoon, he held a military review before the
chiefs.

They were all deeply impressed by the skill and

obvious strength of the Spanish troops, and felt themselves
to be under powerful protectors.

The next day they departed

for their tribal areas satisfied with their new ruler and
his representative.44

^Statement attached to letter from O'Reilly to Arriaga,
October 17, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 101-103.
44Ibid.
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Stronger ties had to be forged by the Spanish with
their Indian allies, especially after the insurrection of
the French settlers in 1768.

The dramatic way in which they

were received by O'Reilly, who sat in their presence almost
as a monarch, and the demonstration of Spanish military power
secured their respect and admiration.

Not only did the Span

ish governor treat them as men worthy of respect in their
own right, but he impressed them with Spain's military
might so that they were deterred from attacking the Spanish
forts.

Considering the small number of regulars he left in

Louisiana, and the great distance between forts, O'Reilly's
move was wise.

His use of presents was also calculated to

win over the Indians.
The use of presents for the Indians was begun by the
French.

While it was costly, the Spanish, nevertheless,

deemed it more feasible than an attempt to conquer the vari
ous Indian nations.

Actually, such a war probably would at

that time have been all but impossible for Spain.

During

O'Reilly's administration, gifts valued at 8,257 reals, 78
sueldos, and 3 dineros were given to twenty-six friendly
nations in Louisiana.

These twenty-six nations were

divided into three major groups.

The first of these groups

was the Taensa, located east and north of Natchitoches, and
numbering fifteen nations.

These were as follows:

the

Ouacha and the Chaouacha, the Osagoula, the Bayogoula,
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the Houma, the Pacana, the Ochana, the Tonika and the
Avoyelles, the Biloxi, the Pascagoula, the Chactoos, the
Mobile, the Chitimacha of the River, and the Chitimacha
of the Great Land.

The second group was the Arkansas,

located near the post of the same name.
cluded the following:

This group in

the Quapaw nation, the Ottawa, the

Olamon, and the three Aldeas nations

(considered one).

The

third group lived in the Natchitoches area, and included
the following:

the Natchitoch nation, the Grand Caddo, the

Little Caddo, the Yatasi, the Rapides, and the Albamon
nation.The

vast amount spent by O'Reilly for the

Indians' gifts, and later by other Spanish governors,
indicates that Spain heeded Ulloa's warnings that the
Indians expected extravagant gifts from the Spanish, and
uttered dire threats when he was not able to provide them.4^
This was another lesson that had been learned from the
experience of the first Spanish governor.
As the military and Indian affairs of the colony of
Louisiana were being solved, O'Reilly sent back to Havana
some of the regular troops in his force.

In October, 1769,

he reassigned to Cuba the three companies of grenadiers of

45"Regulos ... a las Naciones de Indios," March 2, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 274-A.
4^Ulloa to Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6,
in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 61-62.
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the Havana militia, and the fifty volunteer cavalrymen who
had come with him.

He noted that all of these soldiers had

conducted themselves well while on their tour of duty in
Louisiana.

He planned also to return to Havana the

Catalonian fusiliers, thirty-two dragoons, and all of the
officers and troops of the artillery units.

As only a few

pieces of artillery were needed in New Orleans, he returned
at that time all of the pieces which he had transported to
New Orleans. ^
gressed.

Further withdrawals of men came as time pro

In November, O'Reilly sent a communique to Antonio

Bucareli, the governor and captain general of Cuba, to the
effect that he was keeping 179 men from the Lisbon Regiment
for the Louisiana Batallion, but that the remainder of that
contingent was being returned to Havana and would be added
to the regiment of that city.

Those who were disabled would

return to the kingdom of Lisbon/4^
Shortly after this reassignment of troops, two additional
companies were returned to Havana, and plans were made for the
return of seven more companies to that city as soon as
transports for them were available.

As these men were no

longer needed to insure order in the colony, they were being

^ 0 'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 309-313.
4^0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, November 10, 1769,
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana, 1766-1791
Book I, No. 83, p. 17.
----------
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dispatched to points where their presence was required. 49
In December, six of the seven companies which he had
planned to send back to Havana returned on the frigate,
La Fetis.~^

O'Reilly’s well planned actions in establishing

order in Louisiana, coupled with his rapid organization of
militia units and his measures for cooperation with the
Indians, enabled him within a short time to reassign to
Havana most of his regulars.

In this way, as he himself

noted, the best interests of the crown were served and the
burdens of the royal treasury were relieved.
O'Reilly's connection with the military affairs of
Louisiana did not cease after his departure from that colony.
As the Inspector General of Infantry, and also as the man
charged with the establishment of the defenses for Louisi
ana, he was consulted by the crown on various problems that
arose.
In the spring of 1770, Governor Unzaga requested (of the
Spanish Minister of State) advice concerning the defense of
Louisiana.

From San Ildefonso the Marques de Grimaldi in

formed him that until General O'Reilly had been consulted
concerning these questions, no decision could be made.

It

was the king's wish that all of the military commanders in

^ O ' R e i l l y to Bucareli, November 18, 1769, ibid., Bk.
1, No. 87, p. 20.

^O'Reilly to Bucareli, December 10, 1769, ibid., Bk.
1, No. 87, p. 22.
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America should direct their communications concerning
military affairs to O'Reilly.51
Upon the general's return to Spain, Grimaldi sent him
Governor Unzaga's communique.

O'Reilly carefully studied

the document and gave his recommendations.

He pointed out

the problems facing Unzaga in the defense of Louisiana.

The

Spanish general noted that in time of peace the English
garrisoned forts near the Choctaw to keep them under control
and to keep their pelt trade.

These forts extended from

Illinois to Pensacola and made the Mississippi safe for
English shipping.

In time of war, these same forts would

serve as bases for an attack on Louisiana, thereby severing
communications between the Spanish at Illinois and those at
New Orleans.
O'Reilly held that it was impossible to prevent the
English from controlling the pelt trade in time of peace
since they could operate more efficiently than the Spanish.
In time of war, Spain could only defend Louisiana at very
great expense.

The English at that time had fifteen hundred

veteran troops in the area, and they were supported by seven
thousand Choctaw braves.

The Spanish could not afford to

match such a force.52

^Grimaldi to Unzaga, San Ildefonso, August 25, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 55, L.C. pp. 97-98.
52o'Reilly to Grimaldi, Madrid, September 30, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-7, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 183-186.
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If Louisiana should come under a massive attack by the
British, O'Reilly recommended several defensive tactics:
the governor and his garrison were instructed to abandon
New Orleans, take up a defensive position at Opelousas, and
lest he be cut en route to Opelousas, leave a small force
at Manchac to intercept British troops coming from Natchez.
O'Reilly hoped that the troops at the fort in Arkansas could
protect themselves, but if they could not, they should also
retire to Opelousas and join the governor's forces.

The

garrison and people at the forts of Saint Louis and Saint
Genevieve were to flee to the Missouri Indians for protection.
The governor was directed also to closely watch British troop
movements and to report any unusual activities to the captain
general of Cuba.

O'Reilly further recommended an increase

of one hundred regulars and seven canons for the Louisiana
Batallion.53
The strategy in O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi was the
same as that which he had proposed to Julian de Arriaga in
1769.

The colony was indefensible.

Withdrawal to a post

near the Texas frontier seemed the best solution if the
territory were attacked.

If Opelousas could be held while

the British troops dispersed themselves throughout the vast
region, the Spanish would have protected Mexico and would
have some hope of retaining at least part of Louisiana.

53Ibid.
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Since Mexico was vital to Spanish interests and Louisiana
was not, O'Reilly's plans proposed to achieve, with reasonable
expenditures, the main purpose of Louisiana's incorporation
within the Spanish-American Empire.
The two premises contained within O'Reilly's plan,
namely, that Louisiana was indefensible in a traditional way,
and that whatever holding actions were taken, would be
executed primarily by the militia, were never fully tested.
Louisiana never underwent a massive attack while under
Spanish rule.

During the American Revolution, the Spanish

Governor, Bernardo de Galvez, knowing Britain to be occupied
elsewhere, took the offensive and succeeded.

In later years,

fears of an attack by the British during the second phase
of the Spanish participation in the Wars of the French
Revolution never materialized.

However, during that time

Governors Carondelet and Gayoso realized that any British
attacks which might come from Canada or from the Gulf would
require more means of resistance than they could offer.^
The second premise^ the reliance on militia, was accepted
by most of O'Reilly's successors.

The need for such units

was expressed both by Carondelet and Gayoso, who not only
feared attacks by the British, but also by American frontiers
men.

Carondelet maintained that, "Louisiana cannot exist

under Spain's dominion for very long unless it can depend for

-^Holmes, Honor and Fidelity, p. 48.
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its security on its own resources, and by giving it a form
of military administration which arouses the inhabitants'
military

a r d o r .

"^5

He had previously, on his own authority,

re-established six of the Louisiana militia units which
Governor Miro had allowed to disband, and_hacl promised that
these units would be outfitted at the expense of the pro
vincial government.

This proposal, however, was not

approved by the court at Madrid.

Carondelet, nevertheless,

continued to voice his fears of attacks and the need of
militia units for defense.

His successor, Manuel Gayoso

also tried to reorganize the militia units but found that
the men were unwilling to train regularly.

Yet, when called

upon to fight, existing units acquitted themselves with
honor.
The position of Louisiana under Governors Carondelet
and Gayoso would seem to support O'Reilly's view of the
military posture of the colony.

Both of these men knew

that Louisiana was practically indefensible, but they also
agreed with O'Reilly that whatever hope there was for secu
rity lay with the militia.

5^Carondelet to Luis de Las Casas, captain general of
Cuba, May 16, 1792, cited in Holmes, ibid., pp. 48-49.
5®Ibid., pp. 19, 68, 71, 76-78. Holmes notes that the
militia units certainly fought well under Galvez.
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The Indian policy which the general had established
under instructions from the court had mixed results.
some ways the policy was a success.

In

One of its aims had

been to prevent constant attacks on Spanish outposts and
towns by the Indians.

Basically this was accomplished.

However, the reliance upon the Indians as allies was of
dubious merit.

One notable example of the failure of this

proposal, was the alliance with the British by the Creeks
during the American Revolutionary War.

Another instance of

failure was Governor Miro's inability to control the
Cherokee.^
O'Reilly's successors tried to keep the loyalty of the
Indians to promote still another part of the general's
Indian policy.

Spain had accepted Louisiana in 1762 pri

marily to curb British expansion toward New Spain.

O'Reilly

had believed that Indian allies in Louisiana would be an
excellent deterrent to any such aggressive moves.

Both

Carondelet and Gayoso agreed with this policy as there were
so few French and Spanish settlers in that vast colony.

Con

sequently, when the Treaty of San Lorenzo transferred to the
United States (England's successor in this region) areas
inhabited by the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chicksaw
nations, these governors assigned agents to live among the

5^Thomas P. Abernathy, The South in the New Nation,
1789-1819 (Baton Rouge, 1961), p. 43.
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Indians to try and keep their loyalty to Spain.

Due to

Spain's retrocession of Louisiana to France in 1803, and
the colony's purchase by the United States in that same
year, this plan proved meaningless.

However, as these

Indian nations had a population of sixty thousand, of whom
thirteen thousand were warriors, they would have presented
a formidable problem to the United States had Spain remained
in possession of Louisiana and retained their loyalty.
O'Reilly also planned to exclude British traders from
the Indian areas.
followed.

In Louisiana, this policy was generally

However, when Spain later reoccupied the Floridas,

English traders were permitted to continue their trade with
the Indians.

This was a necessity, since Spain could not

provide these people with necessities, especially with guns
and ammunition.^9
Although O'Reilly's Indian policy was not carried out
exactly as planned, and was very costly, it was basically
sound.

When everything is considered, there was really no

alternative.

Certainly Spain could not have afforded the

human and natural resources to conquer the Indians.

Alliance

with them, based on bribery through expensive gifts, was the

5®Arthur P. Whitaker, The Mississippi Question (Glou
cester, 1962, Reprint), pp. 34, 68.
59Abernathy, South in the New Nation, p. 43.
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only other recourse.

A system of alliances without gifts

would have been a complete failure.

If some Indians joined

the English because they offered more, then probably all of
them would have allied with the English, had the Spanish
offered no gifts.

This would have been disasterous.

In summary, it may be said that General O ’Reilly
proposed basically workable military and Indian policies for
Louisiana.

Considering the conditions within the Spanish

Empire at the time, it is difficult to conceive alternatives.

VIII
FINANCIAL, COMMERCIAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL
POLICIES OF GOVERNOR O'REILLY
During his brief stay in Louisiana, O'Reilly could give
attention only to the most fundamental aspects of finance
and commerce.

Primarily, he had to bring the commerce of

the colony into the framework of the Spanish colonial system.
Moreover, the unfortunate situation left by the Ulloa ad
ministration, for which Ulloa was not totally responsible,
had to be remedied before the economy could function - more
especially before any reforms could be made.
As the chief auditor, Don Esteban Gayarre had the
responsibility, under the direction of O'Reilly, for setting
the finances of the colony in order.

An overall accounting

of the financial status was necessary before the colony could
be turned over to O'Reilly's successor, Luis de Unzaga.
Although emergency measures were taken in regard to the
stabilization of finances, O'Reilly's auditor spent many
months untangling the financial maze left over from the first
years of Spanish rule, and the interim period from October,
1768, to August, 1769.
Among the immediate fiscal problems faced by O'Reilly
was the lack of adequate funds to run the colony.
been an insoluble problem for Ulloa.

This had

O'Reilly was more
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successful in meeting this issue, and by December, 1769,
the arrival of 100,000 pesos enabled him to begin to pay
off the promissory notes issued in the name of the Spanish
government during Ulloa's regime.

In 1769 alone, O'Reilly

spent approximately 260,000 pesos on the colony's needs.
An ample money supply helped quickly to establish confiO
dence in the new Spanish government.
Ulloa's financial
difficulties had taught the Spanish court the danger in
herent in a situation such as the one that had been permitted
to develop in the province in the first attempt at occupation.
Another measure taken to set the finances in order was
O'Reilly's insistence on a new appraisal of the value of the
properties being transferred from France to Spain.

These

properties included the hospital buildings, the general
store house, the guardhouse, the dwelling of the comisario,
the physician's house, the botanical gardens and the hos
pital for the soldiers.

The prior assessment under Ulloa

had been a value of 865,799(19-8) pesos fuertes. A new
evaluation changed this to 603,190(1-0) pesos fuertes. a
difference of 262,609(18-8) pesos fuertes. The old evalu-

■*"0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 4, 1769,
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors, Bk. I, No. 86, p. 21.
^Jack D. L. Holmes, "Some Economic Problems of the Span
ish Governors in Louisiana," Hispanic American Historical
Review, Vol. XLII, No. 14 (November. 1962), pp. 524-525;
Documents attached to letter from 0 Reilly to Arriaga, New
Orleans, October 7, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mis
sissippi Valley, pp. 99-101.
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ation was made on the basis of buildings at the time of
their construction.

Depreciation, O'Reilly felt, certainly

reduced them in value.

In this judgment, he was joined by

Aubry, Unzaga, as well as by Hipolite Amelot, Juan Cotilla,
Jean Valentin, Comptroller of the Navy, and, of course,
Esteban Gayarre, his auditor.^

This was another attempt by

the general to relieve the Royal Treasury of what he con
sidered undue costs.^
O'Reilly made it clear that generally the colony had no
problems in supplying itself with food.

Consequently, he

hoped to cut expenses by reducing the importation of those
items which Louisiana could provide for itself.

He found

that large quantities of food brought by Ulloa had spoiled,
thus causing considerable loss to the Royal Treasury.

He

ordered an inspection of the salt meat and flour which were
on hand when he arrived; what was spoiled he ordered dumped
into the river; whatever was still edible he returned to
Havana, as New Orleans was able to supply itself with these
items.

If, by chance, flour became short, he noted, the

^Statements attached to letter from O'Reilly to Arriaga,
October 7, 1769, ibid., pp. 99-101.
^According to Elijah W. Lyons in Louisiana in French
Diplomacy, pp. 53-54, France did not accept this evaluation.
He cites N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana Under
the French Regime (New York, 1916), Calendar, II, p. 1546,
who stated that France prevailed on Spain to pay 1,622,454
liyres. This was more than twice what O'Reilly had recom
mended, namely 603 pesos fuertes, 190 reals, 1 sueldo, or
761,537 livres. /603 pesos fuertes, 190 reals and l sueldo is
the same as the 5^03,190 (1-0) pesos fuertes referred to m the
above cited document. J
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people could make rice bread, which would serve as an
adequate substitute until flour could be obtained.

The

colony of Louisiana was given credit for the cost of the
meat and flour which were returned to Havana.-*
O ’Reilly took these actions to reduce the expenditures
of the treasury for Louisiana.

He hoped that Louisiana

would not be a liability but rather an asset to the Spanish
economy.

France had found Louisiana excessively costly,

and O'Reilly hoped to prevent the colony from becoming a
similar burden to Spain.

Unfortunately, Louisiana proved

to be almost as costly to Spain as it had been to France.
The historian, Gayarr^, claims that by the end of Spain's
era of possession, Louisiana had cost her fifteen million
dollars.^

These measures were only stop-gap ones, as the

general intended to reform completely the finances of the
colony.

Meanwhile, Contador Gayarre's auditing of the books

from the period of Ulloa's rule continued, and by December,
1769, considerable progress had been made.

O'Reilly noted

in a communique to Arriaga that:
Since bad weather has delayed my departure for
Pointe Coupee, I have been able to finish the
accounts submitted by the French comisario. M.
Bobe, for the year 1766, during which the

^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 126-127.
/I

^

Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 624.
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expenditures of the administration of this pro
vince were handled by M. Foucault. I had all
these accounts audited by Auditor Don Esteban
Gayarre, who disapproved the items shown by the
attached paper...
From the attached brief abstract Your Excellency
will see the harm that resulted to the royal
exchequer from the administration of the expen
ditures of the province having been left in the
hands of M. Foucault during the years 1766 and
1767, and the injustice and despotism with which
he was wont to proceed in everything. ... I do
not wish to imply by this that in any way is
blame to be attributed to Don Antonio de Ulloa,
to whose zeal and interest I do the justice that
it deserves. I believe that sole cause of the
irregularity to have been the desire that h3 had
on his arrival of manifesting to everyone his con
fidence and good feeling toward the French. After
wards he was not able to remedy the damage, and
to make up his mind at the end of the first year
to remove M. Foucault entirely from our admin
istration, or to compel him, as he should have
done, to submit his accounts. I know that he
asked him for them several times, but Foucault
always delayed submitting them for the reasons
that are quite evident from the attached paper
... *^
In addition to ordering this meticulous accounting for
all the monies spent by the Spaniards since their arrival in
Louisiana, O'Reilly reduced the number of treasury officials
for the colony, and made the contractor, or auditor, directly
responsible to the governor rather than the Secretario de

^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 29, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 153-156. The final cost for Ulloa's regime
was listed at 80,429 reals, cf. Grimaldi to Arriaga,
Madrid, September 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2586, L.C.
pp. 1-4.
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Despacho (Secretary of State). The treasury officials in
Louisiana were reduced from five to three in order to econo
mize.

The general recommended that a regular accounting of

all of the finances of the colony be made every six months,
in preparation for the annual report sent by the governor.
O

The governor would be assisted in this work by the contador.
Esteban Gayarre disagreed with the procedures estab
lished by O'Reilly for the contador and the treasury
officials.

Under the new rules, these men were subject

directly to the governor of the province of Louisiana.
Gayarre maintained that these rules were too rigid, and
that the contador should be directly responsible to the
Q

Minister of State in Spain.

Upon his return to Spain,

O'Reilly learned of this and he answered the objections
raised by Gayarre.

He asserted that he had made the contador

directly responsible to the governor in order to prevent any
conflict of power in the colony.

He felt that the inde

pendence of these officials under Ulloa had been an
occasion for trouble.

If the contador were directly under

the governor, a tighter control could be kept and financial
difficulties averted.^

^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 32, L.C. pp. 258-266.
^Gayarre to Grimaldi, New Orleans, May 1, 1770, A.G.I.
S.D., Legajo 2543, Docs. 107-108, L.C. pp. 720-730.
■^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, Madrid, September 4, 1770, ibid.,
Doc. 112, L.C. pp. 748-749.
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Whether or not the return of Gayarre to Spain was in
any way the outcome of this disagreement with O'Reilly is
not clear.

In September, 1770, he requested and obtained

permission to return to Spain and was replaced as contador
by Antonio Jose de Aguiar. 12

In any event, in light of the

general approval given by Charles III to all that O'Reilly
did in Louisiana, the chances of success by Gayarre in op
posing any plan established by O'Reilly were indeed remote.
In addition to Gayarre1s general auditing, Don Martin
Navarro, the treasurer, made an extensive study of the col
ony's problems.

He had notified General O'Reilly of the

heavy expenditures that would be necessary to run the colony
under the system begun by Ulloa.

Due to these projected

costs, O'Reilly had decided to reduce the number of all gov
ernmental employees.

He felt that the colony could be run
13
just as efficiently with fewer men.
The general's pen

chant for getting the same work done with fewer men was
characteristic.

Later, as will be noted, it contributed

to his defeat in the battle of Argel in Algeria.

■^Charles Etienne Gayarre, Esteban's grandson, made no
reference to this clash as a cause for his grandfather's re
turn to Spain (History of Louisiana, III, 42-43).
^Appointment of Aguiar, September 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, Docs. 113, 115, L.C. pp. 750-751.
Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, ibid., Doc. 81,
L.C. pp. 543-549.
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Just before bis departure from Louisiana for Havana,
preparatory to his return to Spain, O'Reilly reported that
the finances of the colony were in order.

The treasury re

port had been completed, and the revised financial system
was working.

These actions had been taken in light of the

circumstances existing in the colony of Louisiana at that
time and were thought by him to be those most conducive to
the service of the crown.^
The wisdom of Governor O'Reilly's emergency action in
almost immediately paying off the debts owed by the Spanish
government can only merit praise.

The rapid manner in which

the accounts of the colony were brought up to date by Este
ban Gayarre, his contador, must also elicit commendation.
His reforms for the treasury and accounting system of the
colony, however, must be more closely analyzed to see if
they were suited to the circumstances.
Gayarre disputed O'Reilly's decision to place the of
fice of contador under the governor of the colony.
O'Reilly's decision a disinterested one?
to believe that it was not.

Was

There is no reason

He knew that he would leave the

colony as soon as he had put its affairs in order.

There

fore , he could not have wanted this power for himself.
what of Gayarre?

But

Being subordinate to the governor of the

colony would certainly be a difficult thing for certain men

•^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 32, L.C. pp. 258-266.
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to bear.

Perhaps this partially explains his opposition to

the move as well as his resignation.

Be that as it may, in

view of the clashes that later occurred between the intendants and the governors over Louisiana's fiscal policy, the
subordination of everyone in the colony, in 1769, was a wise
provision.
O'Reilly's decision to reduce the number of treasury
officials in Louisiana from five to three was definitely
praiseworthy.

One of the greatest defects of the Spanish

empire was its excessive bureaucracy.^

Moreover, consider

ing the fact that the colony was a relatively minor part of
the empire, it was realistic to reduce the number of the con
tador 's assistants to an absolute minimum.
Closely connected with the finances of the colony was
the commercial potential of Louisiana.

Trade had been car

ried on by the colonists not only with France, but also with
the English, prior to O'Reilly's arrival.

In the era of

mercantilism foreign trade could not be tolerated once Span
ish power had been established in the colony.

However, in

spite of the commercial regulations that would later be en
forced, the immediate welfare of the colonists was of prime
concern to O'Reilly.

As was noted, one of the general's

first actions upon arriving in Louisiana was to issue a proc
lamation fixing food prices, thereby preventing the acquisi-

^Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York, 1966) ,
p. 109.
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tion of further excessive profits in the confusion attendant
upon his arrival.

The proclamation on food prices stipu

lated:
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, ...
Nothing requires greater attention from the government
than the equitable regulation of the prices of food
products. Having taken note of the abuses which are
being practiced in this regard, and desiring equally
that the farmer receive due recompense for his labor,
and that the soldier, the resident of the city, and
other consumers may not be tyrannized over, we have,
after taking all the steps compatible with the sincer
ity of our intentions, established this tariff of
prices,... under penalty of a fine... .
,,
September 7, 1769.
This proclamation had attached to it a list of nearly
all saleable food items, with the price allowed for each.
O'Reilly obviously did not wish to permit any abusive meas
ures to persist in the colony whereby the very necessaries
of life would be priced beyond reason.
moreover, politically sound.

Such a measure was,

It might anger the profiteers

but it would certainly please the majority.

Thus, O'Reilly

could more readily win the loyalty of Spain's new subjects.
The general's permanent trade policies, however, pre
sented another problem.

At the time of O'Reilly's arrival

in Louisiana, investigations showed that nine-tenths of the
trade in the colony was carried on by the British, and that
they employed commercial agents among the Germans along the
coast, and even in the city of New Orleans.

He had put an

^Proclamation of September 7, 1769, concerning prices,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 187, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 93-94.
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end to all of this.

This tight control of trade, he felt,

should be continued by his successors.^
In a letter to the British General, Thomas Gage, O'Reilly
made it clear that he would see to it that British ships using
the Mississippi would be protected against attacks by Indians
under his control and all necessary aid would be given to
these ships.

Nevertheless, no English ship would be allowed

to put into New Orleans nor to land goods at any place under
Spanish control.

Gage was asked to cooperate in these meas

ures .IS
A courteous reply was soon forthcoming from the British
general.

After congratulating O'Reilly on his appointment as

governor of Louisiana, he proceeded to thank him for his in
tentions to keep the Indians under control, and promised he
would see that the Indians under British rule did not attack
the Spanish.

He further promised that he would instruct

British subjects not to attempt to land any goods in terri
tory under the domination of the Spanish crown, nor to intro
duce any goods into New Orleans without permission.^
That certain limited trade was allowed by the British at
New Orleans is quite clear, and this was evidently what General

^ 0 'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17 , 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid., pp. 103-105.
1^0'Reilly to Gage, New Orleans, September 2, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., pp. 95-96.
l^Gage to O'Reilly, New York, November 18, 1769, A.G.I.
S.D., 80-1-9, No. 4, ibid., pp. 107-108.
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Gage referred to when he instructed Englishmen not to intro
duce goods into New Orleans without permission.

Elias Durn

ford, the British commander in Pensacola, offered further
evidence of the limited trade permitted by O'Reilly when he
wrote to the Spanish general thanking him for the good treat
ment accorded English traders in Louisiana.

He was particu

larly appreciative of the favors shown to a certain Evan
Jones, a merchant, whom O'Reilly had assisted while he was
trading in New Orleans.

Durnford also thanked O'Reilly for

the special port set aside for English ships.

He added that,

in reciprocity, a special port had been set aside on English
territory for Spanish ships.

These temporary arrangements

were doubtless made by O'Reilly to provide for emergency
goods which the English possessed.

The trade regulations

which he later proposed to Grimaldi and Arriaga made no provisions for any such trade reciprocity. 20
These temporary measures were used by O'Reilly until
comprehensive trade regulations could be established for the
colony.

In the meantime, the regulations of 1766 and 1768

initiated under Ulloa were in effect.

However, by October,

1769, O'Reilly saw the need for a more realistic policy and
at that time he began to press the crown for action, as had
Ulloa.

O'Reilly pointed out to Julian de Arriaga, Minister

of the Council of the Indies, that the province of Louisiana

20

Durnford to O'Reilly, undated (copy), A.G.I.S.D.,
80-1-9, ibid., pp. 79-80.
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could not survive without commerce.

Timber, the most impor

tant product of Louisiana at that time, was not then needed
by Spain.

Therefore, he recommended that Louisiana be per

mitted to sell its timber and other products to Cuba.

This

arrangement was considered most feasible, since it would not
only give Louisiana a market for its products but would also
provide the Cubans with wood for sugar crates.

The material

from Louisiana for these crates would be cheaper than any
other wood then available--an arrangement profitable to both
Louisiana and Cuba.

He also recommended that the crown col

lect the duty on this commodity at Havana.

However, no other

duties were to be charged, and trade between Louisiana and
Cuba should otherwise be free.

Louisiana could provide not

only wood for Cuba, but also corn, rice, cotton, indigo and
pelts.

Cuba, for its part, would find a ready market for

its rum in Louisiana.

A final recommendation was that only

Spanish ships should be permitted to engage in this trade
between Cuba and Louisiana. 21
A communique, containing basically the same plans sug
gested to Arriaga, was sent to the Marques de Grimaldi that
same day.

O'Reilly reiterated the needs of the colony for

commerce and again stated that free trade with Cuba would be

210'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
80-1-7, ibid., pp. “103-105. Ulloa had also recommended such
trade with Cuba, but his request was refused. Cf. Ulloa to
Grimaldi, Havana, November 27, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2585,
L.C. pp. 80-90; and Grimaldi to Ulloa, El Pardo, February 22,
1766, ibid., pp. 93-94.
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profitable to both colonies, as well as to the crown.

22

To

facilitate the trade and transportation between New Orleans
and Havana, he compiled a list of the better ships' captains
and suggested a schedule and route for ships sailing between
the mouth of the Mississippi River and the port of Havana.
He recommended that the list and schedule be printed and distributed among those who would trade with Louisiana. 23
Grimaldi received the communiques at El Pardo in Janu
ary of 1770 and soon acted upon them.

The Minister of State

granted O'Reilly permission to observe the proposed trade
arrangements between Havana and Louisiana.

He also approved

the opening of commerce with a limited number of Spanish
ports, among them Seville, Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, La
Coruna and Alicante. However, in all of this trade, Spanish
ships must transport the goods.

This concept was in keeping

with the plans for trade as proposed by O'Reilly.

In addi

tion to this, Grimaldi forbade any direct trade by Louisiana
with foreign ports or with New Spain.

Thus, with the excep

tion of the Cuban trade and the new ports open to Louisiana
trade, the decree of March 23, 1768 was, in essence, re-es
tablished for the Louisiana colonists by the Spanish Minister
99

O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 248-256.
■^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 343-344.
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of State.

24

Further clarification of these orders was spelled out
to Don Antonio Maria Bucareli, captain general of Cuba, in
a letter of instructions from O'Reilly in April, 1770.

Buca

reli was ordered to follow the procedures approved by Grimal
di.

He was warned not to admit to Cuba any tobacco produced

in Louisiana, as it was inferior in quality to that grown in
Cuba.

It is also probable that Louisiana tobacco was not

sent to Cuba to prevent competition. The colonists of Loui
siana were to be prohibited from introducing into Cuba any
goods not produced in Louisiana itself.

If anyone were

found doing this, he would be punished as the law required. 25
Here was an example of the theory of mercantilism in its
most rigid form.
Bucareli received additional instructions from O'Reilly
shortly afterwards.

The duties charged on ships from Louisi

ana were to be the same as those established and observed in
Havana in the trade with the mother country.

To promote this

commerce between Louisiana and Havana, Bucareli was directed
to convince the people of Louisiana of the advantages to be
derived from this trade.

It was O'Reilly's opinion that the

0/
Grimaldi to O'Reilly, El Pardo, January 26, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 349-352.
^O'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 3, 1770, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 165-166.
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value of goods sold to Havana by the people of Louisiana
would be about the same as the value of goods which they
bought in Havana.^6
The extent to which O'Reilly's advice was followed in
matters of trade is additional evidence of the confidence
placed in him by the Spanish court.

Practically all of his

suggestions were accepted, and no decree was drawn up dur
ing this initial period of Spanish rule in Louisiana with
out O'Reilly's advice.

This was as true of commercial mat

ters as it had been of legal and military affairs.

The ex

tent of the court's reliance upon O'Reilly is further illus
trated by Julian de Arriaga's refusal to act upon a sugges
tion of the intendant of Cataluna regarding ships returning
from Louisiana to Spain.

Don Miguel de Muzquiz, the intend

ant, suggested that Spanish ships departing from Louisiana
for Spain should first stop at the Windward Islands.

The

money they had gotten from selling goods in Louisiana could
be used to purchase products at the Windward Islands.

Arriaga

postponed his decision until O'Reilly could return to Spain
and be consulted as to the necessity for such a procedure.^7
Arriaga's action in this matter is but added proof that
O'Reilly obviously had the full confidence of the court and
the king.

2^0'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 5, 1770, A.G.I.
S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., p. 167.
^ A r r i a g a to Muzquiz, El Pardo, March 21, 1770, A.G.I.
S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., pp. 161-162.
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Most historians who have written on this period of Lou
isiana's development, even those sympathetic to the Spanish
regime, like Gayarre, have maintained that the restrictive
commercial policies set up by O'Reilly were unrealistic, and
would have been severely damaging to the prosperity of the
colony had they been strictly

e n f o r c e d . ^

Actually, the as

sertions of these historians are not so much attacks on
O'Reilly's mercantile policies as they are criticism of the
entire Spanish mercantile system.

To attempt to defend his

commercial policies would be to try to defend the entire mer
cantile system of Spain, as opposed to free trade.

Neverthe

less, under the systems existing among all European powers
at that time, the policies established by O'Reilly for Loui
siana were technically no more restrictive than those of the
British or French.

They were devised by O'Reilly to promote

the welfare of both the mother country and the colony.

He

permitted the removal of such restrictive features of mercan
tilism as he felt were needed to maintain the prosperity of
the people of Louisiana.
In his study of Louisiana, Gayarre maintains that, in
general, the mercantile system suggested by O'Reilly and ac
cepted by the Spanish court "was exceedingly foolish as it
could benefit neither the colony nor the mother country."^9

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IIIt 44-46.

29Ibid.. p. 44.
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It is indeed true that Spain had little use for Louisiana's
materials.

The colony had been developed by the French, and

naturally its products had been developed to meet the needs
of France or of her other colonies.

Furs, a large item,

were certainly useless in Spain; Louisiana's tobacco could
not compare with that of Cuba; nor could its indigo compete
with that of Guatemala or Caracas.

However, there was merit

in sending Louisiana's timber to Cuba for sugar crates and
for buildings.

Obviously, this would not have solved the en

tire problem of Louisiana's commerce.

But, in justice to the

Spanish general, it should be judged as a realistic outlet
for a considerable quantity of Louisiana's .timber.

GayarrlT

considers this as part of O'Reilly's enlightened commercial
policy.30
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the mercantile sys
tem simply could not be enforced in Louisiana without wrecking
the trade of the colonists.

Unzaga, for all practical pur

poses, ignored the regulations, and the British openly traded
with the colonists. This certainly helped the settlers, but
it is questionable how advantageous it was to Spain.

Regu

lated trade with foreign nations might have provided the an
swer.

In this way, the mother country could have solved the

problem of disposing of Louisiana's products and providing
the colonists with needed manufactures, while collecting a
tax on foreign trade.

The failure of O'Reilly's commercial

3Qlbid., pp. 44-45.
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plans for Louisiana is, therefore, not so much a personal
failure as it is the failure of an outdated system of trade.
Lack of ample population was part of the basic problem for
the Spanish in Louisiana.

Actually, the territory became

profitable only after American possession, with its influx
of vast numbers of people to the west throughout the nine
teenth century. 3-*Religion was another concern of O'Reilly.

In a society

in which church and state were as intimately united as they
were in Spanish society, O'Reilly exercised almost complete
authority over the church.

As the direct representative of

Charles III, he had the authority of the real patronato.
Here, as in other matters, the crown relied upon his advice.
One of ‘the first things O'Reilly did in the religious
field was to see that the people of the colony and the mili
tia unit had a sufficient number of priests to minister to
their needs.

In a letter to Antonio Bucareli in November,

1769, he noted that the Battalion of Louisiana needed a chap
lain, and he requested that the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba
send one who could quickly learn French.

He further stipu

lated that the Bishop grant this priest as many spiritual
faculties as possible. 32

31Ibid., pp. 624-625.
3^0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, November 10, 1769,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 106.
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Concerning the religious needs of the civilian population,
O ’Reilly conferred with Father Dagobert, the pastor of Saint
Louis Church and Vicar General of Louisiana.

Upon Father Da

gobert 's recommendation, the Spanish governor requested that
the total number of priests for Louisiana be set at eighteen.
Six were needed for New Orleans and its environs, and the
others for the rest of the colony.

O'Reilly thought well of

Father Dagobert, and noted that he was held in high esteem by
the people of Louisiana.^3
Father Dagobert had been faced with a shortage of priests
since his appointment as Vicar General of Louisiana in 1765.
When the Jesuits were expelled from the colony, he, eight
other French Capuchins, and one secular priest were left to
care for the colony's religious needs. ^

O'Reilly's recogni

tion that the eighteen priests requested by Father Dagobert
in 1769 were necessary indicates the governor's realism.

His

ability to get them indicates the complete discretion given
him by the king in handling all matters in Louisiana.

It may

be further noted that, except for the two priests assigned
to the posts of St. Louis and St. Genevieve, the remaining
sixteen were all within the area comprising the present state

33o'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, February 14, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 159-160; O'Reilly to
Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594,
L.C. pp. 261-262.
3 4 - R o g e r Baudier, A History of the Catholic Church in
Louisiana (New Orleans, 1939) , pp. 168-169.
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of Louisiana where the population was heaviest.
Education was not neglected under O'Reilly.

A royal

cedula noted the departure for Louisiana of six Capuchin
priests, who were instructed not only to promote the
Christian faith, but also to train the people in the
fundamentals of reading and writing.36
Capuchins alone in the program.

Nor were these

The Ursuline nuns, an

order which had arrived in Louisiana under Louis XV, had
for many years conducted an orphanage.

In addition, these

dedicated women cared for the education of both White and
Negro girls, gave them religious instructions and arranged
for their baptism at the church of St. Louis in New Orleans.
The hospital work previously done by the Ursulines had to
be discontinued, however, since they did not have a suf
ficient number of young women entering the convent to re
plenish their ranks. ^
The building and care of churches were also directed
and often provided by the state.

Among other things that

he did in the king's name, O'Reilly granted to the church

35Ibid., p. 180.
3^Cedula of Appointment, San Ildefonso., August 17 , 1772,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 484-485.
3?Baudier, Catholic Church in Louisiana, p. 183; Saint
Louis Basilica Archives, New Orleans, Baptismal Register.
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of Saint Louis a new bell, valued at 220 livres, and
additional money needed for sundry

i t e m s .

38

Another example of Church-State relations is found in
the instruction to Athanasius de Mezieres at Natchitoches.
The general ordered that the parish church be repaired.
Furthermore, he impressed upon the lieutenant governor of
that town the people's responsibility for caring for the
church.

Each parishioner was expected to contribute his

share to the upkeep of the building.

De Mezieres was given

the power to compel the people to support the Church, if
compulsion proved necessary.39

Accordingly, De Mezieres

and the priest at Natchitoches, Father Stanislaus, a Cap
uchin, collected a very substantial amount of money from
the parishioners.

With this they erected the first im

pressive church at the post (the old one was beyond repair),
and de Mezieres indicated

that no compulsion had been

necessary to get the people's support.^
Shortly before he was ready to depart from Louisiana,
the inhabitants of the German Coast of Saint John the
Baptist asked O'Reilly for a grant of land upon which to

3^Saint Louis Basilica Archives, Financial Record, Book
I, p. 100, item 30, 1769.
3Q

Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres, I, 27-29.

^ D e Mezieres to Unzaga, Natchitoches, February 1, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 110, No. 189, ibid., I, 237-238.
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build a church.

After examining their request and consider

ing it reasonable, the general ordered the construction of
the church and the appropriation of the land for its site.
The document issued by O'Reilly on this occasion clearly
indicates the control of the Church by the State, and the
absolute power of the State over the colonists and their
lands:
We, Captain General and Governor of the
Province of Louisiana. In view of represen
tations made to us by inhabitants of the
German coast of Saint John the Baptist, and
upon petition of Senor Michael Pauche in the
name of said inhabitants, which documents are
deposited with the government:
We shall take four acres of ground belong
ing to a party named Dubroc, for the purpose of
erecting thereon a church; said Dubroc being
single, without a family, and possessing twelve
acres of ground; provided, however, that the
community shall clear the remaining eight acres
in the same manner as the said four acres taken
for the church, and further providing that they
shall give him as many new posts as there are
old ones on said four acres.
Given at our Cabildo in New Orleans on February
21, 1770.41
As Dubroc was a bachelor, O'Reilly obviously felt he
did not need the entire twelve acres.

Since a church was

deemed necessary for the community and Dubroc's land was
apparently the proper site, it was expropriated.

It should

be further observed, however, that the community had to clear

^Document No. 17, File No. 12816, New Orleans, La.
(copy certified by Z. Milhet, clerk of court, Saint John
the Baptist Parish, Louisiana. 1896.), in Louisiana State
Museum.
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Dubroc's remaining eight acres, and had to give him new
posts to replace those on the four acres taken for the
church.

Thus, a form of compensation was made by the

colonial government for the lands taken for the church
site.

But it is clear that O'Reilly had complete dis

cretion in the disposal of any land for the needs of the
colony.

Whatever form of compensation was given to Dubroc

was given freely by O'Reilly, not as a right due to Dubroc.
The promotion of the health and general welfare of the
colony was another obligation resting upon the Spanish
general.

In addition to the proclamation fixing food

prices in August of 1769, numerous proclamations affecting
the health, welfare, and morals of the colony were issued
during his stay in Louisiana.

Some of these have already

been cited by scholars writing the history of Louisiana,
others have not.

The best known proclamation concerned

the regulations for taverns, coffee houses, boarding houses,
and billiard tables.

Gayarre" noted it and Professor Holmes

recently edited the entire document.

It levied a tax of

forty dollars per year on the coffee houses, taverns and
billiard tables, and a charge of twenty dollars per year
on the boarding houses.

This was to be used as revenue for

the upkeep of the city of New

Orleans.^

it was a reasonable

^ G a y a r r e , History of Louisiana, III, 34-35; Jack D. L.
Holmes (ed.), "O'Reilly's Regulations on Booze, Boarding
Houses, and Billiards, Louisiana History, Vol. VI (June,
1965), pp. 293-300.
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and realistic source of revenue for the city government.
Among O'Reilly's earliest proclamations, one dealt
with unfit meat in the New Orleans market places.

The

royal physician accompanying O'Reilly had noted that
diseased animals had been put up for sale in New Orleans.
Because of this, O'Reilly issued an order on August 29,
appointing Charles Tarascan as inspector of all animals
that were offered for sale as food in the various market
places and stores of New Orleans.

The decree noted that

this official, with the assistance of the lieutenant of
police, was empowered to order all diseased animals re
moved from the market places and stores.

Anyone offering

these animals for sale was fined, and if the person com
mitted a second offense, the fine was increased.^
A health proclamation of a broader nature was issued
by O'Reilly on February 2, 1770, setting the standards to
be met by doctors, surgeons and pharmacists.

The procla

mation made it clear that surgeons were always subordinate
to the doctors.

Before any surgeon was allowed to practice,

he had to pass an examination.

If the doctors did not

approve him, he would then have to work under their super
vision at the Maison de Charite or at the royal hospital

^Proclamation on Health, August 29, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2594, Doc. 71, L.C. p. 217.
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for six months.

At the end of this period, the surgeon had

to pass the examination or he would not be allowed to
practice.44
O'Reilly permitted only six surgeons in New Orleans.
In no case was the surgeon permitted to treat internal ill
nesses in the city, except under a doctor's supervision.
If the former practiced internal medicine in a rural area
he was required to follow remedies prescribed by doctors.
Furthermore, a surgeon could treat children and slaves only
with the permission of the parents or master.

A general

discussion of the medical problems of the area took place
at a meeting of the doctors and surgeons every Monday.
Surgeons were also warned that if they failed to call
in a doctor within three days after consultation and the
patient died, they were culpable.

However, the penalty was

only a fine in this instance, as was the case for any other
failure to follow instructions.

In cases where violence or

poisoning was suspected, a surgeon was required under penalty
of fine to call in the police officials.
Remedies were also subject to inspection by the public
authorities, and would be disposed of if they were not in
proper condition.

According to David L. Cowen, Louisiana

^Proclamation concerning the Practice of Medicine and
Pharmacy and Surgery, November 12, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo
181 •
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was first in pharmacy regulations in the present United
States.^5
Considering the deplorable state of medical knowledge
prevailing in eighteenth century Europe and America, O'Reilly's
regulations in this regard were a necessity.

Moreover, this

proclamation, as most of the others, indicates the high degree
of supervision prevalent within the Spanish empire.

O'Reilly

brought to the Creoles a degree of regulation which they had
t-

not previously^oxperienced.
Many of the problems faced by the Spanish governor had
to be resolved as quickly as possible.

Speed was necessary

to insure stability for the new government and loyalty to
the crown.

O'Reilly himself had often mentioned this in his

letters to Arriaga and Grimaldi.

In making an assessment

of his work in the fields of welfare, health, commerce and
finance, one must consider the general's accomplishments
from two points of view:

first, emergency regulations;

second, policy regulations.

From the standpoint of emergency

actions, it seems just to admire the man for the rapidity
and sureness of the steps which he took.

Matters such as

money supply, food supply, medical practices and immediate
religious or social needs were, as noted, promptly and effect-

^ Ibid.; David L. Cowen, "Louisiana, Pioneer in the
Regulation of Pharmacy," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (April, 1443), pp. 330-340.
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ively handled.

O'Reilly certainly proved that the Spanish

king had acted wisely when he chose the general for the task
of setting up an orderly and stable society under Spanish
rule in Louisiana.
The long range policies of O'Reilly, as has already
been suggested, were not always of such obvious merit.
Without doubt, the weakest of these long term policies was
the outdated mercantile trade policy, whose defects have
already been noted.

The fact that it was later ignored by

Unzaga, and then altered by Galvez, revealed its faults.
Moreover, O'Reilly's attempt to establish an efficient and
not too costly bureaucracy for the colony met the fate of
many such reform measures.

For this he is hardly to blame.

On the whole, his administration, nevertheless, was
excellent.

In spite of some of its long term weaknesses,

the general accomplished his basic mission.

He did establish

effective Spanish rule in Louisiana; and the colonists,
although remaining essentially French in culture, on the
whole were loyal to Spain.

There can be little doubt that

he had the ability and personality required for this par
ticular assignment.

When O'Reilly turned the government over

to Unzaga and departed for Havana, the new governor could
feel secure and begin his own task of governing an orderly
colony, already incorporated into the Spanish-American
empire.

EPILOGUE
Prior to his departure for Havana in March, 1770,
General O'Reilly completed his job of bringing order to
Louisiana.

Among the last things he did before leaving,

was to order inventories of the medical and military supplies
on hand in the colony.
A group of local civilians, assisted by Spanish officials
compiled the report on the medical supplies. Among those who
took part were M. LeBeau, a doctor, M. Duforest, a merchant,
and Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Bouligny, O'Reilly's aide
de camp. and, at that time, also adjutant major of the
Louisiana Batallion.

The supplies at the royal hospital in

New Orleans were valued at 7,500 livres.

In addition, a list

of all other medical supplies available at the various posts
of the colony was drawn up and their value estimated.
Finally, the cost to the French king for medicines during
the period from the cession of the colony to O'Reilly's
arrival, was also estimated.

The total of these two latter

items was estimated at 8,606 livres, making the overall cost
16,106 livres.

This report was delivered to Governor-elect

Unzaga in the middle of February, 1770.^

■*■0'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 15, 1770,
Doc. 9, Report on Medical Supplies, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 181.
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The report on the military supplies throughout the
colony was completed soon afterwards by two Spanish officers,
Juan Kelly and Julian Alvarez.

The most important places

listed in this report included New Orleans, the posts along
the Missouri, the German Coast, the Acadian Coast, the
Iberville Coast, and Pointe Coupee.

The supplies included

items ranging from canons to pistols, with ample powder and
shot for each type of weapon.

Most of the military equip

ment was stored at the capital city.2
By March 1, 1770, all of the governmental papers had
been transferred to Unzaga by O'Reilly.

On that day, the

general deposited with the cabildo a letter certifying the
formal transfer of government to Unzaga, and boarded ship
for Havana.

As early as December 1, 1769, Unzaga had been

appointed military and civil governor of New Orleans and its
environs, but it was not until March 1, 1770, that he assumed
full control of the

colony.-*

On November 29, 1769, O'Reilly had informed Unzaga
that pursuant to his instructions from the Minister of the
Indies, Julian de Arriaga, he would first appoint him governor
of New Orleans and would then turn over to him the direction
of affairs for the entire colony once Louisiana had been

20'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 24, 1770,
Doc. 12, Report on Military Supplies, ibid.
^Records and Deliberations of the Cabildo. Book I, Part
II, pp~ 16-17 (9a-9b) , New Orleans, March 1, 1770.
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stabilized.

Shortly after this, the general had written to

Antonio Bucareli, the captain general and governor of Cuba,
notifying him of Unzaga's appointment and of the subordination of Louisiana to Cuba in civil and military affairs.

A-

When he arrived in Havana, O'Reilly clarified for
Bucareli the status of Louisiana in its relationship to Cuba.
The Spanish general informed him that Louisiana was subject
to the same laws as all the king's colonies in the West
Indies.

Spanish was to be the official language; appeals

from Louisiana would be sent to a special tribunal to be
established at Havana for that purpose; appeals from Havana
were to be sent to the Council of the Indies; and finally,
all appointments to offices in Louisiana would require the
approval of the captain general of Cuba.

Louisiana was, in

effect, a dependency of Cuba in both civil and military
affairs
After terminating his duties on the island of Cuba,
O'Reilly returned to Spain in June, 1770.

He was welcomed

by the king, receiving from him a gift of 2,000 pesos in
recognition of a task well performed.

He was publically

^O'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, November 29, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 231-233; O'Reilly to
Bucareli, New Orleans, December 10, 1769, Dispatches of
the Spanish Governors. No. 88, p. 23.
^O'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 3, 1770, Dispatches of the Spanish Governors, Bk. I, I, No. 95, 32-34.

253
honored in the Gaceta de Madrid, which noted that the king had
commended the general for fulfilling all of the duties assigned
to him.

His work in Louisiana was cited as a special example

of his accomplishments.^
O'Reilly's record in Louisiana was extraordinary, con
sidering that he spent but little more than six months there.
During his brief stay, he had taken possession of the colony,
tried the rebel leaders, established Spanish law in Louisiana,
and had incorporated the colony into the Spanish imperial
system.

It had not been without cause that the king compli

mented him on a "task well-done."
Shortly after his return to Spain, O'Reilly took up his
former position as military governor of Madrid, while still
keeping his post as Inspector General of Infantry.

In his

capacity as Inspector General, he established a military
academy at Avila for the training of officers.
to model the Spanish army after that of Prussia.

He planned
Unfortu

nately, owing to the adverse attitude of the military caste,
opposed to any change in the system, and to O'Reilly's later
fall from favor at the court, this institution eventually

°Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros Anos de domxnacion espanola,
p. 301 (Citing the Gaceta de Madrid of June 18, 1770T"!
~
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fell into disuse.?
Although busy with his new military academy and the many
tasks incumbent upon him as Inspector General and military
governor of Madrid,the general was still much involved in
the affairs of Louisiana.

In his role as Inspector General,

and as the special supervisor of the militia in the Americas,
he closely scrutinized the functioning of the army in Louisi
ana.

Anyone familiar with the task of an inspector general

in a m o d e m army will realize the minutiae with which, of
necessity, O'Reilly concerned himself.

Matters of discipline,

promotion, retirement, deployment of forces, tactics, and
every possible problem connected with the military were
constantly brought to his attention.
One problem, typical of those sent to O'Reilly from
Louisiana for his consideration, concerned the procedure for
troop retirement.

Governor Unzaga was informed by the general,

in reply to his request for a decision, that the Royal Decree
of October 4, 1766, concerning retirement, which applied to
all of the king's troops outside of Louisiana, was also to
govern retirement in that colony.

The Minister of the Indies,

7Ibid., pp. 303-305; Arthur S. Aiton, "Spanish Colonial
Reorganization and the Family Compact," Hispanic-American
Historical Review, Vol. XII (August, 1932), p. 278. It is
also evident that O'Reilly's foreign origin played a part
in the resistance offered by the Spanish officer corps to
his reforms. The clashes between the Aragonese party and
the foreigners who were in favor at court at this time,
bear this out.
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Don Julian de Arriaga, acting for the king,had given O'Reilly
to understand that this was the regulation for Louisiana as
well as for the rest of the

empire.^

A similar problem was solved for Unzaga regarding pro
cedures to be observed in the event of the absence or death
of military officers in Louisiana.

The general notified

Unzaga that in the event of the absence or death of the
colonel of the Louisiana Batallion, he was to be replaced by
the lieutenant colonel; the lieutenant colonel's post would
then be assumed by the sergeant major of the batallion, and
Q
so on down the chain of command.
In the spring of 1773, an interesting incident involving
military discipline came to O'Reilly's attention.

Lieutenant

Colonel Francisco Bouligny, who also held the position of
sergeant major in the Louisiana Batallion, had imprisoned
several deserters for a period greatly in excess of the normal
legal penalty.

Although all of the men were first offenders,

five had been given six year prison terms, and two had
received terms of five years.

The prescribed penalty of the

Royal Ordinances, Title Eight, was only four months imprison
ment, and confiscation of pay for that p e r i o d . A t the same

^O'Reilly to Unzaga, Madrid, September 24, 1773, A.G.
I.P.C., Legajo 181.
^0*R e i l l y to Unzaga, Madrid, November 5, 1773, ibid.
■^Colonel Francisco Estacheria to O'Reilly, New Orleans,
May 18, 1773, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2661, L.C. pp. 17-21.
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time, O'Reilly received a communique from Governor Unzaga
stating that Bouligny, because of this breach of military
law, had been removed from his command and placed under
house arrest. 11 Immediately, the general informed Don Julian
de Arriaga of the situation.

O'Reilly recommended leniency,

as he felt that Bouligny had acted out of ignorance and not
out of malice.

Moreover, he regarded house arrest as

adequate punishment, and recommended that Bouligny be
restored to his command.

He noted, however, that the

lieutenant colonel should be warned to carefully observe
the king's decrees in the future.^

Arriaga accepted these

recommendations without alteration.

In consequence, he wrote

to Unzaga to release Bouligny and to restore him to his com
mand.

At the same time, however, the governor was ordered

to reprimand the lieutenant colonel, and to warn him to ob
serve all royal decrees with exactness in the future.

Unzaga

notified the Minister of the Indies that he had promptly
carried out these orders.13

■^Unzaga to O'Reilly, New Orleans, May 20, 1773, ibid.,
pp. 8-9.
1^01Reilly to Arriaga, Madrid, December 13, 1773,
ibid., pp. 24-25.
•^Arriaga to Unzaga, Madrid, December 19, 1773, ibid.,
p. 27; Unzaga to Arriaga, New Orleans, May 30, 1774, ibid.,
pp. 28-29.
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One curious aspect of this incident is that it involved
O'Reilly's former aide de camp.

Was his recommendation of

leniency for Bouligny influenced by personal motives, or by
a sense of justice?

In the absence of any available docu

ments concerning this, it is impossible to be sure.

However,

when O'Reilly was in Louisiana, he had acted more severely
when confronted with a similar failure to carry out orders
of an even less critical nature.

His sharp censure of the

commander of the Post of St. Louis, M. Desmaseilleres, for
failing to carry adequate supplies, and for distributing gifts
to the Indians in excess of the allowed amounts, stands out
in sharp contrast to his leniency toward Bouligny.^

Yet,

in fairness to the general, it must be noted that complete
obedience to orders was far more necessary in 1770, when
Spanish rule in Louisiana was still so new, than in 1773,
when it had become secure.

It is quite possible that a com

bination of policy and personal motives could be attributed
to O'Reilly in Bouligny's case.

Moreover, Bouligny's house

arrest certainly served as a harsh humiliation for a Spanish
officer whose only offense noted by Colonel Estacheria and
Governor Unzaga was the one under discussion.

It may well

have been an adequate punishment.
An example of a disciplinary decree of a general nature
involving Louisiana was the one forwarded by O'Reilly to

l^Cf. above, Chapter VII, pp. 201-204.
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Governor Bernardo de Galvez in 1781.

The shortage of soldiers

in the colony and the distance from Spain seemed to indicate
to Galvez that some mitigation of the military code was in
order.

However, the Spanish court was not of the same

opinion.

In a letter to the Louisiana governor, General

O'Reilly noted that despite the distance of the colony from
the mother country, there could be no departure from the mili
tary code.

Any soldier found guilty of a crime must be

punished as were Spanish soldiers throughout the empire.
O'Reilly based his ruling on a decree issued by Don Jose de
Galvez, Minister of the Indies at that time.^
Problems of a personal nature concerning military per
sonnel in Louisiana also came to O'Reilly's attention.

Not

long after his return to Spain, he received a request from
Unzaga for a leave for Carlos de Grandpre, adjutant of the
Louisiana Batallion.

Grandpref wished to absent himself from

the colony for eighteen months, in order to settle family
business in France.

O'Reilly recommended the granting of

the leave, but noted that twelve months seamed adequate for

■^0'Reilly to Bernardo de Galvez, Cadiz, December 6, 1781,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181. Had this decree been issued when Bou
ligny violated the military code, it is quite possible that
his punishment would have been more severe.
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Grandpre^s purposes.

When the leave was granted by the

Minister of the Indies, Julian de Arriaga, it was with
O'Reilly's recommendation regarding the twelve month limi
tation.-^

The rather intricate proceedings surrounding the

authorization of temporary absence from duty is noteworthy.
Not only did the Inspector General have to concern himself
with all such matters, but in the cases cited, the Minister
of the Indies made the final decision.

However, as indi

cated in these instances, O'Reilly's suggestions were in
variably followed, and it is likely that the approval of
the Minister of the Indies was generally a mere formality.
Appointment of young men as cadets in the Spanish army
also required the approval of the Inspector General.

Dona

Petit Coulange, widow of Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Villement
of the Louisiana Batallion, asked Governor Unzaga to obtain
permission for her son to attend a military academy in Spain.
The appointment had to come from the king, but before
granting the appointment, Charles III had referred the
petition to the Inspector General for his approval.
certificate of appointment, the king noted:

In the

"The Inspector

General, Count of O'Reilly, has agreed that it is proper to

^Unzaga to O'Reilly, New Orleans. March 1, 1771,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2661, L.C. p. 59; 0 Reilly to Arriaga,
Madrid, June 5, 1771, ibid., pp. 61-62; Arriaga to Unzaga,
Aranjuez, June 20, 1771, ibid.. pp. 63-64.
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grant this favor to some natives (of Louisiana) so that they
may live with satisfaction and grow to love the (Spanish)
nation.
These instances involving the Inspector General indicate
the extensive scope of O'Reilly's jurisdiction.

Even after

he had given up direct command of the militia in Louisiana
(Which had been vested in him by a special commission), he
still exercised considerable supervision in that colony in
his capacity as Inspector General.

After 1777, he was

relieved of his special control over the Louisiana militia,
but as late as 1783 he continued to exercise a kind of super
visory power in the military affairs of the colony in virtue

1ft

of his office of Inspector General. °

After 1770, O'Reilly's main interests lay in Spain.
Both in his special capacity in the army\ and as governor of
Madrid, Andalusia, and Cadiz, successively, he was involved
both in military and political affairs.

■^Decree

of Charles III, Madrid, September 3, 1774,

ibid. , p . 191.
180'Reilly to Bernardo de Galvez, Puerto de Santa Maria,
August 7, 1777 (Document informing Galvez that O'Reilly no
longer had supervision of the Louisiana militia), A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2534, L.C. p. 126; Document referring to O'Reilly as
Inspector General, April 10, 1783, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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During the general's tenure as military governor of
Madrid, his name was linked, although vaguely, with a certain
rationalistic philosopher, Olavide-Samaniego, who was brought
before the Inquisition.

When the philosopher was later

questioned about his views by officials of that body, it
became known that O'Reilly had attended some of his lectures
in Madrid.

According to a well known Spanish historian,

from that day forward the general never again enjoyed the
complete confidence of Charles III.19
This incident may possibly have hurt O'Reilly's career,
but there is no doubt that intrigues in which he later
became involved severely damaged his ascendancy.

The general

was an ally of the Marques de Grimaldi, leader of a clique
of foreigners in power at court.

This group constantly

struggled to maintain itself against its chief opponents,
the Aragonese Party, composed of native-born Spaniards, and
led by the Conde de Floridablanca, who was allied to the Conde
de Aranda.

While O'Reilly was still governor of Madrid, he

was on relatively good terms with Aranda.

In a letter to

O'Reilly, the Conde de Aranda made the mistake of critizing
Charles III.

For motives that are still unclear, O'Reilly

•*-9Rodriguez-Casado, Primer os anos de dominacion espanola,
In light of O'Reilly's continued prominence in both military
and court affairs, this assertion of Rodriguez-Casado seems
open to question.
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passed on this information to Charles III.

If O'Reilly's

intent was to lessen the influence of the count, he succeeded,
at least temporarily.

Immediately upon receiving this news

from the general, the king dismissed Aranda from the court
and sent him to Versailles as ambassador.

After this inci

dent, according to the Spanish historian, Rodriguez-Casado,
O'Reilly was viewed as a dangerous political enemy of the
Aragonese party, and the chief obstacle to their rise to
power.

It is quite possible that if the general had remained

aloof from political affairs, he might well have survived the
fall of Grimaldi in 1775.

That same year, however, O'Reilly

was removed from court; but it must be noted that his
departure was more specifically related to matters other
than the fall of Grimaldi or those events already mentioned.

20

Two other incidents soon followed, the first of which had
little influence on O'Reilly's career, but the second one
most certainly enabled the general's opponents to persuade
Charles III to dismiss him from the court.
The first incident involved a jurisdictional clash with
the influential Duke D'Ossun.

The Guardias Espanolas, an

elite corps stationed in Madrid, was commanded by the Duke.
Some of its officers had committed certain crimes, and the
general wished to have them tried and punished in his courts.

20Ibid., pp

303-304.

He maintained that in spite of Military Article Number 14,
Title 11, of the Royal Military Ordinances, he, as governor
of Madrid, had jurisdiction over these men.

For his part,

the Duke claimed that O'Reilly was obliged to release any
officer of the Guards, whom he arrested, within forty-eight
hours.

The duke contended that the men were subject to him

self as the colonel of the Guards.

To defend his position,

O'Reilly wrote the Secretary of War, the Conde de Ricla,
citing the General Orders of the Army, Article 1, Title and
Tract 6, which gave a governor jurisdiction over all mili
tary personnel within his province.

He ended his plea by

noting that he did not desire to increase his power, but
wished only to preserve the good order of the service.

21

The duke also wrote Ricla, referring to the Royal
Military Orders, Articles 1 and 2, which, he held, gave to
the colonel of units as the Guards, complete jurisdiction
over his officers.

He conceded that the men were subject

to the Bandos de Gobierno issued by a governor, but this
was the limit of the governor's powers.^2
Within a short time, the dispute had been referred by
Ricla to the king, who gave his decision.

Charles III decided

21o'Reilly to the Conde de Ricla, Madrid, January 18,
1775, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo, 2858, folios 1,2.
22o'Ossun to the Conde de Ricla, Madrid, February 17,
1775, ibid., folios 2,4.
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that the captain general and governor of Madrid, O'Reilly,
had jurisdiction over all military personnel within his
administrative area.

But, he also decreed that it was his

royal intention that in cases involving the officers of the
Guardias Espanolas and other such units, the colonel of the
unit be given jurisdiction.

The governor could only hold

these men for forty-eight hours, and then turn them over to
the colonel.

He noted, as D'Ossun had admitted, that the

only exception was in cases involving the violation of the
Bandos de Gobiemo which the governor might issue.^
Whether or not this reflected the gradual loss of
influence by O'Reilly, is open to question.

It may merely

have been the logical settlement of this matter of juris
diction.

However, be that as it may, it is interesting

from another point of view.

The entire episode casts some

light on O'Reilly's character.

As he himself protested, he

had no personal ambition to increase his powers.

Assuming

this, it leads to another explanation of his actions.

He was

convinced that the regulations gave him jurisdiction, and
he feared abuses by the colonel of the Guards who might fail
to punish guilty men, especially when serious crimes were
r\ t

involved.

Possibly, O'Reilly believed that strict enforce-

22

JThe King to Ricla and D'Ossun, Aranjuez, March 31,
1775, ibid., Legajo 2858, folios 4,5.
2^0'Reilly to Ricla, Madrid, January 18, 1775, ibid.,
Legajo 2858, folios 1,2.
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ment of regulations was necessary, whatever else might be
involved.

If so, it may have reflected his natural tempera

ment, or it may have been the result of the type of duties
imposed on him as Inspector General.

His actions indicate

a certain inflexibility of character and make him more readily
understood.

This inflexibility may explain, at least in part,

his decision not to grant either pardon or commutation of
sentences to the rebel leaders who were condemned to death
in New Orleans.
The second incident, certainly a factor in precipitating
O'Reilly's political downfall, was his disastrous campaign in
North Africa in July, 1775.

Spain and Morocco had been major

rivals since the days of the conquest of the Kingdom of
Granada in 1492.

However, a prolonged period of peace be

tween the two nations seemed likely when, on May 28, 176 7,
the Sultan of Morocco and Charles III signed a treaty demili
tarizing their adjacent coastal areas.

Unfortunately, it

was not long before England, Spain's perennial enemy, per
suaded the Moroccans to renew their attacks on the Spanish.
By 1774, the depredations against Spanish shipping forced
Charles III to prepare for hostilies against the Sultan.

It

seemed that war might be postponed when the Sultan sent word
to Charles III that he had ordered his subjects to cease
their attacks.

But, the Dey of Algiers, practically inde

pendent of the Sultan, refused to cooperate and continued
to harass Spanish shipping in the Mediterranean.

Due to
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these continued forays, the Spanish king had no choice but
to continue preparations for war.25
When Charles III first considered the appointment of a
general to lead the forces against the Dey of Algiers, he
turned to the famous Spanish general, Pedro Ceballos.^
The latter estimated that in order to carry out his mission
effectively, he would need forty thousand troops.

This

number seemed excessive to the Spanish monarch, who turned
to O'Reilly for advice.

The Irishman convinced the king

that with a force of only twenty thousand men he could make
a successful landing at Argel and subdue the Algerians.
Consequently, O'Reilly was chosen to lead the expeditionary
force.

This was, incidently, the first time that O'Reilly

had commanded an entire army.^
Preparations for the invasion of Algiers began as soon
as the king made his choice of a general.

The force prepared

by O'Reilly consisted of twenty thousand troops, three

OC

/

^•JGayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287; RodriguezCasado, Primeros anos ae dominacidh~espa~nola, pp. 305-309.
^ G e n e r a l Pedro Ceballos had led the Spanish forces
against the Anglo-Portuguese colony which had been erected
along the border of the Province of La Plata, and had forced
them to withdraw from their positions. Cf. Isabel Rennie,
A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill, 1937), p. 77.

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287; RodriguezCasado, Primeros anos de dominacitm espaiiola, pp. 309-316.
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hundred and fifty transport ships, and forty ships-of-theline.

He also had ordered a fleet of flat boats to serve as

landing craft.

The armada left Spain on June 23, 1775, and

landed at the mouth of the Jarache River in Argel on July S.
Unfortunately, the fleet of flat boats did not arrive on
schedule.

O'Reilly, nevertheless, decided that he had to

proceed with the campaign.

Consequently, he sent ten

thousand of his men ashore in whatever small vessels were
available.

These troops, under the command of the Marques

de Romana, were expected to establish a beachhead and await
the arrival of the remainder of the troops led by O'Reilly.
However, the Marques was drawn into battle by the Dey's
forces, and he elected to disregard his instructions and
pursue the enemy.

The Dey's men led Romana's troops into a

trap and killed four thousand, and among the dead was Romana
himself.

Meanwhile, O'Reilly's forces landed and joined

battle.

Although the general and his troops fought bravely

(O'Reilly's horse was twice wounded in the battle), he felt
compelled to withdraw to the safety of the ships.

His men

had become demoralized by their heavy losses, and it seems
that O'Reilly feared a mutiny.
he chose to retreat to Spain.

28

—

Rather than risk a collapse,

28

Antonio Ferrer del Rio, Historia del Reinado de Carlos
III en Espana (Madjrid, 1856) , Vol> III, pp. 119-121; RodriguezCasado, Primeros Alnos de dominacion espanola, pp. 309-316;
Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287-288.
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Upon his return to Madrid, O'Reilly was the target of
attacks from his foes within the military and at the court.
Through the Gaceta de Madrid, the military hierarchy de
manded his removal from power, since he, the Inspector
General, had disgraced the army by his failure in Algiers.
O'Reilly's old political foes joined in the attack, and the
king was placed under heavy pressure.

In partial deference

to these groups, Charles III sent O'Reilly to the Chafarinas
Islands off the coast of Morocco, ostensibly to secure their
defenses. 29

The real motive seems to have been to remove

the general from the court, at least temporarily.^
O'Reilly returned from these islands late in 1775, and
was transferred from the governorship of Madrid to that of
Andalusia.

He retained his position as Inspector General of

Infantry, in spite of the opposition from most of the mili
tary caste.

This clearly indicates that he still enjoyed

considerable influence wi*"h the king.31

29xhese islands, three in number, are in the Mediter
ranean Sea, off the northeast coast of Morocco. Their names
are Congreso, Isabel II and Rey. At one time they were a
haven for pirates.
30Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola,
History of Louisiana, II, 288; Ferrer deT Rio, Carlos III,
III, 121-135.
31-Aiton, "Spanish Colonial Reorganization and the Family
Compact," Hispanic-American Historical Review, pp. 278-279
(Citing D'Ossun to Vergennes, October 2, 1775, Archivo
General de Simancas, Papeles de Estado, Legajo 1715, pocket
578, folios 4-7); Del Rio, Carlos III, III, 135.
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Although he had suffered a serious loss of prestige,
O'Reilly still remained a factor in court intrigues.

In

1777, he allied himself with the Conde de Rubi and Luis de
las Casas in an attempt to unseat the Minister of State, the
Conde de Floridablanca, who as leader of the Aragonese party,
had unseated his opponent, the Marques de Grimaldi, the
leader of the foreign party.

O'Reilly and his associates

were unsuccessful and were removed from positions of
influence at court.

De Rubi was sent to Prussia as ambassa

dor; de las Casas became governor of Oran; and O'Reilly was
appointed governor of Cadiz.

O'Reilly was also deprived of

his control over the militia in America.

His appointment

to Cadiz marked the virtual end of his influence in state
affairs.^
The general served as governor of that maritime province
from 1779 until his retirement from active life in 1786.

When

he left that post, the cabildo of Cadiz presented him with a
memorial attesting to his seven years of noteworthy service
to the community.

He was praised for improving the finances

of the city, for promoting public works, and for his concern
for and promotion of the welfare of the people.

O'Reilly

answered in kind, thanking the cabildo and the citizens for

32Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola,

p. 317; Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 288.
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their cooperation during his administration and expressing
his gratitude for their

t e s t i m o n i a l .

In 1788 Charles III died.

33

With his protector no longer

on the throne, O'Reilly was banished to Galicia where he
lived in complete retirement on a small pension.

It was not

until the Wars of the French Revolution that he again entered
public life in Spain.

Upon the death of General Carlos

Richardos-^ in 1794, O'Reilly was recalled to duty.

Although

still out of favor at court, he was recognized as one of
Spain's most outstanding generals.

He set out to take com

mand of the Army of the East Pyrenees early in 1794.

How

ever, his advanced age was against him, and he contracted a
fever.

On March 23, 1794, at the age of 72, he died at

Bonette, near Chinchilla (Murcia), before leading his army
into combat.35
Thus ended the career of one of the most remarkable
soldiers of fortune of the eighteenth century.

He had risen

from a lowly cadet in the Spanish army to one of the highest
military positions, and had been elevated to the ranks of the

33A c tas de Cabildo de Archivo Municipal de Cadiz, Vol.
CXLII, folios 98-101, 110, cited in Jack D. L. Holmes,
Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi
Valley, 1789-99 (Baton Rouge. 1965), p . (T
3^Carlos Richardos was a member of the military caste,
one-time Inspector General of Cavalry, and, at the time of
his death, commander of the Army of the East Pyrenees.
35Ant_onio Ballesteros y Berretta, Historia de Espana, V
(Barcelona, 1948), 389; Gayarre, History of Louisiana. II.
288-289.
------- -------------
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nobility with the title of count.

In spite of the constant

friction with the native-born faction in the court, his deeds
of service to the king won him the permanent good will of
Charles III.

Even his exile to Galicia, upon the death of

that monarch in 1788, did not remove his name from influence
among the military, as was evidenced by his recall to active
duty in 1794.
To judge O'Reilly's place in the history of the Spanish
Empire is difficult.

Few men stand out to such a degree

that they merit the title of "great".

It would seem that

Alejandro O'Reilly belonged to that category of men, who,
although they stand far above most in their achievements,
nevertheless fail to reach the summit.

Re was an able mili

tary man and administrator, who, on occasion, committed
serious errors.

Nevertheless, he was one of the most faith

ful officials of Charles III.

He rose from the ranks,

through merit, and became Inspector General of the Royal
Infantry.

In that position he excelled.

He served as a

"trouble-shooter" for the king, both in Havana in 1764, and
in Louisiana from 1769 to 1770.

His administration in

Louisiana demonstrated a high degree of competence.

Not

only did he pacify the province, but he also laid the
foundation for the able Spanish rule that continued without
serious interruption until the retrocession of Louisiana to
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France in 1803.
achievement.

The Code 0 1Reilly was in itself a remarkable

Although his name evoked little love among the

French in Louisiana, he won their respect for the enforce
ment of law and order.
In the last analysis, Alejandro O'Reilly deserves a
place alongside such colonial governors as Bernardo de
Galvez in Louisiana and Antonio Maria Bucareli in Cuba.
Without him, and other such loyal and energetic officials,
the implementation of the colonial reforms of Charles III
would have been impossible.
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